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INTRODUCTION
The pervasive standard form contract is as American as Mom,
apple pie and Mitsubishi. Notwithstanding the considerable print
devoted to these contracts in legal literature,1 a systematic, compre-
C. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, SUPPLEMENT 1984 § 559 (1984) [hereinafter
KAUFMAN, CORBIN SUPPLEMENT]; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362-
71 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION]; Braucher, The Uncon-
scionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 337 (1970); Davenport, Uncons-
cionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAM[I L. REV. 121 (1967); Dugan,
Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1 (1980) [hereinafter Dugan, Good Faith]; Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts-An
Introduction, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1307 (1978) [hereinafter Dugan, Standardized Form
Contracts]; Dugan, The Application of Substantive Unconscionability to Standardized
Contracts-A Systematic Approach, 18 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 77 (1982) [hereinafter
Dugan, Systematic Approach]; Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE
L.J. 757 (1969); Hillman, Debunking Some Myths about Unconscionability: A New
Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1981); Holmes, Interpreting
an Insurance Policy in Georgia: The Problem of the Evidentiary Condition, 12 GA.
L. REV. 783 (1978); Johnson, Unconscionability and the Federal Chancellors: A Survey
of U.C.C. Sec. 2-302 Interpretation in the Federal Circuits During the 1980"s, 16
LINCOLN L. REV. 21 (1985); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Kornhauser, Unconscionability
in Standard Forms, 64 CAIF. L. REV. 1151 (1976); Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) [hereinafter Leff,
Unconscionability]; Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700 (1939) [hereinafter
Llewellyn, Book Review]; Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 1 (1969) [hereinafter Murray, Unconscionability]; Rakoff, Contracts of Ad-
hesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1983); Rotkin, Standard
Forms: Legal Documents in Search of an Appropriate Body of Law, 1977 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 599 (1977); Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63
VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 931 (1969); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1971) [hereinafter Slawson, Democratic
Control]; Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21 (1984) [hereinafter Slawson, New
Meaning]; and Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U.
PrT. L. REv. 359 (1970).
[Vol. 17:323
19871 ADJUDICATING STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
hensive American theory of standard form contracts2 is inchoate and
in some disarray. The rub lies with American courts, which are
egregiously mired in a Serbonian bog of 19th Century classical contract
theory with its notions of free-will, presumed assent, duty to read,
and bound-by-what-you-sign judicial nonintervention, and amoral,
formal, external rules. This persistent retreat to the fold of classical
contract formalism denies the modern reality3 and discrete significance
of standard form contracts which typically do not conform to the
classical bargained-for exchange model. Simply dragging up the straw-
man of monolithic classical contract law and giving it a good intel-
lectual whipping does not, however, necessarily engender a new
comprehensive theory for standard form contracts.
Indeed, for the past half century, courts and scholars alike have
subjected classical contract theory to a considerable and unrelenting
attack. A circumspect review of this eclectic scholarship demonstrates
that no consistent thread or common core of ideas exists. Although
these amorphous analyses, explications, criticisms, and auguries can-
not be pigeonholed into any useful rubric or classificatory scheme,
it is possible to discern some consistent order, that is, a spectrum
2 Regarding terminology, this article interchangingly uses standard form contracts,
standard (form) terms, and standardized terms. What is meant are pre-formulated terms,
mostly but not necessarily printed, which are drafted by a party who normally enters
into numerous contracts of this kind. The terms are drafted to be used in numerous
or at least several contracts. Though there may be some negotiating in a few cases,
the terms are regularly offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and not made subject to
bargaining. Compare Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1177, with Dugan, supra note 1, at
1316, who use almost the same elements for a definition. Some authors speak of
contracts of adhesion rather than standard form contracts. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra
note 1, at 1177. This term emphasizes not so much the standardized nature of the
terms but the way of introducing them into a contractual relationship. As the term
contracts of adhesion has led to inquiries into the circumstances of contract formation,
respective market position of the parties, and other choices available to the adherent
party, the term is not used here for reasons of clarity. This article will inter alia show
that the law has to develop rules for standard form contracts without depending on
such factual circumstances at the time of contracting. Factual inquiries necessarily breed
unpredictability.
I One American scholar has estimated that more than 99% of all contracts today
are standard form contracts. Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at 529.
However, that number may be exaggerated if one counts workday cash sales. See
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1189 n.57. Certainly the major part of credit sales and higher-
value transactions are made on the basis of standard form contracts. The same is true
in Germany. Compare also KAUFMANN, CoRBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 566. In
their worst appearance, standard fine print terms were described quite impressively in
the last century. See DeLancey v. Inc. Co., 52 H.H. Reports (Shirley Vo. IV) 581,
587-88 (Rockingham, June 1873).
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of ideas. This spectrum might be illustrated graphically by drawing
a straight line with ideas from the deontological right on one end
and the deontological left on the other. Movement on this contract-
theory spectrum would be from private to public law, from contractual
freedom to status to statism, from fault to no-fault liability, from
the discrete to the relational, and from the rugged individual utilitarian
to the altruistic community of shared values.
More specifically, this spectrum would consist of the following
theories or models of contract law commencing with the deontological
right: (1) wealth-maximization efficiency model; 4 (2) Pareto efficiency
model;5 (3) rugged individual assent model; 6 (4) promissory model;'
(5) doctrinal classical bargain model;8 (6) formal contract construction
4 This model equates efficiency with wealth maximization, that is, the efficient rule
of contract law maximizes the dollar value of goods and services traded in the market.
See, e.g., Shavell, Damages for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980).
1 Under a Pareto efficient contract model, neither party can be made (subjectively)
better off without consequently making the other contracting party (subjectively) worse
off. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 65-100 (2d ed. 1977). This and
the previous model substitute efficiency for promise as the basis of contractual liability.
For a general discussion on the difficulties and ambiguities in these two models, see
Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HorsTRA
L. REv. 591 (1980).
6 Under this model, private contract duties not assented to are suspect, if not
presumptively invalid, because the preferred basis of private law duties is contract. See,
e.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); B. SEEGAN, EcONOMIc LIBERTIES
AND TIE CONsarrtrrON (1980); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm.
L. REv. 947 (1984). Rugged individualism is promoted by scholars who would belong
to a group like the Federalist Society. See, e.g., Berns, The Constitution, Community,
and Liberty, 8 HARv. J.L. & Pu. POL'Y 277 (1985); Graglia, The Constitution,
Community, and Liberty, 8 HARv. J.L. & Pum. POL'Y 291 (1985). For a flavor of this
philosophy, see Dean Holland's description to his fellow Feds of the Crits in A Hurried
Perspective on the Critical Legal Studies Movement: The Marx Brothers Assault the
Citadel, 8 HARv. L.J. & Pun. POL'Y 239 (1985).
See, e.g., C. FREED, CONTRACT AS PROMSE (1981). Fried's basic thesis is that
"the moral principles embodied in promise underlay, and continue to underlie, contract."
Additionally, he advances that doctrines and lacunae of contract law are consistent
with the promise principle. For a proposal that consent is the justification for enforcing
contracts, see Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLum. L. REv. 269 (1986).
8 Another rubric for this model might be the Harvard model. The classical theory
of contract was initially molded by Langdell in the first American casebook (contracts)
which together with a summary was published in 1871. The theory was further elaborated
by 0. W. Holmes in broad jurisprudential strokes in his lectures on contracts in TiB
COMMON LAW (1881), in meticulous detail by Williston in 1920 in the first major
American legal treatise (contracts), and enshrined in our law by the first Restatement
of Contracts in 1933. See generally Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering -
Case Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 540-60 (1976).
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model; 9 (7) realist neoclassical model;10 (8) adhesion model;" (9) no-
fault tort model; 12 (10) "contort," "tortract," "conequitort" model;'"
(11) socialization of law, secular functional model; 4 (12) relational
9 This model simply builds upon the classical model by advocating the solving of
all contractual disputes through rules of contract interpretation and construction. See
generally Part III A of this article.
1o This model emerged through the literary efforts of Karl Llewellyn, Edwin Patterson,
Lon Fuller, Arthur Corbin, and Grant Gilmore, culminating in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the second Restatement of Contracts (completed in 1979). See
generally Symposium: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
631-899 (1982).
1l Professor Edwin Patterson introduced into the legal vocabulary the phrase "con-
tract of adhesion." Patterson, The Delivery of Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L.
Rnv. 198 (1919). The seminal article appeared a few decades later. Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629
(1943).
,2 This model has nearly, but not quite, been seriously proposed. See e.g. J. O'CoN-
NELL & R. C. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND ch. 1 (1976); O'Connell,
A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident
Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 898 (1985).
11 It was perhaps Grant Gilmore who first showed that the boundaries between
contract and tort were eroding, the result of which Gilmore (in his usual irreverent
style) suggested would be a first-year course called "Contorts." G. GLMORE, THE DEATH
OF CONTRACT 87-96 (1974). See also Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J. L. &
COMMERCE 193, 194-02 (1982); Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REv.
163 (1983). Tort may be abandoning its great flywheel of fault for strict liability,
compensation systems, and no-fault; fault, in turn however, is being absorbed into
contract. Contract, using fault notions, seems to be embracing equitable principles such
as the exciser concept of unconscionability and the additur concept of good faith. The
result of this mix is three varieties of contract breach: (1) the amoral classical contract
breach with Hadley-limited damages; (2) the bad-faith breach for which not only
compensatory but all nonpunitive damages proximately caused by the breach are re-
coverable; and (3) the fraudulent or oppressive breach for which punitive damages are
allowed. The proper label for this remedial expansion would be "conequitort." See
generally Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 332 (1980); Holmes, A Contestual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith
Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prr. L. REv. 381 (1978). On the amoral
nature of classical contract remedies, see Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies
- Efficiency, Equity and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 111 (1981).
4 The 20th Century philosophical struggle of the sociological jurisprudes, legal
pragmatists, and American legal realists to replace "transcendental nonsense" with a
functional approach to law has met with some success. In the process of greatly
influencing the general conception of contract law, 0. W. Holmes, Pound, Jerome
Frank, Llewellyn, Felix Cohen, Lasswell, and McDougal, among others, have perhaps
reduced that conception to an expression of societal preferences. The process of sec-
ularizing law has killed Langdell's idea that-law is an exact science, a system of logically
discovered, scientifically deducible principles. See generally Berman, The Secularization
of American Legal Education in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 27 J. LEGAL
ED. 382 (1975); Cohen, Transcedental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLIrM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Trubek & Plager, The Place of Law and Social Science
in the Structure of Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL ED. 483 (1985); Woodward, The
Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REv. 689 (1968).
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social contract model; 5 (13) altruistic community (Crits) model; 16 (14)
administrative-regulatory (Leviathian) model; 7 and (15) nihilist de-
constructionist model.'" This spectrum may be overly simplistic as
The primary proponent is Ian Macneil, who distinguishes the one-shot, discrete
transaction model of the classical theory from the relational transaction model. The
latter recognizes that many contract transactions involve long-term dealings between
parties in which the parties' needs will change over time due to changed circumstances.
He proposes a "relational approach" which permits the parties' rights and duties to
be overtly adjusted during the relationship. "By contract I mean no more and no less
than the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange into the future."
I. MAcN Ei, TnE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4 (1980). Perhaps the most accessible expla-
nation is Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 854 (1978).
See also Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 483 (1985); Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 545 (1985). For the application of some of Macneil's relational ideas,
see Lightsey, A Critique of the Promise Model of Contract, 26 Wm. & MARY L. Riv.
45, 73 (1984) (applying Macneil's ideas to build an "exchange-relationship" model of
contract that "seeks to heighten the interaction between contract and community.");
Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown
of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 390-97 0986); Speidel, Court-Imposed
Price Adjustments under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. L. Rnv. 369, 400-04
(1981). See infra text accompanying note 362.
16 Using nonutilitarian ethics dependent on the principle of altruism, a Crits Krieger
(devotee of critical legal studies) sees the appropriate model not as an individualistic
one in which persons voluntarily accept individual obligations, but rather an altruistic
model in which obligations to a "community" may supercede or modify those voluntarily
undertaken. See, e.g., Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REv. 563, 616-48 (1983). For a most readable explanation, consult Feinman,
Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829 (1983). For an insider
and outsider interpretation, compare Schlegal, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated,
and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 391 (1984) with Burton, Reaffirming Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the
Left, 36 J. LEGAL ED. 358 (1986).
11 See, e.g., Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd - Consumers and the Common
Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349 (1970) [hereinafter Leff, Unconscionability
and the Crowd]; infra notes 33 and 50; and infra Part III(B)(1).
IS Perhaps the reductio ad absurdum of the Crits-crowd is "deconstruction" (a
critique of formalism), that is, all legal principles, doctrines and rules are indeterminate.
As such they do not and cannot decide legal controversies, even the most simplistic.
For the contract model, see Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract
Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985). Deconstruction and a blitz on liberal political thought
are said to be the two main themes in Critical Legal Studies literature. Tushnet,
Introduction, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1984).
Others have seen the Critskrieg as Puff (a "paper dragon, presently confined, as it
were, to the law reviews"). See Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1203, 1205 (1985).
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other models, such as the ethical model, 9 historical model, 20 skills
model, 2' and even the storytelling model22 do exist.
Given such a spectrum of diverse, often internecine models, one
must approach this polemic with a grain of salt. One can hardly
blame the courts for rushing to the sure, firm ground of the tau-
tological classical contract model when handling standard form con-
tracts. But let us be honest: as we move along the spectrum there
are bits-and-pieces worth saving and others which need to be dis-
carded. To paraphrase Milton, 23 truth has been torn into a thousand
pieces; ever since Christopher Columbus Langdell set sail in 1870 to
discover a new theory of contract,2 4 contract scholars have been
continuously picking up bits and pieces. That process continues here.
The purpose of this article is rather simple, extracting a new theory
of standard form contracts from the good bits of the spectrum of
"old" ideas and combining them with some fresh rethinking. For
something fresh, the authors choose to examine the German law on
standard form contracts. The authors have tried to remain neutral
observers but in extracting the best from the spectrum of ideas one
necessarily states a view-in this instance, one of pragmatic compro-
mise. Thus, this article will cull and identify elements from the
spectrum specifically concerning standard form contracts and compare
them with the German approach. This process is undertaken with a
Perhaps all contract models would lay claim to being the ethical one. Even efficiency
is said to be an ethical goal. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). For an excellent
discussion of the moral and ethical basis of selected contract models, see Kornhauser,
The Resurrection of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 184, 185-90 (1982).
20 See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); L.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
(1974); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); M. J. HORWTrz, THE
TRANSFORuATION OF AMEmCAN LAW (1977); Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study of
the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975); Presser, "Legal History",
or the History of Law.: A Primer on Bringing the Law's Past into the Present, 35
VAND. L. REV. 849, 865 (1982).
21 Contracts can be perceived and taught in terms of component lawyering skills,
such as legal perspective, legal information, legal dialectics, legal operations, and fact
management. See generally Holmes, Education for Competent Lawyering - Case
Method in a Functional Context, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 535, 560-80 (1976).
2 For an account of the lawyer as storyteller, see Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA
L. REv. 1 (1984).
J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA.
• The story of Langdell's quest has been told by many. For one account see Holmes,
Education for Competent Lawyering - Case Method in a Functional Context, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 535, 540-60 (1976).
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perspicuous and pragmatic eye to formulating a new systematic,
comprehensive theory of standard form contracts.
Considering the German and the American legal systems, German
law is an appropriate choice. The economic background of the two
societies is comparable, and use of standard form contracts in both
countries widespread. As a result, courts in both countries developed
rules for standard form contracts from traditional contract law. The
two contract laws have their differences, but they share the basic
notion of freedom of contract. In both countries, this notion is
restricted only by requirements of securing conditions of contract
formation which allow the assumption of equivalence of the bargain
(absence of incapacity, duress, fraud, mistake, and the like). Sub-
stantive control, through concepts like illegality or violation of public
policy, exists in both systems as a tool which is rarely used regarding
classic bargained-for contracts. The result of this practice is that the
courts enforce classically formed contracts without any investigation
as to the adequacy of the exchange involved.
Traditionally, oberservers view American law as common law (judge-
made law) and German law as codified law. There are, however,
similarities in the way American and German law approach the issue
of standard form contracts. In dealing with standard form contracts,
courts in both legal systems necessarily assume the responsibility of
making law. To venture beyond the limited scope of judicial control
that is applied to classic contracts, courts in both countries employ
the same basic concepts of interpretation and construction of contract
language, assent, and direct substantive control.
In contrast to Germany's codified law tradition, the German law
on standard form contracts contains elements of judge-made law.
The German Civil Code, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB], 21 does not
address standard form contract terms at all. The courts thus developed
a distinct body of rules for standard terms based upon three principles:
the concept of assent, the invalidity of legal transactions which exploit
one party to give the other a disproportionate advantage or which
violate public policy, 26 and the general requirement of good faith in
contract performance. 27
11 BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB], January 1, 1900 (German Civil Statutes).
26 BGB § 138 states:
(1) A transaction that offends good morals (die guten Sitten) is void.
(2) Void in particular is a transaction whereby one person, with exploitation
of the necessity, thoughtlessness or inexperience of another, is promised or
[Vol. 17:323
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The advent of the German consumer protection movement brought
about the codification of this judge-made law with the enactment of
the Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbed-
ingungen [AGBG]28 [Standard Contract Terms Act] in 1977. As far
as it contains contract law, the AGBG mainly restates the earlier
court rules. 29 There is, nonetheless, an innovation in AGBG § 13
which gives consumer protection and trade organizations the right to
seek injunctions against unfair standard form contract clauses.30 If
successful, the challenged contract clause can no longer be used.
Traditional (classical) contract law in both the United States and
Germany justified the enforcement of contractual obligations without
evaluating the material fairness of the exchange, relying on a formal
guaranty of fairness. This guaranty presumed that since the parties
are free to bargain and assent to their contract, they have made their
own decisions about the adequacy of the exchange. Based on notions
acquires, for himself or for a third party, economic advantages whose value
exceeds the value of his own performance to such a degree that, under the
circumstances, there is a striking disproportion between them.
27 BGB § 242 states:
Obligations shall be performed in the manner required by good faith, with
regard to commercial usage.
21 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschdftsbedingungen (Act Con-
cerning the Regulation of the Law of Standard Contract Terms) [AGBG], December
9, 1976 (BGBI I 3317), modified through Act of March 29, 1983 (BGBI I 377).
9 For the general development see PALANDT, KOMENTAR zum BURGERLICHEN GESTZ-
BUCH, Heinrichs, Einf. vor AGBG § 1 Annot. (2)(b) (45th ed. 1986); Dawson, Un-
conscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARv. L. Rv. 1041, 1103-21 (1976)
(concerning the time before the AGBG); Sandrock, The Standard Terms Act 1976 of
West Germany, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 551-56 (1978) (a history of the AGBG).
30 Sec. 13 provides:
Action to cease and desist and to repeal
(1) Persons using, in standard contract terms, provisions that are invalid
according to Sec. 9 to 11 of this law, or recommending their use for contractual
relations, are subject to an action to cease and desist and, in the case of
recommendation, also to an action to repeal.
(2) Actions to cease and desist and to repeal may be brought only:
1. by incorporated associations whose purpose as specified in their
articles of incorporation include acting in behalf of the interest of
consumers through education and advice, if they have as members [other]
associations active in this range of goals or at least seventy-five natural
persons;
2. by incorporated associations promoting trade interests; or
3. by industry and trade boards or craft boards.
(3) The associations specified in paragraph 2 no. 1 may not bring actions to
cease and desist and to repeal if standard contract terms are used against a
merchant and if the contract is made in the context of his business, or if
standard contract terms are recommended for use exclusively among merchants.
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of free will and judicial nonintervention courts did not second-guess
the parties decisions. When standard form contracts transformed the
character of contract formation from bargain to adhesion, however,
the courts of the two countries reacted to this change in similar
fashion. 3' The only difference is that German courts went a step
further in acknowledging that they were adjudicating something dif-
ferent from traditional bargained-for contracts. This article, inter
alia, will compare the American and German experiences in developing
a body of standard form contract law and will evaluate what possible
law American courts might fashion prospectively.
Section One of this article commences with some basic assumptions
or premises which underlie the subsequent analyses. These assump-
tions clarify and restrict the scope of this study. For example, no
inquiry is made into the existence and importance of standard form
contracts or whether they are different from bargained-for contracts.
Neither does this article address any need for a different legal treat-
ment of standard form terms. The question is not if there should be
a different body of rules for standard form terms, but how the rules
should differ. The second and third sections, on German and Amer-
ican law respectively, provide the requisite information from which
to draw conclusions concerning the possible development of a new
American theory. The fourth section culls and describes those con-
clusions.
More specifically, the second section begins with an introduction
to German contract law, showing the status of standard form contract
law in the German legal system. Thereafter, any discussion of German
law basically follows the order of the AGBG in addressing the rules
concerning standardized contracts. Section Two goes back in time to
11 They did so quite independently of each other. The court decisions are usually
not at all affected by foreign law, but notice the exceptions. Lenhoff reports a decision
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York which was
influenced by German law in his article Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TULSA
L. REV. 481, 489 (1962). In scholarly writing, there were some contacts mainly through
American authors who knew European law. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 29 at 1041;
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 1072,
1082-88 (1953) (dealing with choice-of-law provisions in adhesion contracts); Rotkin,
supra note 1, at 615-20 (describing the Swedish regulation). One German writer familiar
with Anglo-American law is Kotz, who wrote a commentary on the German Statute
dealing with standard form contracts for the Munchener Kommentar. It does not appear
to have had much of an influence on his annotations, though; see also GOTrFRIED
RAISER, Dm GERICHTLICHE KoNmToLLE voN FORMULARBEDINGUNGEN IM AMERIKANISCHEN
UND DEUTSCBEN REcHT (1966).
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outline how German courts approached the problems currently ad-
dressed by AGBG provisions. This historical discussion is useful since
the American law of standard form contracts will, as this article
demonstrates, have to be developed by the courts. In addition, the
historical discussion is necessary because the AGBG does not resolve
all questions of how to treat standardized contract terms. Although
the Act contains several provisions invalidating certain standard form
terms, there are questions of how these different provisions interrelate.
The historic roots of these provisions are important since the rules
now found in the AGBG have been developed from prior judge-
made law which applied different rules independently of each other.
These once independent rules are now, however, incorporated into
one Act and must be adjusted to each other.
Section Three examines the American rules of contract construction
as applied to standard terms. Regarding assent and substantive con-
trol, the section first presents some scholarly viewpoints, then ad-
dresses American cases and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Such a task is undertaken with an eye toward forming some proposals
for a comprehensive theory of standard form contract law.
The fourth section proposes a new theory for adjudicating standard
form contracts under American law. These proposals are reached by
taking elements and pieces of structure found in Section Three and
rearranging them in a way influenced by the German law presented
in Section Two. The result is a proposal for a simplified and man-
ageable theory for standard form contracts with the goal of en-
couraging fair drafting. Though the proposal ventures outside American
legal terra firma, it is not meant as a wholesale transplantation of
foreign law but rather as a synergistic attempt to combine the best
elements found in American scholarship and case law with the best
from Germany.
I. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
To clarify subsequent analyses, this section states why standard
form contracts require a treatment different from traditional con-
tracts. Each statement here could be subject to scrutiny and analysis
per se. However, since it has been often suggested that standardized
terms need special rules,32 the emphasis now should be placed on the
form and content of these rules.
32 This is discussed in a number of articles; see, e.g. K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW
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ASSUMPTION ONE: Standard form contracts are a necessary part
of today's business life. 31
Standard form contracts are the consequence of mass production and
the hierarchical structures of the businesses which distribute services
and products.14 They assure that numerous, relatively detailed con-
tracts can be formed every day in a swift and efficient manner.
Additionally, standard form contracts assure uniformity and quality
since sales persons and customers are not allowed to formulate con-
tract terms and conditions. 31 Some argue, however, that the body of
auxiliary contract provisions provided by the fine print of standard
form contracts could also be provided by legislative or judge-made
law. It is suggested the benefit of such mandated law might be a
guarantee of greater fairness in mass contract provisions since the
drafting party may not formulate terms in his own self-interest. 36
While this view may hold some merit, standard form contracts are
used in Germany even though there exists a legislated body of dis-
TRADMON, supra note 1, at 600-06. Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at
533-39; probably the most impressive in its succinct and fundamental approach is one
of the earliest, Kessler, supra note 1.
31 That necessity is recognized today at least by legal scholars. See Kessler, Freedom
of Contract, supra note 1, at 632; Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra note
1, at 350-51; Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at 532.
34 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1220-25, shows quite clearly that standardized contracts
have deeper roots than just the efficiency rationale of mass "products" of any kind.
He gives a detailed exposition of how the development of complex bureaucratic entities
in the realm between the single individuum and the all-encompassing state (and market)
led to standard terms as a manner to control these complex, hierarchically structured
institutions. Accord, Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1, at 24-29. In a more embryonic
form, Friedrich Kessler earlier pointed to the relation between large scale enterprises
and standard form terms. See Kessler, supra note 1, at 631. But Rakoff, supra note
1, at 1220-25, shows the relation between the internal structure of those enterprises
and the use of standard form terms. See also Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 731 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, What Price]
and Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra note 17, at 350-51, for the relation
between standardization of mass production and standard form contracts. Cf. Issacs,
The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917). Issacs puts standardization
of contract terms into the larger perspective of the development "from status to
contract."
11 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1222-23.
6 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1247, 1258-61 (Rakoff votes for a presumption of
unenforceability of "invisible" contract terms; as long as the need to enforce them is
not shown, the "background" law applies instead. See also text accompanying notes
49 and 50 infra.
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positive contract law provisions to step in where the parties did not
supply their own terms. The German practice indicates that special
standardized terms have value notwithstanding a dispositive contract
law which gap-fills missing terms.
The benefit of standard form contracts lies in the fact that often-
times standard terms provide the opportunity for rules better adapted
to the special needs of particular bargains. Standard terms typically
become relevant only after contract formation. In such instances, it
is often easier for the non-drafting party to understand terms specially
formulated for the bargain when he later examines his contract rights
and duties (at least where the terms are properly drafted). In addition,
the average contracting party finds the rules of law difficult to
understand, and hard to transfer from general and abstract legal
formulations to specific and sometimes unique circumstances. For
example, many issues have more than one reasonable solution, and
a contract term that deviates from dispositive law is therefore not
necessarily wrong or worse than what the law would imply without
such a contract term. Finally, standard terms can develop new types
of contracts not yet recognized by any mandated law, thus providing
contrasting flexibility. Standard terms, therefore, are justified even
if dispositive rules of law are available to fill the gaps of the parties'
agreement . 7
ASSUMPTION TWO: In order to serve their function of making
transactions more expedient, standard form contract terms, as a rule,
are not subject to bargaining and are not read by the submitting
party.38
31 Rakoff takes the position that the implied rules of law serve the same purposes
as standard terms in a fairer manner. It appears that he needs this thesis to justify his
basic assumption of unenforceability of standard terms. But this is certainly not realistic.
The average consumer would have difficulty in finding the law and transforming the
necessarily general and abstract formulation of a legal rule into a concrete one for his
particular business. See KAUFMANN, CoRanN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 582. What
would be sufficient, in turn, are standard terms which are felicitous in their substance
to the implied rules of law but are in their formulation adapted to the particular deal.
If Rakoff restricts his theory to the notion that modem distribution and business do
not depend on the enforceability of every standard term, he may be correct because
instead of invalid terms the law can substitute enforceable terms. But if his theory that
modem distribution does not depend on the standard form terms has a connotation
that standard terms are unnecessary, he is wrong. More important than the line of
reasoning leading to the principle of unenforceability of standard terms, however, are
other parts of Rakoff's theory. For more details see infra Part III (B)(3).
I This assumption is stated quite clearly by Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1,
at 504.
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This assumption addresses economic reality, as opposed to what
the law traditionally requires.3 9 The Supreme Court addressed this
point when it stated:
It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called
upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it
when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. If this were
permitted, contracts would not be worth the paper on which they
were written.40
American law persists in support of a "duty to read, ' ' 4' the result
of this duty being that a party is bound by what he or she signed
even if he or she did not read the contract document. While German
law also puts the risk of not reading the contract on the signing
party, an exception exists where a standard form contract is involved. 42
19 See Kornhauser, supra note 1, for the relation between different economic models
and contract theory. -
- Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875).
4 The duty-to-read position is probed in W. YOUNG & E. HOLMES, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 237-48 (2d ed. 1985). See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT)
OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932); Sanger v. Dun, 47 Wis. 615, 620, 3 N.W. 388, 389 (1879);
Smith v. Standard Oil Comp., 227 Ga. 268, 180 S.E.2d 691 (1971) (failure to bring
magnifying- glass and to read contract before signing does not affect the enforceability
of the contract); In re Estate of Olson, 447 Pa. 483, 488, 291 A.2d 95, 98 (1972) (in
absence of fraud, failure to read is an unavailable excuse); Omer v. T. W. Phillips
Gas & Oil Co., 401 Pa. 195, 197, 163 A.2d 880, 882 (1960) (inability to read without
magnifying glass not disclosed); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins.
Co., 503 Pa. 300, 305, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983) (speaking about the consequences of
a "failure to read"); Fivey v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627, 52 A. 472 (1902);
but see Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. Co. v. Adeeb, 15 Ga. App. 831, 84 S.E. 323 (1915)
(plaintiff not bound by release she signed; plaintiff did not speak English and did not
understand nature of the contract); Bixler v. Wright, 116 Me. 133, 138, 100 A. 467,
469 (1917) (no enforcement when party who signed could not read and trusted another
who misread the document to him); Journal Co. v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.
Corp., 188 Wis. 140, 146, 205 N.W. 800, 803 (1925) (no duty to read insurance contract
for person seeking reformation of contract). See also Calamari, Duty to Read - A
Changing Concept, 43 FoRDnAM L. REv. 341, 341-49 (1974); Cf. Macaulay, Private
Legislation and the Duty to Read - Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1966) (market functioning and
legal policy considerations concering the question of how far a duty to read should
extend).
42 See generally 1 MUNCHENER KOMMENTAR zUM BUJRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, ALL-
GEMEINER TEM, Kramer § 119 annot. 36-42 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MuKo COMMEN-
TATOR]. Where no standard form terms are concerned, the risk is on the party who
does not read the contract document, although he may avoid the contract for mistake
if he had wrong assumptions about what terms are contained in the document. This
may be hard to prove, though, and may in case of negligence lead to liability for
breach of contract. When the document completely differs from what was planned,
there may not even be a contract because mutual assent is lacking.
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The American rule needs to be reconsidered as its underlying ra-
tionale is invalid for standard form contracts. A duty to read implies
a possibility to read; where, however, standard form contracts are
concerned this possibility may not exist. 43 Even if the contract is
formed by signing the document that contains the standard terms,
reading the terms and trying to negotiate them would normally (a)
exceed the time that both parties can reasonably spare for the business,
and (b) exceed the competence and authority of the agent who rep-
resents the drafting party. 44
ASSUMPTION THREE: When standard form terms are not con-
trolled by the process of bargaining, the law has to step in and
exercise control. In stronger words, contract law using presumed
assent should not grant a license to bully (to hold a legal gun to)
another through the imposition of substantively unfair standard terms.45
American decisions often quote the principle that the courts will
not re-write a contract for the parties. 46 The idea behind such a
principle is that the parties know their needs best. Contract law
41 See Dugan, Systematic Approach, supra note 1, at 78-81. Sometimes, it may even
be physically impossible to read the terms before formation of the contract. For instance,
insurance policies are usually tendered only after the contract has been formed. See
Patterson, supra note 11, at 198-02; Holmes, supra note 1, at 791-92; Slawson, Dem-
ocratic Control, supra note 1 at 540; see also Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y.,
58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954) (both cases involve airline passenger insurance
purchased from vending machines; policy terms not upheld where it was unlikely that
insured was able to read and understand policy); Robinson v. United States Benevolent
Soc'y, 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. 211 (1903) (where application and policy differed,
insured had right to rely on application); see also Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1185. According
to Rakoff, traditional law is based on the opportunity to read; however, not even that
is true. The traditional law works sometimes with the fiction of being able to read the
contract terms.
- See supra note 34.
41 The stronger language might be attributed to a Critskrieger. See supra note 16
and the article by Kennedy cited therein;. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra
note 17, at 351, emphasizing legislative regulation; in accord with Leff is Rotkin, supra
note 1, at 613-15.
46 Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758 (1953);
Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218, 26 A. 446 (1876) (Carpenter, J.); J.R. Simplot Co.
v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 96, 350 P.2d 211 (1960); In re Cohen's Estate, 23 Inl. App.
2d 411, 163 N.E. 2d 533 (1960); cf. 3 A. CoRmN, CoRBiN ON CONTRACTS, 95-95 (1960).
But see J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS, 743 (1974) who calls it a poorly kept
secret that courts nevertheless make contract terms; Murray, Unconscionability, supra
note 1, at 6.
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secures the freedom and profit of the contracting parties by allowing
the parties to control their contractual rights and duties; no one is
presumed to be another's keeper. Where the ability of control through
a self-determined decision is absent due to incompetence (incapacity),
coercion (duress), 47 or a misrepresentation impairing the basis for the
autonomous decision (fraud), even traditional contract law does not
enforce the contract. The same must be true where standard terms
of a contract are provided in a manner that denies the submitting
party control over the content of the terms. Such is true because in
the modern business setting in which standard form contracts are
employed, it is not "the parties" who write the contract, but rather
it is one party writing the contract and the other party giving blanket
*assent thereto. Courts cannot rewind the clock by insisting on applying
anachronistic rules adapted to a different process of contract for-
mation. When the assumption of equal bargaining power tied to free-
will assent can no longer be made, the rules derived from that
assumption have to be changed. 48
Such judicial control of standard form terms does not impose an
undue or uneconomical burden on the conduct of business because
it is up to the drafter to formulate clauses which will be approved.4 9
47 For this concoction of the concept of duress, see Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 293, 295-98 (1975).
48 Indeed, there is never equal bargaining power. Concepts like that are a stan-
dardization or typification and therefore always over and/or underinclusive.
, Judicial control is not the only possible way to deal with standard terms. It would
be possible to subject them to nothing but traditional contract rules and let market
forces secure a way to make the clauses subject to bargaining and to limit the drafters'
choice of formulating terms in favor of the user. Competition among various manu-
facturers that invokes contract provisions could be one way. An example are car
manufacturers' warranties which become a factor in sales techniques from time to time.
See Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at 548. Another way could be pressure
from consumer protection organizations. However, this paper opts for judicial control
which is tailored especially for standard form contracts for several reasons. Epstein,
supra note 47, at 293-94 points to two reasons for the traditional rule of enforcing
contracts as they are: a utilitarian and a libertarian. Similarly, there is a utilitarian and
a democratic reason to subject standard terms to a particular judicial control instead
of relying on market forces of the type just mentioned. One thing is that they are not
likely to work. Competition on one side of the market is not the same as control
through bargaining force by the side of the market opponents. It is the choice of the
drafting entities if they want to make terms subject to competition or not. They may
as well choose uniform trade. association terms as in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors
Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). Consumer protection organizations have even
in their high times not been able to serve as a counter-weight. Their reach was not
far enough to represent sufficient bargaining power without invoking administrative or
legislative action. Furthermore, it is doubtful if they have a legitimate mandate to
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ASSUMPTION FOUR: To do justice in individual cases by enforcing
a standard term is not the most important court function in handling
standard form contracts terms. The process of review should en-
courage the drafting of non-objectionable clauses which comport ab
initio with basic notions of fairness.5°
It is costly and ineffective to control standard form terms by
adjudicating them ex ante in every individual case. When dealing
with mass standardized contract terms, the law should serve more
than an enforcement function. In such instances, the law should
encourage performance of contracts through the understanding that
enforcement of contracts is to be expected from the courts. To
accomplish this goal, the law has to give guidance on which clauses
will pass the courts' review. After a clearance process, it should be
predictable which terms will and will not be enforced. Such pre-
dictability gives the drafter the ability to formulate terms which can
be expected to be enforced. A predictable law thus insures that
standard form contracts can serve their function of furthering fast
and effective contract formation.5' Without this predictability, the
review of standard form contract terms does more harm than good,
impose their control on the submitting party. They are self-imposed representatives.
The courts, on the other hand, have at least the legitimation of the democratic structure
to exercise power when they apply substantive control of contract terms, though for
judicial power, this democratic legitimation is weaker than for other branches of power.
Perhaps the best argument for judicial control lies in the fact that one contracting
party has asked the court to be a neutral arbiter by invoking the court's jurisdiction.
0 Leff sees danger in a case-by-case solution of dealing with standard terms and
votes for a more detailed legislative solution. It appears, however, that a lot depends
on how courts deal with standard terms. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra
note 17, at 354- 57.
11 See Spanogle, supra note 1, at 936, who surmises that predictability of an unfairness
control increases the stability of contracts. Testifying in support of the UCC's un-
conscionability provision (Section 2-302), Llewellyn noted how courts without any
predictable law twist harsh contract clauses to achieve justice:
Case No. 1 comes up. The clause is perfectly clear and the court said, 'Had
it been desired to provide such an unbelievable thing, surely language could
have been made clearer.' The counsel redrafts, and they not only say it twice
as well, but they wind up saying, 'and we mean it,' and the court looks at
it a second time and says, 'Had this been the kind of thing really intended
to go into an agreement, surely language could have been found,' and so on
down the line.
1954 Report of the New York Revision Comm'n, Leg. Doc. No. 65, at 178 (1954);
see also Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 1.
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by obstructing the very purpose of standardizing contracts to avoid
the burden of deciding upon appropriate terms in every single business
deal.
ASSUMPTION FIVE: To adjudicate standard form contracts in an
appropriate manner, the law's answer must also be standardized.
It exceeds the capability of the courts to subject every contract
incorporating standard form terms to an individual inquiry into the
particular circumstances of the formation and operation of the con-
tracts terms. It has been said that it is easier to find one attorney
who can skillfully draft a form for a million contracts than to find
a million persons who can draft one satisfactory contract each. 2 It
is likewise easier to find one court that can make a good decision
guiding the formulation of a million standardized contracts than to
find a million judges who can appropriately adjudicate as many
contracts by giving consideration to the particular circumstances of
contract formation and performance of each contract. 3
ASSUMPTION SIX: It is the law's, and therefore the courts', role
to offer a suggested dispositive law for those standard parts of
agreements which are not important enough to be subject to specific
bargaining and individualistic formulation.14
Traditional contract law left it to the parties to formulate all the
terms of their bargain. In a time of relatively few and relatively
simple business deals, the possibility of such self-restraint of the law
existed. Today, most contracting parties do not have the time and
skills to formulate an agreement that provides for all possible prob-
lems. Given the complexity of modern products, manufacturing
processes, and distribution systems, a complication of adequate con-
tract provisions naturally follows. This complication makes it harder
for the parties to provide appropriate provisions on their own without
512 Holmes, supra note 1, at 795.
11 How far the courts' influence really reaches will be affected by factors other than
the predictability of the law. It may be more costly to change a standard form than
to lose a few cases. Those factors depend on how the submitting parties and the public
behave. Additional remedies like the claim that can be brought under AGBG § 13 in
Germany (see supra note 30) may increase the costs of not complying with the law
and thus give an additional incentive to do so. But the first step has to be to make
a clear decision on what are properly drafted terms.
' Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 6.
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investing unreasonable amounts of time and effort. To meet this
need, the law should assume a service function in addition to its
enforcement function. A body of dispositive law should supply ad-
ditional provisions where the parties did not agree on their own terms.
Even where one party provided the additional terms in the form of
standardized clauses, this service function of the law is needed. In
such cases, the law should decide whether the standard terms comply
with basic notions of fairness. Such a decision, however, is not
possible without a notion of what the proper terms are. If standard
terms are found inadequate, the law should provide suitable terms;
under modern conditions it is illusory and against the interests of
both parties to invalidate the whole contract because of the failure
of individual standard terms.
Common law courts have always been active lawmakers, either
covertly or avowedly, subject only to accountability of the appeals
process. These courts do more than declare and enforce immutable
principles and rules of law or standard contract terms. In fashioning
the dispositive law to evaluate fairness of standard terms, courts
should follow a "community-sense" of shared values, that is, a large-
scale communal sense of fairness. This communal or societal sense
of appropriate standard terms seeks an intellectual and pragmatic
mean between rampant individualism and a gravid legislative (or
bureaucratic) "Leviathan." As Professor Peter Linzer explains:
Judges represent the state, but they are somewhere between a
faceless bureaucracy and the individual. If they admit that they are
lawmakers, if they face the need to change basic concepts of private
law when times call for change, if they attempt to decide the issues
in light of an ideal of community in a sense of rejecting an every-
man-for-himself approach, they offer a partial solution to the col-
lision between statism and rampant individualism." In a societal-
sense of fairness, common law courts are another's keeper and the
race is not necessarily to the swift regarding the use of mass-
standardized contract terms. 5
II. GERMAN LAW ON STANDARD FORM TERMS
A. Status of the Standard Contract Terms Act (AGBG) in
German Law
The Standard Contract Terms Act (AGBG) is the special source
of standard form contract law in Germany. It is not, however, the
11 Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. Rsv. 323, 424 (1986).
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exclusive source. In addition to the provisions of the AGBG, other
rules of private law, such as fraud, incapacity, illegality, and mistake
apply to.standard form contracts. Moreover, the AGBG itself refers
to other statutory provisions to determine the fairness or unfairness
of contract terms. 56
The status of the AGBG can only be understood in the broader
context of German private law as a whole. German law is typically
classified as codified law, as opposed to the English/American com-
mon law. While this codification has never been perfectly systematic
and comprehensive, subsequent developments have further under-
mined this posture.17
The German Civil Code, the BGB, is the core of codified German
private law,58 but it is not the exclusive source. The "Handelsge-
setzbuch" which came into force together with the BGB in 1900,
serves as the Code of German Commercial law. These two major
Codes have been supplemented by a growing number of statutes (e.g.,
Abzahlungsgesetz (Installment Sales Act); Versicherungsvertragsgesetz
(Insurance Contracts Act)). As the need appeared for more detailed
regulation certain subjects were taken out of the Codes and addressed
in more specific statutes. For instance, important legal forms of
companies are dealt with in the Aktiengesetz (Stock Companies Act)
and GmbH-Gesetz (Limited Liability Corporation Act). Many new
developments, however, have never been incorporated into the Codes.
Instead, specialized statutes like the "Strassenverkehrsgesetz," dealing
with strict liability for car accidents, have been enacted. The AGBG
36 See, e.g., AGBG § 9(2)(1).
57 The German codification is of relatively recent origin. The idea of codification
as a general program of systematic and comprehensive enactment of law is a result of
"The Enlightenment" and the adherent school of "Natural Law" in the 17th and 18th
centuries. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW,
136-37 (1977). In Germany, however, the idea was not put into effect until the late
19th century, a fact due mainly to the delayed national unification of the numerous
German feudal states. F. BAtR, BiBLiorRAPHY Or GERMAN LAw 1 (German Association
of Comparative Law ed. 1964). Prior to this nationwide codification of law, only some
of the German states had enacted their own codes (e.g.; Prussia in 1794). Of predominant
influence on the codification was the ius commune, the continental common law, which
was applied in the majority of the states and was systematized by legal scholars. This
law was based on the Roman Law as contained in Justinian's Digests and received in
medieval Italy. Thus, the codification has a recent basis in case and scholarly-made
law.
58 For a general overview of German private law as contained mainly in the BGB,
see N. HoRN, H. KOTZ & G. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 71-169 (1982); see also G. WEicK, COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Lecture Materials, 21, 23-24 (1985).
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is thus only one of many specific statutes concerning legal subjects
which developed simultaneously with changes in modem life.
The growth of case law proved an even more important segment
in the process of undermining the ideal of codification. Almost im-
mediately after the codes entered into force, the Courts began the
practice of judicially filling loopholes and omissions which existed in
the Codes. The courts eventually went even further and modified the
very provisions of the Codes in order to keep up with perceived
changes in modern society. Court decisions are not official sources
of law in Germany, nor do they serve as binding precedents as in
England or the United States. The de facto importance of rules
established by the courts should, nevertheless, not be underestimated.
For example, certain areas of law, such as labor and products liability
law, are based mainly on court decisions. Until the enactment of the
AGBG in 1977, the law of standard form contracts served as another
example of predominantly judge-made law. The AGBG itself is pri-
marily a codification of rules developed earlier by the courts. The
BGB in its construction and application by the courts remains, how-
ever, the core of German private law. It contains a highly abstract
introductory section which applies pervasively throughout the private
law, even though this law is contained in specific statutes.
The BGB reasons in terms of obligations rather than in terms of
bargains and torts. The sources of obligations are manifold: the
contractual promise, torts, and what the American lawyer would call
quasi-contract (unjust enrichment). Basic rules apply in general to all
obligations, and additional specific rules apply to certain specified
types of obligations such as sales and rent contracts.
Not content with merely enforcing obligations, the codified law
seeks to structure such obligations. Freedom of contract is still the
quintessential principle, but the law assumes a service function for
the contracting parties by gap-filling a body of rules covering con-
tractual circumstances for which the parties themselves failed to pro-
vide. This service function includes the shaping of contract types,
the offering of dispositive rules, and even the imposition of coercive
provisions which add auxiliary duties after contract formation. While
American law in principle does the same,5 9 American law tends to
5 To what extent this is the case is questionable. Compare Rakoff, supra note 1,
at 1258 (who sees American law already providing background rules in many situations),
with Llewellyn, COMMON LAW TRADIoN, supra note 1, at 368-69 (who advances the
development of transactional contract models and the specification of rules for them).
19871
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
emphasize the distinction between freely incurred contractual duties,
which the law must enforce without further consideration, and tort
duties imposed by the law. 60 In Germany, the presence of a com-
prehensive code furthers recognition of the fact that the parties ex-
ercise their freedom of contract against the backdrop and within the
framework of the law. The idea of judicial control of standard terms
is more acceptable to German courts6' because in Germany contracts
are understood as an interaction between law and individual auton-
omy.
Some have proposed that standard terms have the quality of reg-
ulatory (administrative) law, and in fact, German law once treated
them as such. Presently, this notion is unanimously rejected and
German law views standard terms as a special species of contractual
terms. These terms are subjected to specific control triggered by the
very nature of a clause being classified as a standard term. The test
that triggers the application of the AGBG is thus formalized.
B. Characterization of Standard Form Contract Clauses:
Regulatory Versus Consensual Contract Law
Although once described as administrative or regulatory law, the
AGBG treats standardized terms as contractual provisions. 62 Today,
this notion is unanimously rejected. 63 The drafter or supplier of
standardized terms has no authority to impose regulatory law on the
60 For an example of the importance given to this distinction (by talking about its
destruction), see G. GILMORE, Ti DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974).
61 Dawson, supra note 29, at 1104 mentions another possible reason that led to the
early concern of German courts with standard forms: their importance in the first half
of this century throughout business activities, resulting from the structure of economic
life in Germany during these years. There was a remarkable influence of industrial,
commercial and occupational groups, one of whose functions was to draft standard
forms for general use throughout industries (German antitrust law is of relatively recent
origin).
Judgment of Jan. 31, 1941, Reichsgericht [RG], 1941 DEuTscrEs REcIrr [DR] 1211,
1212; Judgment of Jan. 19, 1951, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], 1 Sammlung der Entsch-
eidungen des Bundesgerichtschofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 83, 86; Judgment of March
26, 1943, Reichsgerichtshof [RG], 171 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtshofs in Ziv-
ilsachen [RGZ] 43, 48; Judgment of Oct. 13, 1942, RG, 170 RGZ 223, 240-241;
Herschel, Die Vertragsordnung als Rechtsnorm, 1942 DR 753; Bernhard, Die allgemeinen
Geschaftsbedingungen als Rechtsnormen, 1942 DR 1171; Hamann, Uber die Verbin-
dlichkeit der "Allgemeinen Deutschen Spediteurbedingungen" (ADSp), 1949 MON-
ATSSCHRyr FUR DEurrscHEs REcHT [MDR] 209; cf. Helm, Private Norm und staatliches
recht beim Massenvertrag, 1965 JURiSTiSCrn SCHULUNG [JuS] 121, 122.
63 PALANDT, supra note 29, AGBG § 1 Annot. 1; Judgment of Feb. 3, 1953, BGH,
9 BGHZ 3; Judgment of March 8, 1955, BGH, 17 BGHZ 2.
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other party. Standard terms can become part of the contract only
by agreement of both parties. Granting the drafter authority to impose
rules of law would contradict any notion of personal autonomy and
democratic control of the legislative process. Thus the drafter has no
legitimacy, through elections or otherwise, to impose rules on the
non-drafting party so long as this party does not consent. 64
The idea that standard terms can be characterized as regulatory
law, however, is not without merit. 65 Such a characterization furthers
an understanding that standard terms are inherently different from
bargained-for contract terms. By analogizing standardized terms to
regulatory law, it is apparent that the consent of the non-drafting
party to standard contract terms is defective in relation to consent
to bargained-for terms.
This defectiveness has two aspects. First, the consent to standard
terms is defective since it is not based on a true choice. It can be
assumed that the party submitting to a standard form does not have
a choice concerning the content of the clauses. Standardized terms
are regularly offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, thus the only
existing alternative is not entering into the contract at all.
The fact that most parties to a contract are not able to formulate
reasonable alternatives to the supplied contract terms serves as another
limit upon the parties' choice. This limit affects not only the non-
drafting party, but also most representatives of the supplying party.
The fact that the law provides dispositive rules which can be sub-
stituted for standard form terms does not rectify this lack of choice.
Under German law, there is always the possibility of replacing the
standard terms with the dispositive provisions66 of the BGB. The party
- Helm, supra note 62, at 124.
61 One of the useful aspects of perceiving standard terms as privately made law,
and probably the reason that the language of a "prepared legal order" originated in
the first place, concerned the problem of legitimacy of review by the highest court.
The Bundesgerichtshof is, as the Reichsgericht was, restricted to reviewing questions
of law, not of fact. Interpretation of contract language is considered to be a question
of fact and the process of contract formation. By declaring standard form terms to
be "general norms," the Reichsgericht succeeded in making itself competent to decide
on the meaning of standard terms and to insure coherent and uniform law pertaining
to those terms. See Dawson, supra note 29, at 1104-05; see also STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR
ZUM BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, EINLErrUNG zu §§ 241-42, AGBG; Schlosser, AGBG
§ 5 annot. 18 (12th ed. 1983). Today, the competence of reviewing terms which are
used in the district of more than one Oberlandesgericht [Higher District Court] is
contained in ZrVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] §§ 549-50 (Code of Civil Procedure).
66 For an explanation of dispositive law as opposed to compulsory law, see Lenhoff,
supra note 31, at 486.
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faced with standard form terms can expect to get fairly balanced
contract terms by substituting the standard terms with an agreement
to use the BGB. Some commentators believe that American law also
gap-fills rules for all fields of contract where standard terms play a
role. 67 One example of this gap-filling by American courts is found
in contracts regarding the sale of goods, to which Article Two of
the UCC applies. However, American common law as a rule expects
more of the parties in fashioning their own terms, though the re-
quirements of definiteness are declining. 68 Even where the law provides
terms which could be chosen by the parties instead of standard terms,
the non-drafting party is still impaired in making an active choice
by formulating different terms, especially for highly technical con-
tracts like insurance.
The second defective aspect concerns the act of consent to standard
terms themselves. The defect arises since the non-drafting party nor-
mally does not even know to what he has assented. In the formation
of most standard contracts, there is not ample time to read, under-
stand, and check the standardized terms and predict their conse-
quences. These time constraints prohibit any substantive review, with
any consideration generally being limited to the basic terms of the
deal, such as subject matter, price, and the like. As Karl Llewellyn
put it:
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing
more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent)
to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on
his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning
of the dickered terms.69
Given these two aspects of defective assent, it is not surprising that
some perceive standard terms as a form of regulatory law rather than
agreed-upon contract provisions. Even if the characterization as reg-
ulatory law cannot be accepted, the mere recognition that standard
form terms are different from normal contract terms is important.
67 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1181-83.
See, e.g., Llewellyn's second presupposition of American general law in LL~w-
ELLYN, Book Review, supra note 1, at 700 ("Any particular or specialized terms in
which the parties are interested, they will bargain about."); compare Rakoff, supra
note 1, at 1181-83 (50 years later). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§
33 and 204 (1981).
LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADriON, supra note 1, at 370.
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It is this regulatory-law characterization which helped the German
law to make a basic distinction between individualized contract terms
and standard terms.
This distinction made by the AGBG is one of the most important
achievements of modern German contract law. The use of standard
terms is a structural change that will continue. By adjusting the law
to that change, German courts and the legislature have created a
body of rules governing the courts' treatment of particular stan-
dardized terms concerning how the courts will evaluate particular
clauses.70 While there are standard terms which have never been tested
in the light of the AGBG and need this review in order to be re-
formulated by the drafter, the appearance of standard form contracts
has changed based on consistent decisions. The law can account for
this success.
C. General Structure of the Standard Contract Terms Act
The AGBG applies only to standard form contract terms, thereby
limiting the scope of its application. There are, however, areas of
law which are exempted from the application of the AGBG: labor
law, law of succession, law of domestic relations, and corporation
law are examples. 7 1 One important basic principle of the AGBG
provides that the mere characterization of contract provisions as
70 Bunte, Erfahrungen mit dem AGB-Gesetz - Eine Zwischenbilanz nach 4 Jahren,
181 ARcHiv FUR DEE cIVMISTISCB PRaxTs [AcP] 31, 34-35 (1981). There remains, without
doubt, a certain degree of vagueness and uncertainty that can never be avoided when
the ex post control through courts is involved. But Rakoff notes that much of the
resulting danger could be avoided by not trying to push standard terms to the outer
limits of what is acceptable under the law. In addition, the provider has to run the
risk of losing something if standard terms favor him too much. Otherwise, it would
be an invitation to overdraft the clauses, which must be avoided even if the subjecting
party may from time to time get a windfall. For the same reason, German law refuses
to adopt partly invalid terms by striking out entirely the invalid parts in the form
rather than reformulating the terms. Instead, the BGB provisions are invoked for the
whole term. Otherwise, it is argued, standard form terms would be overdrafted because
the risk would be no more than to be pushed back into the limits of what is possible
and most favorable for the drafter. The drafters then could let the courts rewrite the
most favorable terms for them.
1' AGBG § 23(1). The reasons for this exemption vary with the concerned fields.
In labor law, unions make up for the missing power of individual employees. Collective
bargaining agreements govern de facto even the contracts of non-union members.
Furthermore, the courts of labor exercise a rigid control of employment contract terms.
In the law of domestic relations and the law of successions, standard terms are not
really used. Furthermore, family relations are more important in these cases than the
business aspect.
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standard form terms is sufficient to trigger the Act's mechanisms of
control. This initial test is a formal one, with no inquiry into the
respective bargaining power, availability of substitute suppliers or
different contract terms, intellectual ability of the non-drafting party,
and the like. 72 The purely formal character of the initial test makes
the application of the AGBG predictable and easy to handle.
Once the AGBG is found to be applicable, it addresses three
questions:
1) How standard terms become part of a contract (AGBG §§ 2
and 3);
2) How those standard terms are construed (AGBG §§ 4 and 5);
and
3) Which clauses are substantively objectionable and therefore in-
valid (AGBG § 9 states the general rule; §§ 10 and 11 name specific
clauses which are always invalid).
D. The Provisions of the Standard Contract Terms Act
1. What Are Standard Form Terms?
Section One of the AGBG limits its application to standard form
contracts. The AGBG's definition goes beyond prior judge-made law,
by fashioning a reliable and uniform definition of standard form
terms. 73 Furthermore, prior judicial law had a more restricted un-
derstanding of standard form contracts. Master form contracts were
treated as standard form contracts only when inconspicuously ar-
ranged and containing numerous terms.7 4
72 The same principle (there will be no inquiry into the degree to which the particular
signer's assent was impaired) was already emphasized by Dawson, supra note 29, at
1113, for the law prior to the AGBG.
" See id, at 1116-17, for an account of some of the questions relating to what was
held to be a standard term and subject to special control prior to the AGBG.
1, Master form contracts differ from contracts with standard form terms because
the standardized parts are not added to the contract. The contract is formed by
completing a form that provides the categories for parties, subject matter, price, etc.,
and may contain additional clauses. The contract document itself is standardized; it is
individualized only by filling in blanks. To what extent a master form contract is
standardized may differ profoundly from contract to contract. See as examples of
denial of special control for master form contracts, Judgment of May 18, 1973, BGH,
61 BGHZ 17, 21; Judgment of Sept. 25, 1970, BGH, 1970 BETRBSBERATER [BB] 1504;
Judgment of Oct. 29, 1975, BGH, 1976 WERTPAPIRMrrTEILUNGEN [WM] 31, 32; cf.
J. SCHMIDT-SALZER, ALLGEMEINE GESCHXrBEDINGUNGEN 24 (2d ed. 1977); STAUDINGER,
supra note 65, AGBG § 1 annot. 17.
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Under AGBG § 1, all preformulated contract clauses which are
intended to be incorporated into numerous contracts are subject to
the AGBG. Thus, even the first time a standard form term is in-
corporated into a contract, the term is controlled by the AGBG. The
intent to use the term as a standard one in numerous contracts is
sufficient.75 Also, any single standardized term apart from the bar-
gained-for terms is subject to the provisions of the AGBG. 76
It is not important who drafted the provision, whether it be the
supplying party, a trade association, or even a commission repre-
senting the interests of persons usually confronted with standard terms
of that kind.77 What is important is that the terms have been intro-
duced into the contract by one party. Exactly how standard terms
are supplied also does not matter. They may be put in the form of
"fine print" and supplement the contract document, a fine-print part
may be incorporated into the contract document, or a master form
contract (Formularvertrag) may be used (a prepared form with blanks
to complete to form the specific contract).
The AGBG, however, distinguishes between standard form and
non-standard parts of a contract; the AGBG provisions apply only
to the standardized parts. If prepared form parts have been subject
to bargaining, the AGBG does not apply, 78 even if the terms have
not been changed in the bargaining process. 79 The non-drafting party,
however, must have had a real chance to influence the substance of
the prepared clause(s).80
AGBG § 1 distinguishes between provisions which can be considered
as contractually agreed upon (in the sense of traditional bargained-
for contracts) and provisions which have been supplied by one party
and submitted to the other. To the bargained-for parts, traditional
7, PALAN.DT, supra note 29, AGBG § 1 annot. 2(c).
76 PALANDT, supra note 29, AGBG § 1 annot. 2(c); STAUDINGER-SCBIOSSER, supra
note 65, AGBG § I annot. 15.
STAUDINGER-SCHLOSSER, supra note 65, AGBG § 1 annot. 20; cf. First Nat'l Bank
of Decatur v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 424 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 939 (1970) (Ill. law) (terms of banker's blanket bond were drafted under consultation
of American Bankers Association is insufficient reason for not applying the contra
proferentem. rule).
7 AGBG § 1(2).
, STAUDINGER-SCILOSSER, supra note 65, AGBG § 1 annot. 31; left open in Judgment
of Oct. 20, 1976, BGH, 1977 BB 59 (concerning brokerage contract granting the broker
exclusivity and containing a damage provision if the real estate sale was completed
without letting the broker participate). But see KOCH-STUBn G, AGBG, AGBG § 1
annots. 32-42 (1977); DrrrMAN-STABI, AGBG, AGBG § 1 annot. 49 (1977).
'0 PALA.NDT-HERNFECHS, supra note 29, AGBG § I annot. 4(c).
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contract law applies. Judicial control is restricted to reviewing the
formal conditions under which the agreement was reached, together
with a very limited substantive control, much like in American con-
tract law.8' The control mechanisms of the AGBG apply to the
unbargained-for parts.
2. Construction of Standard Form Contract Terms
AGBG § 5 contains the German version of the American contra
proferentem rule that ambiguous terms are construed against the
drafter.8 2 The rationale for the German rule is the same as the
American rationale. It is in the hands of the drafter to formulate
clear terms.13 He should not profit therefore from ambiguity in his
own poor drafting. This reasoning implies that terms, at least those
which go to court, are favorable to the drafting party.
Like all other substantive parts of the AGBG, § 5 (contra pro-
ferentem) does not apply to clauses which have been specifically
negotiated.8 Apart from that limitation, § 5 applies to all standard
form clauses, even those used between merchants, including big com-
panies with bargaining power and sophisticated knowledge of contract
law. Regarding such parties, the applicability of the rule has sometimes
been questioned by American courts. 5 Limiting the applicability of
contra proferentem to cases of an unsophisticated party submitting
Concepts like fraud, duress, incompetency, and mistake apply. The substantive
control concerns illegality (BGB § 134), and violation of public policy and overreaching
in combination with defects in the contract formation (BGB § 138). See supra note
26. How far the concept of violation of public policy reaches is described in Dawson,
supra note 29.
82 The German contra proferentem rule is not contained in the BGB. The Reichs-
gerichtshof [RG] in Zivilsachen developed the rule for standard form terms early in
this century. For the character of the rule as specifically applicable to standard terms
see STAUDINGER, supra note 65, Annot. I to AGBG § 5; J. SCHMIDT-SALZER, supra
note 74, at 158; Judgment of March 11, 1927, RG, 116 RGZ 274, 276 (ambiguous
insurance contract terms are construed in the sense in which the insured could understand
them in good faith, with regard to commercial custom); Judgment of Jan. 18, 1918,
RG, 92 RGZ 60, 64 (insurance contract); Judgment of Jan. 10, 1928, RG, 120 RGZ
18, 10.
83 J. SC MIDT-SATZER, supra note 74, at 158; Judgment of Feb. 12, 1952, BGH, 5
BGHZ 115. For American law, see Foltz v. Beguoche, 222 Kan. 383, 388, 565 P.2d
592, 597 (1977); Holiday Homes of St. John, Inc. v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d 1176, 1186
(3d Cir. 1982).
See supra Part II C.
83 Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum);
Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976)
(no need for contra proferentem rule when insured is a large corporation managed by
sophisticated businessmen).
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to standard terms, however, creates problems in identifying proper
criteria to draw the line. In addition to that difficulty, there is another
reason to make negotiation or non-negotiation rather than the bar-
gaining power or sophistication of the non-drafting party the decisive
element. The use of standard form terms is often dictated by the
character and situation of the intended business. Time and effort
going into a business deal may have to be limited to make a bargain
profitable.8 6 This limiting condition can properly be seen as more
determinative of the character of the agreement than the abstract power
of the parties.17 It is therefore justified to subject non-bargained-for
standard form clauses to the rule of contra proferentem even if the
non-drafting party is not powerless, uneducated, or the like. The only
concession German law makes is to take into account specific experience
and capability of typical offerees of standard terms when deciding on
the ambiguity of a term.8 1
Reducing one-sidedness of standard form contract clauses through
construction has been a popular means in the early adjudication by
German courts of standard form contracts.8 9 The reason for the
courts' attitude appears to be that "construing" is the easiest way
to reach a fair result with the least deviation from traditional contract
law. Since construction of contract language typically concerns a
single clause and a single contract, the decision can be based on
specific factual circumstances and language. It does not require new
or changed rules of law, or a general shift of doctrine.
The need to exceed the limits of traditional contract doctrine came
with the rising number and quality of standardized clauses being
called into question. In many cases it was difficult to find any
ambiguity for the court to construe. Similarly, with the increasing
number of cases, the decisions based on individual circumstances
become more and more disparate. When the issue of predictability
of the decisions was raised, the search for an underlying principle
16 See supra text accompanying note 44.
"I There is the possibility that both sides try to impose their standard forms onto
each other, which often occurs when two sophisticated companies deal with one another.
The problem is then to decide which of the two conflicting standard term documents
governs the contract. The U.C.C. solution is in U.C.C. § 2-207 ("Battle of Forms").
As to German law, the problem is dealt with by the general law of contractual obligations.
The AGBG does not consider this question. The solution is in principle that non-
contradictory terms become part of the contract. Where the terms conflict with each
other, the dispositive law applies instead (majority view).
88 WOLF, HORN & LINDACHER, AGBG, AGBG § 5 annot. 33 (1984).
'9 STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 8 annot. 3; AGBG § 5 annot. 1.
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issued. In the case of standard form contracts, the search led to
substantive control of fairness and the use of the concept of assent,
a path America law might well follow.
In addition to the more recent doctrines of substantive control and
sufficiency of assent, the contra proferentem rule has survived in the
AGBG. Construction, however, has substantially declined in impor-
tance. A review of the commentaries to the AGBG shows more
decisions involving substantive control and lack of proper assent than
decisions construing contract language. 90 One can conclude that recent
decisions are indeed rarely based on construction of standard terms
against the drafter. In the area of insurance contracts, virtually no
decision of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGHZ) (German Supreme Court
in Civil Matters) since the enactment of the AGBG has been based
on AGBG § 5.91 In contrast, the American contra proferentem remains
bedrock insurance law, which is surprising given the formal, com-
plicated, standardized language of insurance policies. One reason
construction of contract terms has been discredited in Germany is
the covert use for control in times when the legitimacy of substantive
control was not yet generally recognized. After the AGBG expressly
put substantive control into the hands of the courts, they concentrated
on using these rules instead of reverting to construction. After sub-
stantive control becomes well established, courts can again look at
the language of the contract terms.
A current controversy concerning AGBG § 5 involves using "ob-
jective" versus "individual" standards of construction to decide the
issue of ambiguity. Individual construction takes into account the
specific circumstances of the bargain, such as knowledge of the non-
drafting party, representations at the time of contract formation, and
the like. 92 According to the objective theory, standardized clauses
have to be construed without regard to the individual circumstances
0 See some of the standard commentaries, at e.g., PALANDT, supra note 29, or
STAUDINGER, supra note 65.
1, Bernstein at the Jahrestagung 1984 Deutschen Vereins ftir Versicherungswissen-
schaft [annual meeting 1984 of the German Association of Insurance Science] as reported
in: ABTEILUNGSBERICHTE VON DER JAHRESTAGUNG 1984 DES DEUTSCHEN VEREINS FOR
VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFT, 1984 VERSICHERUNGSWIRTSCHAFr [VW] 852 [hereinafter
Bernstein, 1984 VW].
9' STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 5 annot. 22; Brandner, Die Umstcinde des
einzelnen Falles bei der Auslegung und Beurteilung von allgemeinen Geschaftsbedin-
gungen, 162 AcP 237, 258-61 (1963); WOLF, HORN & LINDACHER, supra note 88, AGBG
§ 5 annot. 6.
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of the case 93 because the terms are standardized and in general use.
It has even been said that standard form contracts have to be con-
strued like statutory provisions; 94 such an objectionable proposition
resurrects the idea that standard form terms are a type of (admin-
istrative) regulatory law. 95 More recently, it has increasingly been
suggested that the difference between the objective and the subjective
theory of construction is not important, as relevant individual cir-
cumstances are just not present in most cases. 96 This statement would
no longer be true, however, if the individual theory were extended
one step further. As AGBG § 5 applies contra proferentem to cases
where there are doubts in the construction of the standard term, not
doubts after the construction, it has been suggested that the appli-
cation of the rule has to be extended. 97 The criticism is that under
the label of an objective construction the courts can entirely avoid
AGBG § 5 by simply finding one meaning of the standard contract
term. Rather than this kind of effort, AGBG § 5 would require a
favorable decision for the submitting party whenever in the course
of construction more than one meaning appears reasonable.
The controversy has a parallel in American law, as illustrated by
the conflicting versions of contra proferentem in New York expressed
in Champion International Corporation v. Continental Casualty Com-
9' PALANDT, supra note 29, AGBG § 5 annot. 3; ULMER, BRANDNER & HENSEN,
AGBG, AGBG § 5 annot. 13, 16-20 (5th ed. 1987); 2 MONcHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Kotz, AGBG § 5 annot. 4 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MuKo-
KoTz]; Judgment of Dec. 10, 1980, BGH, 79 BGHZ 117, 119 (concerning a special
warranty clause); Judgment of May 12, 1980, BGH, 77 BGHZ 116, 118 (concerning
liability clause). This is still the majority view. For formulations to the same end from
the time prior to the AGBG, see Dawson, supra note 29 at 1106-07; Judgment of Oct.
18, 1935, RG, 149 RGZ 96, 100 (extended reservation of proprietary rights); Judgment
of April 6, 1937, RG, 155 RGZ 26, 28 (extended reservation of proprietary rights);
Judgment of Dec. 31, 1938, RG, 1939 Juristische Wochenschrift [JW] 563; Judgment
of Oct. 25, 1952, BGH, 7 BGHZ 365, 369 (extended reservation of proprietary rights);
Judgment of Aug. 22, 1958, OLG Stuttgart, 1958 NJW 1875 (invalidity of seller's
terms because of no provision against having over-secured the transaction, complete
invalidity of the terms based on BGB §§ 138, 139).
14 Judgment of Oct. 13, 1942, RG, 170 RGZ 233, 240-41; Judgment of Oct. 21,
1958, BGH, 1959 NEUE JtlusTIscBE WOCHENSCHmrUT [NJW] 38 (standard terms in
electricity supply contract have the character of general rules of law (allgemeine Re-
chtsnormen) similar to a Rechtsverordnung [regulatory administrative statute]).
9' STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 5 annot. 21.
- STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 5 annot. 18 and 20; Brandner, supra note
92, at 254-55.
Bernstein, 1984 VW, supra note 91, at 853.
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pany,9s and the more restricted view stated in Schering v. Home
Insurance Company.99 While the New York rule looks for any rea-
sonable meaning favoring the non-drafting party, 1°° the opposing
position is that contra proferentem is only the last resort after eve-
rything else has been tried to give the standard term a reasonable,
clear meaning.10 Part Four of this article will reconsider the question
of how to apply the contra proferentem rule. 02
3. The Role of General Assent in Controlling Standard Form
Contracts
Two provisions of the AGBG, sections 2 and 3, use the concept
of assent to control standard form contract terms. AGBG § 2 concerns
assent to the incorporation of standard form terms into contracts in
general. AGBG § 3 involves the invalidity of particular clauses which
are so unusual that they are not presumed to fall within the general
assent. Applying either section results in a contract between parties
who agreed on the essential terms like price and subject matter, but
all or part of the additional contract terms are invalid. While the
remainder of the contract is valid, the invalid standard terms are
expunged, and the rules of law are substituted. Only where it would
be an undue hardship to one party to enforce the remainder of the
contract is the entire contract void, which is a very rare case.10 3
According to general contract law (BGB § 139), the whole contract
is void if it cannot be assumed that the contracting parties would
have formed the contract without the invalid part. Though the written
" 400 F.Supp. 978, 980 (1975) (concerning construction of "each occurrence" lan-
guage in liability insurance policy); see also Datatab, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 347 F.Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (sufficient if the insured can offer a
possible construction of an ambiguous provision); Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 11 N.Y.2d 386, 230 N.Y.S.2d 12, 183 N.E.2d 899 (1962). (concerning construction
of an exclusion clause in insurance policy); Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp. v. United States
Fidelity and Guar. Co., 364 F.2d 275, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1968) (concerning exclusion
clause with slightly different language in comprehensive general liability policy).
712 F.2d 4 (2d.Cir. 1983).
,oo Champion Int'l Corp., 400 F.Supp. at 980.
20 Schering, 712 F.2d at 10 n.2.
,02 The "contra proferentem" rule in AGBG § 5 is supplemented by AGBG § 4
which grants the parties' negotiated understanding priority over standard terms. Section
4 also contains an explicit rejection of any type of parol evidence rule because the
priority of negotiated terms is not restricted to written individual understandings. See
Sandrock, supra note 29, at 561. But cf. Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc.,
75 Wash. 2d 241, 450 P.2d 470 (1969) (invalidating adhesion contract integration clause).
03 PALANDT, supra note 29, AGBG § 6 annot. 4.
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law is rather strict in its presumption of invalidity, in case of doubt
judicial construction has favored upholding contracts, especially where
standard terms are concerned. 104 BGB § 139, if strictly applied to
standard form contract terms, could in many cases cause the invalidity
of the whole contract. AGBG § 6 changes BGB § 139 by enforcing
the remainder of the contract except in specific cases. 05 The provision
thus continues what the courts had already done.1° The underlying
reason for upholding the contract is that usually the parties presum-
ably want to go through with their bargain even if auxiliary standard
terms are invalid.
With these foregoing general remarks, the specific requirements of
AGBG § 2 will be considered first and AGBG § 3 thereafter in
connection with the provisions on substantive control. Since the re-
lation between rules on defective assent to contract terms and rules
invalidating contract terms for reasons of their substantive unfairness
is an issue in German as well as in American law, it is useful to
look at these two aspects together.
AGBG § 2 states three requirements for the incorporation of stan-
dard terms into the contract:
1) notice of the application of standard terms;
2) reasonable opportunity for the non-drafting party to obtain
knowledge of the terms; and
3) assent of the submitting party.10 7
These requirements have two effects: the non-drafting party cannot
avoid the application of standard terms by simply not reading them,
and the drafter cannot impose standard terms without obtaining the
other party's assent and without giving him a chance to read the
terms. AGBG § 2 is, however, restricted in its application in two
regards. The provision does not apply to agreements between mer-
chants,108 and it applies in a modified manner to standard terms which
104 See Sandrock, supra note 29, at 561.
103 Judgment of Aug. 22, 1958, OLG Stuttgart, 1958 NJW 1875, 1876 (example from
the time before the AGBG). There is no example cited in the leading commentaries
for the time after the enactment of the AGBG.
' The courts have done it generally when invalid standard form terms were concerned.
See Judgment of Oct. 29, 1956, BGH, 22 BGHZ 92; Judgment of May 16, 1974,
BGH, 62 BGHZ 327 (limitation of warranty clause; BGB § 139 is not applicable to
standard form terms); Judgment of March 8, 1955, BGH, 17 BGHZ 1; Judgment of
April 5, 1962, BGH, 37 BGHZ 94; Judgment of Feb. 17, 1964, BGH, 41 BGHZ 151.
Ill But cf. in American law Klar v. H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 61 N.Y.S.2d 285,
aff'd, 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947) (requiring notice and assent for making
a limitation of liability part of the legal relationship).
I- AGBG § 24(1).
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have to be approved by an administrative agency before they can be
used. 109
The notice of the application of standard terms must be expressly
stated, either orally or in writing. 110 The notice also must be com-
prehensible.1"' AGBG § 2 provides for the possibility of posting a
conspicuous notice at the place the contract is made in cases where
the giving of notice in a different manner is too burdensome. In
these cases, compliance with the second requirement of AGBG § 2
(the chance to obtain knowledge of the terms) can be made in the
same manner, by posting the terms conspicuously. 1 12 An example
where posting of the terms is sufficient is a transportation contract." 3
Normally, however, the chance to obtain knowledge is properly given
only by tendering an exemplar of the terms that can be kept by the
non-drafting party.1 4
AGBG § 2 rejects the concept that standard form terms become
part of the contract if the non-drafting party "should have known"
that they are incorporated, a view (merchants excepted) sometimes
taken by courts before the AGBG was enacted." 5 A position similar
to this older view is taken by the AGBG only for standard form
terms which have to be approved by an administrative agency and
for agreements between merchants."16 Regarding administrative terms,
notice and chance to obtain knowledge are not prerequisites to their
incorporation, though general assent to the incorporation of the
standard terms into the contract is still necessary. This special treat-
ment concerns, most notably, insurance policies.",
109 See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
11o STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 2 annot. 4.
- See MUKo-KOTZ, AGBG § 2 annot. 9.
112 STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 2, annot. 18-25, 34.
113 See PALANDT, supra note 29, AGBG § 2 annot. 2(b) and 3(a).
"4 STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 2 annot. 31; Judgment of Oct. 3, 1977,
Amtsgericht Frankfurt, 1978 BB 254.
"I See STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 2 annot. 1; Judgment of Feb. 3, 1953,
9 BGHZ 1, 2; Judgment of Jan. 22, 1954, 12 BGHZ 136, 142; Judgment of July 8,
1955, 19 BGHZ 98, 99. The concept differs from Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
§ 211(1) as well. The Restatement requires the manifestation of assent but does not
require the possibility of obtaining knowledge. Instead, it is sufficient that the submitting
party has reason to believe that like writings with like terms are regularly used, and
has manifested assent to the applicability of the terms.
"6 See AGBG § 23(3).
117 Insurance policies must have been approved by the Versicherungsaufsichtsamt
(Insurance Control Agency, an equivalent to the Insurance Commissioners in the United
States) before they can be used, see Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz [VAG] § 5(III)(2)
(Insurance Control Act).
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The tightened requirements for the incorporation of standard form
terms brought by AGBG § 2 are an improvement. They cannot be
expected to change fundamentally the process of agreeing on standard
terms. The non-drafting party will in most cases still not read the
terms, but the requirements give the non-drafting party the chance
to rely on the knowledge of the terms once a problem involving them
arises. In this sense, AGBG § 2 serves as a "subsequent party au-
tonomy." The price for pursuing this kind of autonomy is reasonable
because the drafting party normally can easily tender the text of the
standard terms.
4. Control of Specific Terms: Defective Assent and Substantive
Control
Under the AGBG, a specific standard term may be unenforceable
for two different reasons. First, the term may be so unusual that a
non-drafting party could not reasonably expect it (AGBG § 3). The
term's unusual character excludes it from the assent given to the
general application of the standard terms. Alternatively, the term
may violate the notion of good faith and therefore be invalid (AGBG
§ 9).
AGBG § 3 emphasizes the formal defect. The consent of the
submitting party is defective because the drafting party could have
perceived that under traditional circumstances, with actual knowledge
of the terms and the ability to choose, the other party would not
have accepted the terms. If it is conceded that in the course of modern
business relations it is in both parties' interest that standard terms
are accepted without reading and negotiating them, the resulting power
of the drafter to impose whatever he likes must be reduced. This
power to impose results from the traditional duty-to-read rule which
holds the non-drafting party to whatever terms the drafter included.
Once the duty to read has been limited, AGBG § 3 expresses nothing
but the objective theory of contractual agreements. The non-drafting
party's assent is construed as a reasonable user-drafter of standard
terms would understand it. The non-drafting party cannot be deemed
to have given a blanket assent to what could not be expected and
understood.118
This formal control through the concept of assent has its separate
justification and significance even if substantive control of standard
, See STAuDrNGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 3 annot. 4. Section 3 is only a specfication
of general principles of the doctrine of contractual assent.
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form terms has been broadly accepted. Limiting the assent to con-
spicuous, foreseeable terms permits the presumption of comprehension
of the standard terms when contractual provisions become important
in a situation of actual conflict. 19 Moreover, the legitimacy of en-
forcing standard terms is addressed. The only basis to enforce stan-
dard terms is the presumed assent of the submitting party. When the
court tells a non-drafting party that he assented to a confused or
exotic term, the credibility of the law is at stake. The issue should
not be whether party autonomy is exercised the moment the contract
was formed but whether the law can enforce a clause predicated on
the submitting party's assent. The question is what a reasonable
party's attitude would be the moment a judge enforces a standard
term that the party never read: is it, "O.K., I should have read it,"
or is it, "What a loophole! The court has given me a boat to cross
the River Styx."
The second control of standard terms is AGBG § 9, which con-
centrates on the substantive defects of standard terms. The provision
is supplemented by a catalogue of invalid clauses in AGBG §§ 10
and 11. The technique which the AGBG uses in Sections 9, 10, and
11 is a compromise between predictability and flexibility. Sections 10
and 1 I address specific clauses which by experience are often included
in standard terms. 20 Merely to forbid certain clauses, however, is
never sufficient against the ingenuity of contract drafters who will
divine new ways to unfairly favor their own interests. Therefore,
section 9 contains a general clause invalidating standard form terms
which violate the notion of good faith.' 2 ' The specific clauses pre-
empted by Sections 10 and 11 shall be disregarded here, for they
belong to the specific context of German law and society; American
law has to make its own decision about which clauses offend American
notions of good faith and fairness.
What should be addressed, though, is the technique AGBG § 9
uses for substantive control of standard terms. The general gauge is
"9 The same consideration in American disclosure requirements for consumer trans-
actions can be found in Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulations in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400, 463-66 (1973).
11o The sections do not apply to contracts between merchants. See AGBG § 24. But
the general clause in AGBG § 9 does apply to contracts between merchants. The
consequence has been that courts have applied generally the same rules as stated in
sections 10 and 11 but under the different rationale of section 9. See WoLF, HoRN, &
LINDACHER, supra note 88, AGBG § 24 annot. 17, 18.
121 See Dugan, supra note 1, at 1333 (citing the difficulties of deciding between
detailed interference and a generalized standard).
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the standard of good faith. In the case of doubt about the fairness
of a standard term, section 9 uses two presumptions to determine
when terms prejudice the non-drafting party in a manner that violates
the command of good faith. One is the deviation from fundamental
principles .which underlie the legal rules which would govern the
contractual relationship without the standard terms. The legal rules
have the presumption of fairness in their favor. If standard terms
deviate from what would otherwise be the applicable law, a valid
reason has to be shown to convince the neutral observer that the
terms still comply with fundamental notions of fairness. If the de-
viation is material and there are doubts about its appropriateness,
the standard terms are invalid. 122
The second presumption concerns standard terms which contradict
the rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract. 23 This
presumption applies to the situations where standard terms eviscerate
terms which are material to the contract. A case like Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 24 could be discussed under this pro-
vision. In Williams, the dragnet security clause had the effect that,
as long as any item purchased from the furniture store was not yet
completely paid, all the other goods bought from the store served
as security for the open balance and could be repossessed upon default
of any payment. This extended possibility of repossession, because
it made it difficult to obtain unrestricted possession of the purchased
goods, could be invalidated by a German court under the second
presumption of AGBG § 9.I25
For purposes of fashioning a new American theory, the important
aspect of AGBG § 9 is its first presumption; that standard form
contract terms are invalid if they deviate unreasonably from the legal
rules which otherwise would govern; the availability of a body of
2 This reasoning has its predecessors in earlier court decisions. See, e.g., Judgment
of Nov. 4, 1964, BGH, 1965 NJW 246 (concerning term in brokerage contract that
entitled broker to the agreed commission by merely finding a lender, whether or not
the loan was actually made); cf. BGB § 652(1), (the broker earns the commission only
if a contract is actually made); Dawson, supra note 29, at 1111.
'2 See Dawson, supra note 29, at 1112-13 for the judicial role prior to the AGBG;
Judgment of Feb. 17, 1964, BGH, 41 BGHZ 151; Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, BGH,
1971 NJW 1036.
- 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" That does not mean that the clause would be invalidated. The specific needs of
a business would be taken into account when deciding on the validity of a term. For
further consideration of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, Inc., see text at note
306 infra.
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rules to govern contracts without standard terms has certainly made
the step towards substantive control easier in Germany. Standard
terms can be compared to legal provisions when the fairness of the
terms is in question. Substantive control thus frees itself from the
anathema that the courts "wrote the contract for the parties." What
made the courts invalidate standard terms was not that the judges
had their own ad hoc notion of what should be fairly included in a
bargain. American courts could point to legislation, administrative
rulings, and standing judicial construction to show what is deemed
to be fair and adequate for a contractual relation. German courts
have principles to refer to because the BGB assumes a service function
beyond enforcing properly formed contracts as the parties made them.
It provides the supplementary (dispositive) rules for agreements of
the parties to the extent that the parties omitted terms in their
agreements. 126
Because of historical reasons, both lines for the control of standard
terms (defective assent and substantive defect) are incorporated into
the AGBG. The two approaches originated in the earlier judge-made
law; though substantive control started early in this century,' 27 courts
made only limited use of it, relying instead on BGB § 138.128 Sub-
stantive harshness and facts surrounding contract formation, like the
drafter having a monopoly, weretaken together to invalidate terms.129
Only recently has the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters (BGHZ)
based a frank substantive control of standard terms on the good
faith requirement of BGB § 242.130 At first, however, many decisions
'6 That this is the case may have its reasons in the BGB thinking in terms of
obligations rather than of bargains where contracts are concerned. The idea of obligation
involves the law to a greater extent and requires that it be structured. Cf. supra note
59 and accompanying text.
'" STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 3 annot. 1; see Judgment of March 31,
1941, RG, 1941 DR 1726; Judgment of Feb. 17, 1964, BGH, 41 BGH 151 at 153,
154; Judgment of May 8, 1973, BGH, 60 BGHZ 377, 380 (concerning provision in
brokerage contract with exclusivity clause that commission has to be paid in full if the
seller executes a contract without help of any broker).
's Used in Judgment of Nov. 11, 1968, BGH, 51 BGHZ 255, to invalidate the whole
contract (confusing installation contract for an automatic vending machine).
129 Judgment of Feb. 11, 1888, RG, 20 RGZ 115, 117 (no violation of BGB § 138
seen; case involved carrier disclaiming liability for damages to goods for transport);
Judgment of Dec. 15, 1933, RG, 143 RGZ 24, 28 (electricity supply contract; misuse
of a monopoly position); Judgment of Aug. 14, 1941, RG, 168 RGZ 321, 329 (BGB
§§ 138 and 242 used as gauge); see L. RAISER, DAs RECHT DER ALLGEMENEN GES-
CHAFrSBEDINGUNGEN 116 (1st ed. 1971) on the consideration of misuse of a monopoly
position when adjudicating disclaimers of liability.
130 Judgment of June 4, 1970, BGH, 54 BGHZ 109; Judgment of March 8, 1955,
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were based on double-reasoning, mentioning the defectiveness of
assent as well as substantive unfairness.' The reluctance to exercise
openly a substantive control is thus not confined to the United States.
German courts have over a long period of time preferred to avoid
an open exercise of substantive control by stretching contract con-
struction and concentrating on the lack of assent to standard terms. 13 2
Because both lines of reasoning, defectiveness of assent and sub-
stantive unfairness, were incorporated into the AGBG, questions arose
concerning the relationship of each to the other. Neither operates
independently of the other: assent to unusual and unexpected terms
is defective because the terms are unfavorable to the non-drafting
party; no one, obviously, would complain about favorable clauses.
Equally, harsh terms imposed in the form of standard terms make
the substance of such terms objectionable under AGBG § 9. The
terms which section 9 invalidates would be validated if contained in
a bargained-for agreement.
AGBG §§ 3 and 9 thus start -at different points to deal with the
same phenomenon, " and overlap in part. Under section 3, standard
terms may be unusual because of their uncommon and harsh sub-
stance, but the two provisions are not congruent. A term that could
pass the standards of section 9 may be invalidated via section 3
because it was hidden in fine print or inconspicuously formulated.
A perfectly clear and conspicuous term may be invalid because of
its substance.
The relation between AGBG §§ 3 and 9 has recently been subjected
to discussion because German courts continue to avoid difficult ques-
BGH, 17 BGHZ 1; Judgment of Feb. 17, 1964, BGH, 41 BGHZ 151, 153-34; STAU-
DINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 3 annot. 1; Dawson, supra note 29, at 1107-08; Weber,
Zum Recht der Ailgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen, 1968 NJW I. In scholarly writing
it has also been proposed to use an analogy to BGB § 315 to justify substantive control
of standard form terms. The section concerns contract provisions that one party shall
determine the required performace of the other and gives guidelines of doing that in
accordance with good faith. See Lukes, BGB § 315 als Ausgangspunkt fur die Inhal-
tskontrolle allgemeiner Geschaftsbedingungen, 1963 NJW 1897; see also Dawson, supra
note 29, at 110 and n.170; K. LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT, § 6 (III) (10th ed. 1974);
Judgment of April 30, 1969, BGH, 38 BGHZ 183; the BGH subsequently has not
used this kind of reasoning.
"I See Judgment of May 8, 1973, BGH 60 BGHZ 377; Judgment of Feb. 28, 1973,
BGH, 60 BGHZ 243; STAUDINGER, supra note 65, AGBG § 3 annot.; cf. Dawson,
supra note 29, at 1110.
"I See Dawson, supra note 29, at 1107.
,13 See id. at 1111-13. The author shows how courts prior to the AGBG have dealt
with the same principles now contained in section 9 under the heading of unfair surprise.
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tions of substantive unfairness by using the unusual character and
the resulting lack of proper consent to invalidate a term. One proposal
seeks to limit the scope of section 3 to questions of physical
inconspicuousness 134 because of the type of print or the placement
of the term. 135 Historically, the two-fold line of argument shows that
questions of surprise and unfairness are closely related. Although
substantive unfairness does not in every case have to affect the assent
(and vice versa), inconspicuousness and the surprise factor both affect
assent and thus assist the unfairness inquiry. A fair clause is less
likely to be surprising. On the other hand, the substantive unfairness
of a clause makes it harder to find the assent genuine. The two
aspects of analysis thus do not concern completely separate issues
which can be properly distinguished and put into two different cat-
egories. Rather, in every case of objectionable terms one must explore
both procedural conspicuousness and substantive fairness in varying
degrees. Courts in every case must evaluate where the emphasis of
objectionability lies: on the method of securing the formal manifes-
tation of assent or on the very substance of the clause. It will be
the task of legal scholarship dealing with the AGBG in the next
decade to find principles for this evaluation.
114 German law does not require easy-to-read provisions like some provisions of
American insurance and consumer contracts. The rise in the 1970's of anti-jargon
legislation has proven to be a failure. The painfully obvious question is: To what extent
can plain language improve individual comprehension of contracts? See Davis, Protecting
Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbleygook: An Empirical Look at the Simpli-
fication of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841 (1977). Several tests (Flesch
and the Dale-Chall) have been divined by social scientists to ascertain the reading level
of a document and have been legislated to specify a desired level of readability. See,
e.g., W. YOUNG & E. HoLMEs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 237-48
(1985). Comprehension is the rub, not readability of words. Simply put, concepts are
less difficult and more comprehensible the more one is familiar with the subject matter.
Who is familiar with insurance policies? For an amusing example, see Skariat, Readable
Policies, 21 FOR rnE DEFENSE 17, 20 (1980) where the following was Fleschingly readable:
"Theorem: Let S be a set. Let it be bounded. Let it be infinite. Then there is at least
one point of accumulation of S. PROOF: S lies in a closed interval. Call it 1.1?.
Divide 1.1? into two parts . . ." In contrast, the following was adjudged unreadable:
"Crackle, crackle came the interference over the citizens band radio in Hernando's
eighteen-wheeler. Suddenly a sultry voice purred, 'Hello, eighteen-wheeler jockeys. This
here's Cynthia at Leroy's Trucker Haven. How about some you eighteen-wheeler jockeys
pulling into Leroy's for some exotic relaxation." Familiarity breeds comprehension?
For this article, these stimulating issues are rejected in favor of a pure objective approach.
See infra note 350.
"I Werber, Die Bedeutung des AGBG fur die Versicherungswirtschaft, 1986 VERsR
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E. Presumption of Enforceability or Unenforceability of Standard
Terms?
Does the AGBG base its control of standard form terms on the
presumption of enforceability or unenforceability of standard terms?
This question is not raised by German law, but is mentioned here
because the theory of presumed unenforceability of standard terms
will be addressed in connection with American law. For example,
Rakoff's article on contracts of adhesion (discussed subsequently)
uses this presumption.1 6
The proper formulation for the AGBG position is that "standard
terms are enforceable but only if. . ." One may call the AGBG
position a diluted presumption of enforceability. The word pre-
sumption may be inappropriate, for once the non-drafting party has
made a prima facie case that the contract terms were standardized,
their substantive fairness is reviewed as a matter of law. The judge
must review (n his own initiative. One cannot speak of a presumption
of enforceability in the sense of rules of evidence, as in drawing a
conclusion regarding causation from certain facts, nor in the sense
of U.C.C. § 2-719 (3) (limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable). By contrast, German law goes further in AGBG §§ 10
and 11. The clauses mentioned by those sections are always invalid.
In the case of AGBG § 9, however, validity depends on the court's
analysis. No specific burden of proof of invalidity is made since a
question of law is involved. The term "presumption" can thus be
used in a non-technical sense only, expressing a general attitude
whether standard terms deviating from dispositive law tend to be
enforceable or not. There is no easy answer in this non-technical
sense as to whether section 9 is based on a presumption of enforce-
ability or non-enforceability of standard terms. The tendency to strike
terms has grown constantly after the instrument of AGBG § 9 was
entrusted to the judges. The control of insurance policy terms, for
instance, has only recently begun in earnest, and insurance policy
terms will certainly come out differently in this process. Confronted
with this rising exorcism by the courts, drafters are asked to diminish
through modifications of the standard terms the gap between what
the court by law would state and what the standard terms state. On
the other hand, courts have to consider what standard terms provide
'16 Rakoff, supra note 1.
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when they develop principles of law for new businesses and com-
mercial innovations. Thus, the content of standard terms can become
an element of creation of law. As a general impression, one may
note that the courts have increased the requirements for valid standard
form contract clauses during the last decade. In Rakoff's terminology
that may indicate a trend towards presumptive unenforceability. That
observation, however, seems rather overdrawn. One should instead
describe the German process as a tightening of the strings between
dispositive law and standard terms.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW OF
STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
The elements in the American effort to develop a doctrinal approach
to standard form contracts will now be elaborated upon so that the
following Section Four can reorganize those elements with a synthesis
of the best from German law to formulate a new American theory.
This theory will primarily use the elements of American law but
systematize them in a manner influenced by German law.
Like German law, American law has used three basic concepts
(construction, assent, and substantive control) when dealing with
standard terms. The use of contract construction shall be addressed
first, as it is easily separated from the other two. The general law
regarding assent and substantive control shall then be presented,
followed by an evaluation of the scholastic attempt to develop a
coherent doctrine. Thereafter, the case law will be reviewed to discern
if the structural elements advanced by scholars are in fact used by
courts. Finally, U.C.C. § 2-302 shall be considered with special at-
tention paid to the problem of controlling contract terms through
the courts, a point of interest which has produced a lively discussion
about the doctrine of unconscionability. 37
17 Braucher, supra note 1; Davenport, supra note 1; Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle
and its Limits, 95 HAIv. L. REv. 241 (1982); Ellinghaus, Defense of Unconscionability,
supra note 1; Note, Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New Duties on
Commercial Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1983); Hillman,
supra note 1; Note, Unconscionability -The Code, the Courts and the Consumer, 9
B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 367 (1968); Note, Unconscionable Contracts: the Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 IOWA L. REv. 843 (1960); Johnson, supra note 1; Kornhauser,
supra note 1; Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1; Leff, Unconscionability and the
Crowd, supra note 33; Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1; Speidel, supra note
1; Vener, Unconscionable Terms and Penalty Clauses: A Review of Cases Under Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 89 COM. L. J. 403 (1984).
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A. Contract Construction: Contra Proferentem and the Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations
The traditional common law rule of construction, contra profer-
entem, supplements the equally traditional "plain meaning rule."
According to the plain meaning rule, contract language is given the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words. 3 ' The rule is still often
cited by the courts,3 9 although it has been criticized because words
never have one "correct" meaning. 140 The contra proferentem rule
adds that if language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible
to two interpretations, one of which favors each party, the under-
standing that is less favorable for the drafter or supplier of the words
is preferred.1 4'
Two underlying rationales for the contra proferentem rule are
usually advanced: the drafter is in the business of using this kind of
form and he could do better by writing better forms or explaining
them to the other party;' 42 and the drafter wrote a contract which
-38 Inman Mfg. Co. v. American Cereal Co., 133 Iowa 71, 110 N.W. 287, 290-91
(1907); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
119 Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 306,
469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983); Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 453, 233 A.2d 548 (1967); Herman v. Stern, 419 Pa. 275, 280,
213 A.2d 594, 598 (1965) (plain meaning rule decisive); State Bank of Albany v.
Hickney, 29 A.D.2d 993, 994, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981 (1968) (plain meaning rule applied);
a fine example is Rodemich v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 130 Ariz. 538, 637
P.2d 748 (1981) (a study in what the judge "believes" is the difference in the ordinary
meaning of "collision" and "colliding").
,40 A. CORBN, supra note 46, at 16; Hurst v. Lake & Co., 141 Or. 306, 16 P.2d
627 (1932) (explaining that the word "thousand" may mean different things according
to custom, codes, local dialects, etc).
14 E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 499 (1982); North Gate Corp. v. National Food
Stores, 30 Wis. 2d 317, 140 N.W.2d 744 (1966); Mohn v. American Cas. Co. of
Reading, 458 Pa. 576, 326 A.2d 346, (1974); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American
Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983); see also Gaunt v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947),
where Judge Learned Hand explained the rule this way: "[I]nsurers who seek to impose
upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft,
must bear the burden of resulting confusion." Heffron v. Jersey Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp.
5, 9 (E.D.S.C. 1956) aff'd, 242 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1957); Hathaway v. Commercial
Ins. Co., 85 Misc.2d 485, 380 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1976).
,42 Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 418 n.3, 421,
425 (Mo. App. 1981); KAUFMAN, CoRBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 561 (pointing
out that this is an application of the general rule that the law will place losses on the
party who can better avoid them); Holiday Homes of St. John, Inc. v. Lockhart, 678
F.2d 1176, 1186 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
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was unfair.'43 If the second rationale envisions unfairness in giving
the non-drafting party the expectation of a favorable meaning but
then asserting a different meaning, it is little more than a different
aspect of the first rationale, and is acceptable. However, if the second
rationale means that the contra proferentem rule is a way to secure
substantially fair terms in general,'4 it must be questioned. Where
rules of construction are applied to control the substance of a term,
the danger of hidden rationales becomes acute,1 45 for what is in reality
substantive control may be covertly called construction. As courts
can differ about what language is ambiguous,146 this danger is very
real. The relation between contra proferentem and substantive control
will be addressed later in this part.' 47 For the moment, the two
rationales may stand side-by-side with the acceptable understanding
of the fairness rationale.
American courts employed the contra proferentem rule as a specific
rule of construction for contracts drafted by one party' 48 long before
,3 KAUFMAN, CoRtaN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 561.
4 Apparently that is what it means to Kaufman. Id.
141 Spanogle, supra note 1, at 34-35 explicates the vicious circle of hidden substantive
control through "construction." As the drafter faces misconstruction by the courts, he
tries again to find clear language. Thus contract language becomes longer, more com-
plicated, more technical and impairs rather than helps the layman in understanding it.
Concerning the complications in administering the law through the use of construction
(or the concept of mutuality of obligation), see K. LLEwEuxN, COMMON LAW TRADION,
supra note 1, at 364-65; Hillman, supra note 1, at 17.
- Concerning the exclusion of intended injury in liability policies, see, e.g., Patrons-
Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981); Farmer Ins. Group v.
Sessions, 100 Idaho 914, 916, 607 P.2d 422, 424 (1980); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell,
18 Ariz. App. 486, 489, 504 P.2d 962, 965 (1973); Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 165 Ind.
App. 445, 451, 332 N.E.2d 240, 244 (1975) (all holding the exclusion of coverage for
intended injury in general liability policies ambiguous); Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co.
v. Phalen, 182 Mont. 448, 456, 597 P.2d 720, 724 (1979) (finding no ambiguity in the
same exclusion); and the controversy between the district court and court of appeals
regarding the term "occurrence" in a liability insurance policy in Michigan Chem.
Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 530 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Mich. 1982) ("occurrence"
ambiguous with regard to whether the causing event or the injury constitutes the
occurrence for purposes of determining the applicable coverage limits) and 728 F.2d
374 (6th Cir. 1984) (language not ambiguous because longstanding unequivocal con-
struction by the courts supplied).
147 See infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text. Compare also the German law
which has used construction over a long period of time to exercise substantive control,
and the complaint that the relation between construction and substantive constraints is
almost unexplored in U.S. law in Dugan, Standardized Form Contracts, supra note 1,
at 1327.
141 For what is not necessarily a standard form contract, because a contract may be
drafted for one particular bargain, cf. infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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theories of substantive control of standard form contracts were ap-
plied.' 49 This section explains how the contra proferentem rule is used
today and what the rule means, especially for standard form contracts.
The question of whether the rule will still be necessary after a new
American doctrine of substantive control of standardized terms has
developed is addressed at the end of this part. The answer to this
question, however, can only be given after reviewing the theoretical
efforts concerning substantive control. The relation between sub-
stantive control and contra proferentem will thus be a subject for
Section Four.
It has often been said that the contra proferentem rule does not
apply exclusively to contracts of adhesion. 150 Certainly, contra pro-
ferentem is not restricted to situations where a party with superior
bargaining power offered terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.'51 One
may doubt, however, that the rule applies to other than standardized
contracts. Very few situations can be envisioned where non-standard
terms are drafted by one party alone. Certainly, cases where a party
formulates and offers a contract document for only one particular
bargain are feasible.5 2 This article is not concerned with the question
of whether contra proferentem should apply to these contracts. Even
if specific rules for standard form contracts are advocated by this
article, that does not mean that one of these rules could not apply
to other situations as well. Therefore, the question of how far the
149 Overt substantive control of standard form terms is a product of the last twenty
to thirty years, as far as it is exercised at all. The landmark decision, Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), dates from the late fifties.
The contra proferentem rule has been around throughout the century; see American
Lithographic Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 81 N.J.L. 271, 80 A. 25 (1911);
Drainage Dist. No. 1. v. Rude, 21 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1927); Star-Chronicle Pub.
Co. v. New York Evening Post, Inc. 256 F. 435, 441 (2nd Cir. 1919); Dickinson v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 A. 866 (1924); Keefer Coal Co. of Ill. v.
United Elec. Coal Co., 291 Ill. App. 477, 10 N.E.2d 210 (1937); Winne v. Niagara
Fire Ins. Co., 91 N.Y. 185 (1883) (doubtful term in insurance company's instructions
to its agent); Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947); Ransom v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
43 Cal. 2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d 633, 636 (1954) (en banc); see also Rakoff, supra note
1, at 1268 n.285; for more references see CoRBiN, supra note 46, at 262-65.
,10 KAuFMAN, CoRB N SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 561 ("the rule of contra pro-
ferentem is occasionally applied to non-adhesion contracts.")
"I, E. FARNSWORTH supra note 141, at 499. 1
152 The example is in KAUFMAN, CoRBiN SuPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 561 (nearly
illiterate drafter contracting with a powerful corporation represented by able counsel
who could easily point out to the drafter the problems with his contract) but seems
somewhat unrealistic.
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application of contra proferentem should extend beyond the scope
of standard terms will not be addressed.
More important for this article are any limitations of the contra
proferentem rule which make it inapplicable to certain types of stan-
dard form contracts. One possible limitation is the requirement of
superior bargaining power of the drafting party as a prerequisite for
the application of contra proferentern. Courts have sometimes asked
if the rule is still applicable where the non-drafting party is a large
corporation with sophisticated management and counsel;' the ten-
dency, however, is to apply the rule. 5 4 Nevertheless, if one sees the
benefit of standardized contracts as accelerating contract formation
required by business needs,' it is sound to apply contra proferentem
even between equally sophisticated parties.
Another limitation concerns relatively important and singular deal-
ings. 5 6 Arguably the non-drafting party has sufficient reason and
opportunity to avoid ambiguities in a major outstanding business
deal and can make the contract read as it should have read, but
determining what is a major deal is troublesome and unpredictable.
In most cases of singular dealings, the terms have in fact been subject
to negotiations though they were drafted by one party. Under such
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1523 (D.D.C.
1984) (concerning the doctrine of reasonable expectations as a principle of construction);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425, 429 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (equal economic resources no reason not to apply contra proferentem to
commercial insurance policy); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682
F.2d 12, 21 n.6 (1st Cir. 1982); Grace Line, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d
361 (9th Cir. 1974); Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 522 F.2d 469, 474 n.
3 (7th Cir. 1975) (doubts expressed, but dictum); Schering Corp. v. Home Ins. Co.,
712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (doubts expressed, but only dictum); Eagle Leasing
Corp., v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F'2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (no need for
contra proferentem when injured large corporation managed by sophisticated busi-
nessmen).
"I Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1523 (D.D.C.
1984); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425,
429 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12,
21 n.6 (1982); Bay State Smelting Co. v. Ferric Indus., Inc., 292 F.2d 96 (1st Cir.
1961) (exporter drafted order confirmation in sale of copper to it).
'" See supra text accompanying note 44.
11 See Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 522 F.2d 469, 474-75 (7th Cir.
1975) (contra proferentem does not relieve court from first seeking to determine the
intent of the parties); Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 346 F.2d 962 (Ct.
Cl. 1965) (dictum: the obligation to seek clarification as to a patent ambiguity is
inherent); cf. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp
1300, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rejecting the claim of unfair surprise as to terms of a
large contract involving experienced firm).
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circumstances, it is convincing that both parties assume the respon-
sibility for the language of the terms. Thus, the rule should be
inapplicable to negotiated standard terms. 5 7 To draw the line for the
applicability of the contra proferentem between negotiated and im-
posed terms promises to be an easier distinction than the sophistication
of the non-drafting party or the importance of the transaction. The
problem with the latter lies in finding predictable criteria for the
necessary degree of sophistication or importance, which is too trou-
blesome to make those criteria workable.
Another possible limitation occurs when a third party drafts the
terms. As long as the third party is some kind of trade organization
for the supplier of the terms, the contra proferentem rule should
apply. 58 Trade associations draft terms in the interest of the user,
and the supplying party chooses to use those terms. Questions may
arise where the terms have been formulated by an organization rep-
resenting the interests of the submitting party5 9 or under control of
an administrative agency.' 60 Administrative agencies have a tendency
to become dominated by the interests of the people with whom they
usually have to deal.' 6 And as far as other organizations' participation
in the drafting process is concerned, the "representation" of non-
drafting parties lacks regular authority and control 62 (with the ex-
ception of unions in collective bargaining agreements). The partici-
pation of organizations or administrative agencies in the drafting
process is no basis for holding the non-drafting party equally re-
-5 Courts differentiate negotiated and unnegotiated terms, applying contra profer-
entem only to the latter. See Payroll Express Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 504 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified 659 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1981) (non-cancellation
provision negotiated); Powell v. Central Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Cal. App.
3d 540, 545, 130 Cal Rptr. 635, 640 (1976) (real choice for the customer pertaining to
variable or fixed rate mortgage); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 9 Ohio Misc. 113,
(Common Pleas 1966) (dictum); cf. Kinney v. Capitol-Strauss, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 574,
577 (Iowa 1973) (contra proferentem is inapplicable where the instrument is prepared
under scrutiny and with help of both parties' counsel).
', See KAUFMAN, CoaIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 563.
See First Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 424 F.2d 312, 317 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970) (terms to bankers blanket bond were
drafted under consultation of American Bankers Association). Another example is a
collective bargaining agreement. See Houston Oilers v. Neely, 361 F.2d 369 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840 (1967).
,60 See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 710-11, 552 P.2d 1178,
1185-86, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 889-90 (1976) (medical benefit plans negotiated by the
California Board of Retirement).
161 KAUFMAN, CORBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 574.
162 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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sponsible for the terms used. 163 The better view is to apply contra
proferentem even where third parties took part in the drafting process,
with the exception of collective bargaining agreements. 64
Finally, the negotiation of some of the contract terms is not a
valid reason for refusing to apply contra proferentem to the other
terms of the contract. 165 Otherwise, contra proferentem would be
meaningless because there are always terms in a transaction subject
to conscious choice, for example, the subject matter and perhaps the
price. Negotiation of some terms does not alter the character of the
rest of the terms.
Apart from the issue of limits on the applicability of the contra
proferentem rule,66 there is the question of how the rule applies.
163 First Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 424 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970).
-6 See supra note 71 for the exemption of labor law from the AGBG in German
law. The case is even stronger in American law because in Germany collective bargaining
agreements usually are applied to non-union members as well. But these agreements
differ in the way equal bargaining power is achieved. As the union is in the collective
bargaining business, the substantive reasons for special rules for standard terms do not
apply. There is no presumption that the content of the agreement can be prescribed
by one side.
165 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1254-55. For an example of a decision treating a standard
form contract like a negotiated one because one term (the price) was altered, see
Lamoille Grain Co., Inc. v. St. Johnsbury & L.C.R.R., 135 Vt. 5, 9, 369 A.2d 1389,
1391 (1976); see also Clinic Masters, Inc. v. District Court, 192 Colo. 120, 124, 456
P.2d 473, 475-76 (1976).
66 One more problem is proclaimed by insurers: that the rule cannot be applied
where terms are prescribed by regulation; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §
206 comment b (1981); CosRtN, supra note 46, at 267; Rosenthal v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 158 Wis. 550, 149 N.W. 155 (1914). The problem seems to be over estimated.
If there is a choice regarding the actual language, the reasons to apply contra proferentem
are still valid. If there is no choice at all, the insurance industry has easier access to
institutions able to change the wording of insurance contracts so that often prior insurer
language has been enacted as a regulation; therefore, the contra proferentem rule can
also apply in this case. See CoRBiN, supranote 46, at 267; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 206 comment b (1981). This, however, is not a convincing rationale to
apply a construction against the drafter and to consider insurers as the drafters. If the
language of the regulation is taken from prior customs and formulations, the construction
that was given to this prior language may be seen as integrated into the regulation.
Apart from that, there is no draft by one side any longer and the regulation should
be considered to be enacted for the benefit of both parties by a public institution to
secure the public interest and the fairness of terms. The underlying reason for contra
proferentem is no longer valid. It is a strange proposition to construe regulations against
the party lobbying for them. It may be responsive to the reality of democratic institutions
but it is difficult to incorporate into a theory. The distinction in applying contra
proferentem should thus simply be: was there any choice at all for the drafter or was
the language prescribed word-by-word?
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The manner of application may make an important difference in how
strongly contra proferentem works for the non-drafting party and
against the drafter. Two extant positions are epitomized by Corbin's
theory and the New York rule.
Corbin advocates contra proferentem as a last resort, to be applied
only after all the other instruments of interpretation and construction' 67
have failed.' 68 In contrast, the New York rule provides that if there
is a reasonable construction of the contract terms which favors the
non-drafting side, this reasonable construction should be applied. 69
While Corbin's theory primarily seeks a reasonable, clear meaning
of the contract language, the New York rule primarily searches for
the best reasonable meaning for the non-drafting party. The difference
between the two theories affects how often the contra proferentem
rule is invoked as well as the degree to which it works in favor of
the non-drafting party.
Critics assert that the contra proferentem rule is a matter of public
policy rather than a rule of construction because it does not actually
attempt to find the meaning of the parties' agreement.' 70 Whenever
contract construction is based on the objective theory of contracts,' 7'
however, construction involves an objective element that can be related
to public policy. One does not look for the true intent of the parties
but instead for a meaning that the law, taking the position of a
reasonable person, can give to the contract language. The contra
proferentem rule, like other rules of construction, presupposes that
to make business transactions predictable and reliable contract lan-
guage must be given a meaning that the parties can reasonably connect
,67 For an explanation of the differences between interpretation and construction, see
CoREBN, supra note 46, at § 534.
'16 CoRBIN, supra note 46, at 262; KAuFMAN, CORBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at
564; Rottkamp v. Eger, 74 Misc. 2d 858, 346 N.Y.S.2d 120, 127 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
- See Champion Int'l Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 400 F. Supp. 978, 980
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Datatab, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 F. Supp. 36,
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (sufficient if the insured can offer a possible construction of an
ambiguous provision); Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 386, 389, 183
N.E.2d 899, 901-02, 230 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1962) (concerning construction of an exclusion
clause in an insurance contract); Nat'l Screen Serv. Corp. v. United States Fidelity and
Guar. Co., 364 F.2d 275, 279-80 (2d Cir. 1968) (with a slightly different language
concerning exclusion clause in a comprehensive general liability insurance policy); Vargas
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1961); Filor, Bullard & Smyth
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 605 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962
(1979).
110 CoRBIN, supra note 46, at 270.
,", See FARNSWORTH, supra note 141, at 113-16.
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with their communication. That contra proferentem takes into account
the consequences of adjudicating different meanings of doubtful lan-
guage does not take it out of the rules of construction. Other rules,
such as construing doubtful terms in a manner giving a reasonable,
lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms, 72 evaluate the con-
sequences of construction.
There is, however, some truth in singling out contra proferentem
from other rules of contract construction, not because it is inherently
different, but because it is used in a different manner. Corbin's
treatise on contract law illustrates this difference by considering the
courts' control of fairness of adhesion contracts in the chapter on
contra proferentem.173 This way of treating the contra proferentem
rule is even more significant in Kaufman's 1984 supplement to Cor-
bin's Contract Law because of the extent of the growth of substantive
control. 74 Kaufman indicates that courts have used the technique of
finding an "ambiguity" and construing the contract against the drafter
as a back door to invalidate unfair adhesion terms.' 75 A theory that
gives a good example of how the line between construing a contract
against the drafter and exercising substantive control can become
blurred is the doctrine of reasonable expectations (DRE) used in
insurance law. 176 The DRE, originated in 1970 by Professor (now
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (a) (1981).
'73 CoRnIN, supra note 46, at 262-71, especially 270-71.
'14 KAUFMAN, CORBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 565-68.
,71 Id. at 567. For a clear, outspoken criticism of using ambiguity as a hidden
rationale, see Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz.
383, 389, 682 P.2d 388, 394 (1984). An earlier, now historical, example is given by
Kessler, supra note 1, at 633, with the reinterpretation of warranties in life insurance
policies into representations; see as an example Moulor v. American Life Ins. Co., 111
U.S. 335 (1884); Ehrenzweig & Kessler, Misrepresentation and False Warranty in the
Insurance Code, 9 U. Cm. L. REv. 209, 210 (1942). For another example, see Steven
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962). For
a criticism of strained construction, see also Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d
189, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1955) (J. Frank, dissenting).
176 See generally K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 101-32 (1986); W. YOUNG & E.
HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 72-83 (2d ed. 1985); Keeton,
Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970)
[hereinafter Keeton, Insurance Rights]; Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second
Decade, 12 FORUM 225 (1976); Note, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1175 (1982); Note, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603 (1980)
[hereinafter Note, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF.]; cf. Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1,
who attempts to base the entire theory of bargained-for contracts on a modified doctrine
of reasonable expectations.
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Judge) Robert Keeton is a formulation that indicates all its ambiguity
and the broad scope of possible application:
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be hon-
ored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations. 77
This formulation grants an option to use the DRE as a manner
of construction or a way of substantive control. Most courts will
apply the DRE only after finding contract language ambiguous.' 78
With the ambiguity prerequisite, the doctrine is little more than a
substitute for the contra proferentem rule. The DRE can be extended,
though, depending on how courts handle the ambiguity requirement. 179
The reasonable expectations of an insured or beneficiary may be
drawn from the contract as a whole and may concern what a term
should say rather than its actual wording. 80 Such reasoning opens
broader possibilities than construction of the contract language. For
example, burglary insurance policies provide that the fact of a burglary
has to be proven by visible marks on the outside of a building which
show violent entry. If that evidentiary provision is deemed clear and
unambiguous, the policy cannot cover a case where there are no
outside visible marks even if other evidence clearly indicates a theft
occurred and was not an inside job. Courts applying the DRE in
such case' give coverage by determining what a proper burglary
insurance policy should say. These courts thus cross the borderline
,17 Keeton, Insurance Rights, supra note 176, at 967; see also Rodman v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973); C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975).
171 Machinery Center, Inc. v. Anchor Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 434 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.
1970); Wolf Mach. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 133 Cal. App. 3d 324, 328, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 695, 697 (1982); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 22 Cal. 3d
409, 583 P.2d 1335, 149 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1978); Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 927-28 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Adkisson,
121 I11. App. 3d 224, 459 N.E.2d 310 (3d Dist. 1984).
,19 Compare Note, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF., supra note 176, at 613-16.
-' See Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 594, 388 A.2d 1346, 1353
(1978).
"I United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Woodward, 118 Ga. App. 591, 164 S.E.2d
878 (1968) (dealing with the same problem in terms of ambiguous language); C. & J.
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Ferguson v.
Phoenix Assurance Co. of N.Y., 189 Kan. 459, 470-71, 370 P.2d 379, 387 (1962)
(reasoning: definition is evidentiary condition and as such against public policy); Atwater
Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985).
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into substantive control.8 2 The transgression of mere construction is
even more apparent when no ambiguity is required before application
of DRE.13
The possibility of departing into substantive control is indicated
by Keeton's formulation. The phrase "even though painstaking study
of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations"
suggests that the DRE may exceed the scope of possible meanings
of the words. Keeton's language, however, is cautious. He says only
that the reasonable expectations should be enforced although a "pains-
taking" study of the language would reveal otherwise. He thereby
indicates that only a limited deviation from the contract language
should be permitted, or perhaps that only the efforts to resolve
ambiguities should be limited. If Keeton's formulation is understood
to mean that not every effort must be made to find an objective,
clear meaning of the contract language, it is similar to the New York
contra proferentem rule.
The DRE is thus an example of how the step from construing
ambiguous language to substantive control can be taken without
openly admitting that substantive control is exercised. That the line
between construing ambiguous language and substantive control may
be blurred does not mean, however, that there is no difference between
the two. Construing ambiguous language always involves substantive
issues because it requires a choice between different substantive pos-
sibilities. Construction is still concerned with a possible meaning that
812 See Note, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF., supra note 176, at 606-07, for distinguishing
three types of "ambiguity" in relation to the doctrine of reasonable expectations: (1)
inconspicuous exclusion clauses which do not sufficiently warn of limitations of primary
coverage [Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 267, 419 P.2d 168, 170, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 106 (1966)]; (2) the use of incorrect, uncertain, or unclear terms (ambiguity
in the true sense of the term), Elliot Leasing Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810 (R.I.
1977) (car rental contract stated that agency would pay for "accident repairs" caused
by collisions without mentioning negligence: agency and insurer liable for repairs caused
by customer); and (3) contradiction between oral representations or extrinsic information
and the written policy, Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 294-95, 255 A.2d 208,
212 (1969); N. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975) (contradiction
between the term "accident" and flyer advertisement language); Klos v. Mobil Oil Co.,
55 N.J. 117, 259 A.2d 889 (1969) (date of coverage in policy and application varied).
8I Davenport Peters Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 286, 290-91 (D.
Mass. 1980) (with a list of decisions using the DRE without requiring ambiguous
language); Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271
(Minn. 1985) (with an account of jurisdictions using the DRE without requiring ambiguity
of policy language). But see Minn. Ct. of App., Slip Opinion No. CI-86-313, Aug.
12, 1986 limiting the holding in Curtis v. Home Ins. Co. For a discussion favoring
ambiguity as a requirement, see Note, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF., supra note 176, at 621.
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can be taken from the words. Substantive control, however, goes
further if the meaning of the wording is not decisive. A standard
taken from outside the contractual relationship is used as a gauge:
how the contract should read.8 4 Because there is a difference between
substantive control and construction of contract language, both may
have a legitimate right to exist. Section Four will return to this issue.
To summarize: the contra proferentem rule has a proper but limited
place in any theory of law for standard terms. The rule, however,
can sometimes wrongfully serve as an instrument for hidden sub-
stantive control. This covert tendency of courts to cross the border
from construction to control shows that the rule, taken alone, is not
sufficient to provide the legal answer for the phenomenon of standard
terms. Therefore, what will be addressed next are alternative means
of control of standard terms: the requirements of a valid, non-
defective assent to standard terms and their substantive control.
B. Scholarly Concepts of Standard Form Contract Law
Several American scholars have attempted to develop a compre-
hensive approach to standard terms."8 5 Before evaluating the less
systematic approaches of courts, it may be beneficial to explore the
most important of these scholarly efforts which can help structure
the American law encountered in court decisions. Although rooted
in the common law of contracts, these scholars attempt to formulate
special principles for dealing with standardized contracts.
1. Slawson's Parallel to Administrative Law
Slawson seeks to treat standard form contracts systematically dif-
ferently from negotiated contracts. 8 6 Standard form terms, according
84 Slawson also perceives this difference. See Slawson, Democratic Control, supra
note 1, at 562-63.
"I Before these attempts are described and evaluated, it should be mentioned that
there is still the position that the market (through elite buyer groups) can take care of
imbalances in standard terms. Therefore, traditional contract law should be applied.
See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 638-39 (1979). The problem
is not that the model is wrong but that the demands of certain buyer groups are often
more economically ignored or specially served instead of taken as an incentive to change
contract clauses generally. The level of intervention is thus changed through such an
approach to the problem. See also Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle
of the Forms: A Reassessment of Sec. 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1254-57 (1982)
(arguing in favor of the mirror-image rule and against U.C.C. § 2-207 by reasoning
that since the seller must be aware that at least some buyers will read his form he has
an incentive not to overdraft the form.) The answer to the elite-buyer theory is provided
by Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1, at 42-46.
,16 Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at 529-66; Slawson, New Meaning,
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to Slawson, should be subject to judicial review regarding their com-
pliance with general standards of the common law or generally rec-
ognized principles. 187 Slawson justifies this kind of judicial control
with a parallel to administrative law. 8 1
Slawson views contracting as a form of private lawmaking. The
parties make the rules which should govern the enforcement of their
agreement. As legislative lawmaking has changed, private lawmaking
has done likewise. The legislator today makes only a portion of the
law and delegates to members of the administration the responsibility
for filling in the gaps. Contract law has reached the same stage.
Instead of agreeing on all the terms, the parties concentrate in their
negotiations on a small part of the terms and delegate to one party
the power to provide the rest. 8 9
Administrative law keeps the delegated lawmaking of agencies con-
sistent with legislative intent and otherwise in the public interest. 19°
The courts review agency lawmaking not only in the light of au-
thoritative standards like constitutional or statutory law but also in
conformity to non-authoritative, commonly recognized standards in
the p-ublic interest.' 9' In traditional contract law, the consent of the
parties authorizes their control over law applied against them. Tra-
ditional contract law is thus needed to review the contract only in
the light of authoritative standards. For standard terms, however,
Slawson claims that the same extent of review as for delegated ad-
ministrative lawmaking is necessary:
A law made by one private person for another, without the other's
consent - a standard form sought to be enforced against a person
who had no reasonable opportunity to read it, for example - should
supra note 1, at 34-35. Similarly, Leff has denied the contractual nature of adhesion
terms and has seen them as "things" to be regulated like products. See Leff, Contract
as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 131, 144-45 (1970); the same idea is expressed in Slawson,
Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-20 (1974).
"8 Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at 532.
In A similar idea is expressed by Kaufman, as underlying support for control of the
fairness of standard form terms. See KAUFMA", CoRBiN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at§ 559E. Slawson has renounced his parallel to administrative law in the meantime. See
Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1, at 41. It is nevertheless included here because
the parallel marks an original step in the development of American standard form
contract theory and is illustrative of Slawson's position. The criticism that, without
speaking of the adhering party's assent, the enforcement of standard terms cannot bejustified is still valid without any parallel to administrative law.
189 Slawson, Democratic Control, supra note 1, at 532-33.
'9 Id. at 533.
01 Id. at 534-35.
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be subjected to judicial review by virtue of the same authority as
a court has for enforcing it in the first place. 92
Slawson distinguishes two basic situations regarding standard form
terms. One situation occurs when the submitting party gives some
kind of assent to the terms of the contract. The whole standard form
is rarely a manifestation of assent, however, because it contains terms
of which the recipient is usually ignorant. If some kind of assent is
given, the private lawmaker could assume that his lawmaking was
valid unless the other party raised an appropriate challenge. Then
the private lawmaker would have to show conformity of the challenged
terms to non-authoritative standards.
The second situation arises when the recipient's agreement is ad-
hesive. Such an agreement does not express the adherent party's
consent. Therefore, the drafter has to show as part of his prima
facie case that the terms are in conformity with non-authoritative
standards. 193 Adhesive terms are those which the recipient had no
reasonable way to avoid. 194 Where the legitimacy of contract terms
is not derived from the act of bargaining, their legitimacy has to be
reviewed vis-a-vis generally accepted non-authoritative standards. 95
Examples of contracts of adhesion are contracts with monopolistic
utitities 196 and "contracts by imposition" where adhesive terms are
connected with ordinary contractual activity, such as liability dis-
claimers or remedy limitations used in theatres, parking lots, dry
cleaners, or restaurants. 197
There are two major problems with Slawson's theory. Since he
does not develop the particulars to which standard terms must con-
form, his theory demands an inquiry into the market situation every
time a standard form term goes to court. His theory depends on the
adhesive or non-adhesive nature of the contract and, therefore, on
the market situation in determining who has the burden of proof
regarding compliance with general standards. This burdensome inquiry
makes it difficult for the drafter to predict how his standard terms
192 Id. at 538.
193 Id. at 538-39.
194 Id. at 549-50. "The party resisting enforcement [on grounds of adhesion] must
have had no reasonable choice but to make the contract, and the party seeking
enforcement must have narrowed the choices of the first party by illegitimate means."
Id. at 550.
191 Id. at 552-53.
19 Id. at 554.
19 Id. at 555-56.
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will be reviewed because, depending on the particular time and place
of formation, the contract may or may not be found adhesive.
The second problem concerns the theoretical justification Slawson
gives for judicial review. He refuses to see standard terms as part
of the contractual agreement because the recipient cannot assent to
something that he did not even read. Slawson's theory of private
lawmaking, however, is based on the assumption that the non-drafting
party leaves the lawmaking to the other, 9 which means that the
adherent party consents to the other party's lawmaking. If there is
no basis to assume assent to the boilerplate terms (a general or blanket
assent to one party's supplying the terms as advanced by Llewellyn'99),
there is likewise little basis for assuming consent to the drafter's
lawmaking activity. 200
The non-drafting party arguably does not grant the power of
lawmaking. If anything, the law, that is the courts, give the drafting
party the power of lawmaking. The question is whether the law can
and should do so. The answer is clearly "no" because conveying
such power comports with neither private nor public law. Private
entities have no public, democratic legitimation to make rules for
other people beyond the limits of their voluntary subjection. Thus,
the foundations for the lawmaking of standard form drafters could
only be commercial power and business needs. Neither are sufficient
under contract law to justify enforcement. What justifies the en-
forcement of standard terms is rather private toleration of such terms,
coupled with the advantage for both sides of stating the applicable
law for the particular contract. Therefore, it seems more realistic and
theoretically more appropriate to approach the phenomenon of stan-
dard terms with a modified theory of assent than with concepts of
general lawmaking power. For example, Slawson recently renounced
his parallel to administrative law and pronounced the contract to be
what the parties reasonably expected. Their reasonable expectations
are fulfilled by enforcing the stated contract terms or by using the
rules of law when their contract terms are unreasonable. 201 Such an
approach is as indistinct and indiscrete as unconscionability, and
similarly does not resolve the problem of justification of standard
19 Id. at 533 ("[the parties] now agree to only a part .... and delgate to one of
them... the power to make the rest.")
199 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
For the same criticism in Rakoff, see supra note 1, at 1213-14.
201 Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1, at 26-28 and 71-72.
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term enforcement. Justification must, at least in part, originate in
the non-drafting party's assent.
2. The Concept of Limited Assent: Llewellyn, Murray, Et
Aliter
.A different approach to standard form contracts is taken by a
number of scholars 2 2 adapting ideas first advanced by Karl Llew-
ellyn.203 Their starting point is generally not the problem of standard
form contracts in particular, 204 but instead the concept of uncons-
cionability. Excepting price unconscionability,25 the issues these scho-
lars discuss primarily concern standard form terms even though
unconscionability is not so restricted. Their approach is contractual
in nature and concentrates on the difference between the assent to
bargained-for contract terms and to adhesive terms (including stan-
dardized terms). Their theory justifies enforcement of standard terms
through the assent of the non-drafting party, but advocates, given
any changed circumstances in obtaining the assent, the review of the
validity and extent of the assent. Llewellyn distinguished the assent
to the broad type of transaction and the few dickered terms subjected
to a conscious decision from the "assent" to boilerplate language.
In so doing Llewellyn saw specific assent only in the first instance. 206
- MURRAY, ON CONTRACTS, supra note 46, at 747-49; Murray, Unconscionability,
supra note 1; Spanogle, supra note 1; Holmes, supra note 1, at 789-91; Ellinghaus,
supra note 1.
10 K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 1, at 362-71; Llewellyn, On
Warranty of Quality, and Society (pt. 2), 37 COLUM. L. REv. 341, 393-94 (1937)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Warranty]; Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 1; Llewellyn,
Common-Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?, 41 COLuM. L. REv.
863, 869-71 (1941) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Common-Law Reform]; Llewellyn, What
Price, supra note 34, at 731-34 (not convinced that special control for mass contracts
is necessary).
With the exception of Llewellyn, who formulated his thoughts especially for
standard form contracts.
-o F. N. Roberts Pest Control Co. v. McDonald, 132 Ga. App. 257, 260, 208 S.E.2d
13, 15 (1974) (contract between home improvement business and 87-year old woman);
American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 0964);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc.2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Term 1969);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966),
rev'd, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (N.Y. App. Term 1967).
The similarity of this aspect of the theory with the English theory of fundamental
breach is often pointed out. See Spanogle, supra note 1, at 945; Meyer, Contracts of
Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178, 1187-99
(1964); Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 72-79; Note, Unconscionability and
the Fundamental Breach Doctrine in Computer Contracts, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
547 (1982). This is not pursued further because it is not particularly helpful.
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Regarding boilerplate language, he spoke of a blanket assent since
the fine-print boilerplate is normally not read and understood. This
blanket assent concerns any "not unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms and are neither in the
particular nor in the net manifestedly unreasonable or unfair. '20 7 In
this passage, Llewellyn concentrated on the defects in the assent to
boilerplate language. On other occasions, he emphasized the question
of control of unfairness and oppressiveness of standard terms. 208
In principle, Llewellyn favored the enforcement of standard terms.
He saw them as having the advantage of allowing businesspersons
to adapt the law to their business needs and to develop new types
of transactions. 209 He also understood, however, that the very nature
of standard terms affects the non-drafting party's assent to incor-
poration of such terms into the contract and that standard terms can
be strongly one-sided in favor of the drafting party. 210 Llewellyn's
theory permits commerce to create new contractual transactions and
adapt traditional law to business needs by using standard forms, while
at the same time encourages courts to review standardized clauses in
the light of basic principles of reasonableness and fairness.
In Llewellyn's theory two aspects of standard form contracts work
together to justify the exorcism of objectionable clauses: the character
of assent to standard terms (which is weaker in nature than the assent
to bargained-for terms), and the substantive evaluation of standard
terms in the light of the entire transaction. These two aspects are
not further elaborated or distinguished. Llewellyn did not develop a
systematic approach to decide what is unreasonable and too unfair.
He did indicate, however, that legal authority and trade practice may
serve as guidelines. 2"
2 K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 1, at 370; cf. Oldfather,
Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of the Adhesion Contractor's Lawmaking,
16 U. KAN. L. REv. 303, 305-06 (1968); compare also Spanogle, supra note 1, at 340-
42.
2m K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADMON, supra note 1, at 366, 371; see also
Spanogle, supra note 1, at 942-43, who perceives that Llewellyn's theory has these two
aspects of defective assent and unfair substance.
109 Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 1, at 704-05; K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW
TRADITION, supra note 1, at 367; cf. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 626-32 (1975) (discusses the UCC
policy in Article Two influenced considerably by Llewellyn).
210 See K. LLEWEuYN, COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 1, at 362.
211 Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 1, at 704.
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It is at this point that Murray elaborates and refines Llewellyn's
theory.2 12 Other authors have joined in shaping its contours and
boundaries. 213 Murray differentiates between the contract as expressed
in the written document and the actual contract formed by the parties,
the "true circle of assent." Concepts like mistake or the doctrine of
constructive conditions are always used to go beyond the written
document and arrive at the real contract (or circle of assent). 214 Murray
wants to apply the doctrine of unconscionability in the same manner
to find the contract as the parties concluded it behind the expressions
of the written document.
215
This theory poses no problem where the written document and the
"circle of assent" are identical. This occurs when all terms are subject
to bargaining or are at least explained and voluntarily agreed upon.
The allocation of legal risks is expected for both sides. 216 Again, there
is no problem with boilerplate terms when they allocate the legal
risks in a way that is expected or at least not unexpected, which
means basically that the standard terms are in accordance with what
reasonable parties under normal circumstances would assume to reg-
ulate their contractual relation. 21
7
The problematic case is an unexpected risk allocation. 21 Such occurs
where it is questionable if the written document expresses the agree-
ment of the parties. Murray proposes a closer analysis of the non-
drafting party's assent to determine whether it is defective regarding
the unexpected written term(s). 219
212 Murray, Unconsicionability, supra note 1; MURRAY, ON CONTRACTS, supra note
46, at 745-49; see the summary of Murray's theory in Speidel, supra note 1, at 361-
62.
213 Holmes, supra note 1, at 789-801. This understanding of the terms has to be
distinguished from another one used by Leff. See Leff, Unconscionability, supra note
1, at 489-528. Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 762-63, 773, 775, adopts Leff's distinction
between procedural and substantive unconscionability, referring to defects in the bar-
gaining process as well as unfairness of terms. Ellinghaus adds the distinction between
substantive overall unconscionability and unconscionability of specific parts of the
contract, the latter being the proper starting point for the review of standard form
terms. Similarly, see Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1053-54, using the terms "non-sub-
stantive" and "substantive" unconscionability; Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F.Supp.
264, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976). But see Hillman, supra note 1, at 2-3, 21-22 (criticizes the
procedural substantive distinction used in Leff's sense).
214 Murray, Unconscionabiity, supra note 1, at 6-11.
215 Id. at 5-6.
26 Id. at 15-16.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 18.
219 Id. at 14-49. If the risk allocation is unexpected, Murray asks next if this is
19871
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Similar to Llewellyn's distinction between blanket and specific as-
sent, Murray distinguishes apparent and genuine assent. 220 Apparent
assent concerns essentially standardized contract terms. Since those
terms are usually not subject to bargaining and are not even read,
the question is to what extent the signing party is bound by standard
terms. To put it differently, the question is how far the duty to read
is extended. Murray would hold a signing party bound only to those
terms the party had the opportunity to read and understand. 22' Thus,
Murray places the risk of not reading the contract document on the
signing party only where this party had a chance to know what he
signed.
To analyze whether apparent assent to any boilerplate terms exists,
Murray inquires whether the terms have been specially agreed upon
and, in the absence of such special agreement, whether the assent of
the non-drafting party is impaired because the terms were incon-
spicuous. 22 2 A term can be inconspicuous in two ways: the term can
be hidden (put in fine print or the like) so that it cannot reasonably
be found or, even if a term is physically conspicuous, it may be
formulated in a way that the signing party cannot understand. These
two catagories of inconspicuousness are labelled by other scholars
"procedural unconscionability," with two sub-categories of physical
and substantive inconspicuousness. 223 The landmark case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. illustrates these categories. 224 In
Henningsen, the court found a limitation of liability in the fine print
on the back of a car sales contract insufficiently conspicuous to be
discovered by the buyer. The court thus acknowledged a lack of
physical conspicuousness. In addition, the decision posited whether
an ordinary layman could be expected to realize what he was being
granted in the contract's "limited warranty" and what he was relin-
material for the bargain. The question is put this way: "If the risk is allocated to the
disfavored party according to the clause, will such party still receive the substantial
benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated?" Id. This question seems unnec-
essary for a practical analysis. What one party thought important enought to mention
in a form and the other party thinks important enough to attack in court should usually
be material. This part is consequently left out when considering Murray's theory here.
Id. at 29-31, 40-43.
22, Id. at 15.
12 Id. at 14-21, see especially at 18.
=1 Murray speaks only of a clear wording. Id. at 20-21. For the distinction between
physical and substantive inconspicuousness, see Holmes, supra note 1, at 792-94; compare
also the definition "conspicuous" in U.C.C. § 1-201(10).
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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quishing in return. What was in fact a limitation of liability the
contract labeled a "limited warranty" purporting to give the buyer
something by granting replacement of defective parts. For an ordinary
buyer it may not be clear that through such a formulation, when
combined with the exclusion of other remedies, he gives up the right
to recover for personal injuries. This ambiguity is the concern of
substantive inconspicuousness.
For the issue of apparent assent, Murray does not consider factors
such as inequality of bargaining power, the subject matter of the
contract being a necessity or a frill, or the availablity of different
provisions in other suppliers' standard forms. The buyer "signed
without a reasonable opportunity to know of the clause; therefore,
at least the choice of signing or not signing with knowledge of the
clause was precluded. ' 221 For the issues of choice, it makes no dif-
ference whether the subject matter was necessary, or whether a choice
existed.
A term lacking apparent assent is void. If there is apparent assent,
the next question is one of genuine assent: did the non-drafting party
have a genuine choice to avoid the term? 226 For the issue of genuine
assent, it is important whether the subject matter is a necessity or a
frill. Murray argues that because a frill is unnecessary a no-choice
situation does not exist. The buyer can avoid the clause by not
signing. 2 7 Other factors considered are the respective bargaining power
of the parties, whether the customer can procure the same item or
service from other suppliers without similar standard terms, 228 and
the determination and circumstances of the relevant market where
the buyer is able to look for an alternative.
Other attempts to systematize the unconscionability analysis have
considered the situation of the "stuck" party having no choice to
avoid the harsh clause. 229 One may label this aspect of finding a
225 Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 30.
1 Id. at 28.
- Id. at 21. The issue of considering whether the subject matter of the contract is
a necessity or a frill shall not be further elaborated here. It is disqualified by being
neglected in subsequent legal scholarship, a fate Braucher predicted. Braucher, supra
note 1, at 346. Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 555, is correct in criticising
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), for using
the same considerations as Murray proposed. It is not for the courts to tell the poor
what is superfluous for them.
221 Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 32.
2 Holmes, supra note 1, at 794-96; see also KAuFmAN, CoRBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 1, at § 559C.
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contract term unconscionable as either "substantive unconscionabil-
ity" or "no-choice unconscionability. ' ' 230 Leff and Ellinghaus distin-
guish procedural unconscionability (defects in the bargaining process)
from substantive unconscionability (the unfairness of terms).23 This
distinction is useful in identifying the concepts of defective (impaired)
assent and unfairness control. This theory of unconscionability, which
uses impaired assent as a starting point, can be summarized as follows:
bargained-for (expected) terms and standard terms which do not shift
to the non-drafting party risks not assumed under normal circum-
stances in a reasonable bargain (not unexpected terms) are subject
to traditional contract law. Unexpected terms are first tested with
regard to apparent assent and must be procedurally and substantively
conspicuous. If unexpected terms are not conspicuous in either man-
ner, they are not part of the bargain. Inconspicuous terms are void
without regard to the availability of other contract terms in the
market. Conspicuous terms are then subjected to the question of
genuine assent. If the adherent party had no choice but to accept
the unexpected conspicuous term it is, again, not part of the real
contract and therefore invalid. The impaired party does not have to
make an inquiry into the availability of choices, since a party is not
required to do something that is useless.
To develop a theory of standard form contract law, a number of
aspects of Murray's theory need scrutiny. Murray formulated his
theory specifically for unconscionable contracts, therefore, some ad-
justments must be made. The first striking characteristic of Murray's
theory is that it does not openly concede that invalid standard terms
are replaced by terms imposed by the law. Instead, the theory tries
to legitimate the imposed terms with the intent of the parties. Murray
opposes the contractual agreement as written in favor of the true
agreement. The purpose of an unconscionability analysis is to reform
the written agreement and make it comply with the true agreement.
The true agreement is not what the parties subjectively intended but
what the law perceives as agreed-upon on the basis of the objective
theory of contract. The question is what the parties, as reasonable
persons, can be said to have agreed upon, notwithstanding contra-
23 For the terminology, see Holmes, supra note 1, at 794-97; Murray, Unconsicion-
ability, supra note 1, at 21 (illustrates the distinction between procedural and substantive
unconscionability in equity).
23 Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 762-63; Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 489-
528.
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dicting expressions in the contract document. The contract document
may not be taken at face value because the awareness creating a
standardized contract document impairs the non-drafting party's abil-
ity to control the drafter and thus influences the contract's formu-
lation. Although the law plays an important role in determining which
provisions will be enforced, the legitimation of enforcement rules via the
legal standard of the reasonable person instead of the written contract
terms is "personalized": the true agreement of the parties is en-
forced.232 The same attitude of justifying the invalidation of standard
terms with the parties' intent pierces through Llewellyn's formulation,
albeit vaguely.233 The reason given for substituting terms provided by
law is that the parties in their true bargain agreed to those terms.
Unlike traditional contract law, the bargain is not taken at face value
as expressed in the contract document. A more perspicuous analysis
is needed to determine the extent of the bargain.
The German lawyer would look at this reasoning with amazement.
Once again it is not expressly stated that the law provides rules in
a situation where the parties want to go through with a deal, but
the circumstances of contract formation enable one party to impose
a burden to which the "stuck" party does not assent in a legally
enforceable manner. It is not true that the parties actually agreed to
something different from what the writing expresses. The drafting
party wants his overreaching terms. The other party wants the trans-
action but not the unexpected and unnoticed clauses. The law could
take the formal position that, upon signing, the non-drafting party
is bound by unknown terms because of his signature, notwithstanding
the form and content of those terms. If the law does not extend the
objective theory of contract beyond this simplistic rule, only one
alternative exists: there is no valid mutual assent to the harsh or
unexpected terms at all. One party wanted only these terms, and the
other party cannot be said to have agreed to those terms. If the
parties completed their bargain without mutual assent, 234 the only
way to supply valid terms is to replace by dispositive law all those
standard terms on which the parties did not successfully agree.
Arguably, the background justification for substituting standard
terms by legal provisions is not important as long as the rules derived
232 See Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 13, 20, 42-43.
233 See K. LLEWELLYN, CommoN LAW TRADITON, supra note 1, at 370 (basing the
limitation of enforcement of harsh standard terms on the concept of assent); see also
supra note 51.
Usually problems appear after the parties perform, at least in part, their contract.
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from the background theory are workable. One account of the avail-
able structure using an unconscionability analysis shows that the
theory of unconscionability provides a method of analysis without
referring to Murray's background justification.235 This theory can be
shaped more specifically for standard form contracts than done by
Murray. This theory elaborates the system of unconscionability anal-
ysis for insurance contracts, distinguishing procedural and substantive
unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability deals with the two
aspects of physical and substantive inconspicuousness as previously
mentioned. An alternative analysis, "unconscionability per se," is
the substantive control of oppressive terms under public policy aspects
set against the backdrop of a contracting process impairing free choice
concerning contract terms. 236
Since any unconscionability analysis can be formulated in a manner
that gives law the role of substituting invalid standard terms, one
may say that only the analytical structure counts, no matter how the
application of this structure is justified. Given, however, the courts'
tendency not to interfere with contracts made by the parties, Murray's
reasoning apparently is one more device to avoid a clear statement
of what is necessary in dealing with standard form contracts. To
justify replacement of standard terms by legal provisions allows the
courts to continue pretending that they do nothing but what they
have always done: enforce the agreement of the parties. Such a
justification avoids the clear statement that standard form contracts
regulate business transactions in a manner different from negotiated
contracts and that the role assumed by the law regarding standard
terms is therefore different. Murray's background theory holds that
the law intervenes at certain points because it will not lend its en-
forcement power to overly one-sided deals not reached on the basis
of true bargaining. The efforts to formulate background legitimation
with its roots in the true assent of the parties should be abandoned.
Another important characteristic of Murray's theory is his failure
to distinguish standard form contracts from bargained-for contracts.
Murray develops a theory of unconscionability rather than a theory
of standard form contracts. The modern concept of unconscionability,
as expressed in U.C.C. § 2-302, addresses unconscionable contracts
as a whole as well as single unconscionable clauses, and can thus be
used to deal with standardized contract terms as well as with bar-
233 Holmes, supra note 1, at 789-801.
236 Id. at 796-97.
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gained-for contracts. The first point of Murray's unconscionability
test, the idea of apparent assent, is specially adapted to standard
form terms. A review of the conspicuousness of untypical terms makes
sense only where those terms have not been negotiated. Murray
eliminates negotiated terms because negotiated terms are not unex-
pected. He also eliminates explained terms as not belonging within
the scope of the apparent assent analysis because they are not un-
expected. Murray's test could be revised to determine: whether a
standard form term is concerned; whether a term, though included
in a standard form, is subject to negotiation and could therefore be
treated as a bargained-for term;23 7 whether the remaining standard
form terms are unexpected in their risk allocation; and finally, whether
the unexpected terms are conspicuous. Such a test would have the
same basic effect as Murray's test with the advantage of clearly
showing that a special doctrine for standard terms is applicable,
making the initial test for entering into the analysis easy and pre-
dictable. One objection to this test is that it does not include form
contracts drafted for a single bargain. Such form contracts are rare,
however, and traditional contract law should be sufficient to deal
with them. 238 Even if special form contracts are not subjected to
traditional contract analysis, there is still the possibility of applying
the rules for standard form contracts by analogy.
The second part of Murray's theory, the issue of genuine assent,
is broader in scope than the first issue of apparent assent. Genuine
assent concerns traditional as well as standard form contracts. The
inquiry into the circumstances of contracting makes this part of
Murray's theory too burdensome for practical, substantive control
of standard terms. Murray's test of genuine assent is apt to control
cases of extreme inadequacy in the overall exchange of any type of
contract, standardized or not. Compared with German law, the issue
of genuine assent is similar to the controlling of unequivalence through
BGB § 138239 rather than the substantive control of standard form
terms in AGBG § 9.240
2u KAuIAmA, CORBN' SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 579 (an example of this portion
of the test can be found here).
238 See KAurmAN, CoRanN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 572 (proposing the application
of traditional contract law).
239 See supra note 26 and text at notes 128 and 129; Dawson, supra note 29, at
1046, 1068-71, and 1103-10 (especially concerning the significance of BGB § 138 for
the law of standard form contracts).
m See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
1987]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L.
The issue of genuine assent as used by Murray is not a special,
particularized device for substantive control of standard form terms, 24'
but such a special control is necessary. Courts (and scholars) have
openly used substantive control of unfair or oppressive terms to
invalidate standard terms. 242 Substantive control is a more candid
invalidating device where the criticism concerns not the formulation
of a term or its placement in a contract form but rather the very
substance of a standardized clause. Murray's test (whether the ad-
herent party had a choice of alternative contracts and can be said
to have assented genuinely to the contract terms) applies the same
standards to bargained-for and to standardized contracts. Once the
contract form is understandable, in principle, the "duty to read"
fully applies simply because the fact that standard form contracts
are usually not read and are not supposed to be read is not considered.
Murray's theory of genuine assent extends the duty to read too
far in light of the realities of contract formation. It restricts direct
substantive control of standard terms to cases of gross unfairness
sufficient to invalidate a non-standard form contract. There is, there-
fore, a missing link between the test for procedural unconscionability
(especially for standard form contracts) and the general concept of
no-choice or overall unconscionability (which can concern any type
of contract, and consists of a combination of impaired choice and
harsh clauses). The missing link is a test for substantive uncons-
cionability, specifically of standard form terms. To formulate such
a manageable test for routine control of standard form terms, it must
be less complicated and time-consuming to apply than no-choice
unconscionability. Such a test would be more severe than the no-
choice unconscionability test because standard form terms do not
enjoy the presumption of a fair exchange. This presumption must
be overcome before the typical non-standardized contract is invali-
dated for reasons of one party's impaired choice.
This additional test could be called unconscionability per se or
substantive unconscionability. What was previously labelled "sub-
stantive unconscionability" or "violation of public policy" usually
invoked the factual question of choice. 243 Even Kaufman, who views
2' This is basically Speidel's criticism of Murray's theory as well. Speidel, supra note
1, at 362-64.
242 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); KAuF-
MAN, CoBiN SurP eiramr, supra note 1, at 565-68, 576-81; Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
'43 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 358, 161 A.2d at 69; Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d at 445; Weaver v. American Oil Comp., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N. E.2d 144 (1971).
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more recent court decisions as applying an unfairness test for standard
form contracts, 244 includes in his examples decisions which return to
the question of choice at the time of contracting. 245 Kaufman's for-
mulation of what is required of standard. form clauses in terms of
substantive fairness, 246 however, promises the possibility of a test that
does not invoke questions of choice and market evaluation. He asserts
the necessity that adhesive contract terms have: (1) a legitimate pur-
pose, and (2) do not impose a greater burden on the "stuck" party
than is justified by the fair purpose of the standard terms. 247
At this juncture, one could conclude that the solution lies in some
modification of the unconscionability doctrine as developed by Llew-
ellyn, Murray, and others. Before deciding whether, with the elements
of apparent assent and substantive control, a workable test for val-
idating form terms can be formulated, the whole theory of assent
should be compared to a recent theoretical concept by Rakoff that
goes much further in implementing substantive control of standard
form terms. Rakoff refuses to base the enforcement of standard terms
on the idea of the non-drafting party's consent and advocates a
substantive control of standard terms by comparing standard terms
with the implied rules of law otherwise applicable to the contract. 248
3. Rakoff's Presumption of Unenforceability of Standard
Terms
Rakoff contests the current justification for the enforceability of
standard form terms, as he perceives no legitimacy in the assumption
of lawmaking power by private business entities which draft standard
form terms. 249 Furthermore, the adhering party's consent is also in-
adequate to obtain a legitimate lawmaking power. Since standard
terms are generally not read and understood, and the drafting party
is aware of this fact, there is no basis to assume assent. 250 Rakoff
stops short of declaring standard form terms entirely void. 251 As it
may promote democratic notions in allowing decentralized rulemak-
KAuFMAN, CORBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 565-66.
245 Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 445; C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc., v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
246 KAur.A, CORn SUPPLENINT, supra note 1, at 576-81.
- Id. at 579.
24 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1230-83.
149 Id. at 1213-14.
Id. at 1200-01.
'" Id. at 1230-43.
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ing, Rakoff accepts the enforcement of at least some standard terms
and-develops a theory that enforces them only when the drafter
demonstrates a reason for doing so.
A prerequisite for applying Rakoff's special rules for standard form
contracts (instead of traditional contract law) is that a contract of
adhesion be found. Rakoff has seven criteria for adhesion contracts. 25 2
These criteria are descriptive of an ideal type rather than a classi-
ficatory one, and not all seven criteria must be present to make a
contract adhesive. The criteria essentially describe a written document
that purports to be a contract consisting of terms prepared by one
party likely to make numerous contracts of that kind and is imposed
on a party likely to make fewer contracts of this type. The contract
terms are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis while only a few
essential terms (like subject matter and perhaps price) are subject to
bargaining. 253 Rakoff's description approximates what here is called
a standard form contract. 254
Once an adhesion contract is found, Rakoff distinguishes visible
and invisible contract terms. Visible terms are (a) those subject to
negotiation, and (b) those which a "customary shopper" can be
deemed to have shopped for, 255 including the determination of the
"broad type of the transaction. 25 6 The visible terms of an adhesion
Rakoff's seven criteria include:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that
contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract. (2) The form has
been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction. (3) The drafting
party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented by the
form and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine. (4) The form
is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except perhaps
for a few identified items (such a the price term), the drafting party will enter
into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document. This
representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is
understood by the adherent. (5) After the parties have dickered over whatever
terms are open to bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent. (6)
The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by
the form--few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party. (7) The principal
obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a whole is
the payment of money.
Id. at 1177.
2 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1248-50.
- See supra note 2.
25 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1250-58.
21 One part of differentiating the boundaries between visible and invisible terms
consists of determining the broad type of transaction. See also K. LLEWELLYN, COM..IMON
LAW TRADIToN, supra note 1, at 370. The fleshing out of the visible terms involves
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contract are "most often those that would constitute the entire explicit
contents of a very simple ordinary contract, with the price term being
the paradigmatic example. ' 25 7 The invisible terms are the rest of the
terms in the contract, and are presumptively unenforceable.
215 If
nothing further is asserted, the terms which the law for the particular
type of transaction would imply in the absence of a contractual
agreement should apply-the so-called background law. To show that
an invisible term should be upheld, the party supplying the term has
to show the degree of deviation from the background law as well as
the reasons supporting both the background law and the deviation. 219
This practice would force courts to make clearer statements about
the background law as well as about the adjudicated standard term. 260
Rakoff's theory has two advantages. The first advantage is the
elimination of any consideration of market situations and the possible
choice of other suppliers offering different terms. He presents a theory
of substantive control of standard terms with the initial test limited
to whether a contract is a standard form contract, 261 thereby fulfilling
the categorization of the contract, adapting the more general rules of law not to every
contract but to a more general type of contract. Judges can make a point-by-point
comparison between the drafter's terms and the legally implied characteristics of this
type of contract. The question is how many specialized contract categories one recognizes.
Rakoff primarily addresses the issue of the drafter choosing to flesh out a contract
with terms of a transaction type that the non-drafting party could not expect. If,
according to the visible terms, the contract is at the borderline between two transaction
types, Rakoff will recognize the drafter's choice. The choice is an invisible one, however,
if the drafter's choice goes beyond the anticipation of the adherent. See Rakoff, supra
note 1, at 1256-57. The idea is not especially surprising for the German lawyer who
is familiar with the categorization of contracts in the BGB as well as with courts
handling new types of business transactions for which a general background law
(Rakoff's term) is created by the courts, but not for every single contract. It seems
doubtful, however, that this is very often p problem of invisible terms. Generally, the
adherent party may expect the type of transaction set forth in the standard form because
the supplier of the form can be deemed to use a form adapted to the transaction he
wants to conduct. There may, however, occasionally be the problem of using a wrong
form. Where particular clauses do not fit into the bargain for the adherent, the idea
of transaction type helps to elaborate the contradiction. But, in essence, it is a problem
of substantive inadequacy of the term.
257 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1251; cf. AGBG § 8.
M Id. at 1243, 1251, 1258.
29 Id. at 1242, 1247, 1280-82.
Id. at 1259-60.
2' The same is true for Dugan's theory. Dugan, supra note 1, at 1307 n.2; Dugan,
Systematic Approach, supra note 1, at 84-86. Dugan proposes a five prong test, asking
if: 1) a standard form is involved, 2) it deviates from statutory or common law, and
3) the displaced rules import balance into the otherwise dispositive regulation of the
transaction. If a clause survives one of these three questions, it is immune from further
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the need for an easily applicable and predictable test to determine
whether ordinary contract law or special rules for standard form
contracts should apply. The second advantage is that Rakoff appre-
ciates the role the implied rules of law play in the substantive control
of standard form terms. 262 Substantive control is exercised by com-
paring the standard terms with what the law would imply without
standard terms. This comparison is involved in every theory of sub-
stantive control, even if the formulation is different; finding terms
"deviating from what a reasonable man would expect ' 2 63 or "driving
to a hard bargain"2 64 means nothing more than that the risk allocation
which the law would undertake absent standard form terms is ma-
terially different from what the terms state.
The difficulty with Rakoff's theory, however, is his presumption
of the unenforceability of standard form terms. This presumption
goes so far that critical attention can be expected to concentrate on
this point 265 at the expense of the advantages previously mentioned,
which amount to a salutary step toward a manageable and predictable
doctrine of standard form contracts.
The presumption of unenforceability, however, does not seem vital
to Rakoff's theory. For the present time, while courts may still resort
too easily to the principle of a duty to read,266 thus avoiding a careful
questioning. If not, the two other tests come into play. If: 4) the standardized contract
provides the non-drafter with a legal benefit hot otherwise available under the existing
law, and 5) this benefit is a fair equivalent for the displaced right, the deviating standard
term is valid. If either 4 or 5 are answered in the negative, the deviating standard term
is unconscionable. The theory could work and has the advantage of excluding unnec-
cessary factual questions. It ignores, however, what the law has achieved up to now
in dealing with standard form clauses under the heading of construction, unconscion-
ability, and the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Instead, it requires a new start
together with abandoning prior approaches, and it does not take into account useful
formal aspects of unconscionability like inconspicuousness. It is for these reasons not
further pursued here.
26 The same is true for Dugan, Systematic Approach, supra note 1, at 87-92.
263 Compare similar formulations in Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 14.
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).
2 See, e.g. KAUFMAN, CoPBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 582-84.
266 Karlberg European Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Josef Dratz Vertriebsgeselschaft mbH, 618
F.Supp. 344, 347 (1985) (forum selection clause in commercial setting). The "duty to
read" is still used in recent decisions. See e.g. Fields v. Blue Shield of California, 163
Cal. App. 3d 570, 578, 209 Cal. Rptr. 781, 785 (1985) (insured has duty to read, but
this is insufficient to bind him to unusual or unfair language); Hallowell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 928 (Del. 1982); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Edwards, 67 N.C. App. 1, 6, 312 S.E.2d 656, 661 (1984); Martinez v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 301, 310, 367 A.2d 904, 909 (1976) (life insurance
policy); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price, 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524 (1984).
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analysis of standard form terms and the changes in the process of
contract formation, Rakoff's presumption may be a useful provo-
cation to open new ways of thinking. In the long run, however, the
presumption of unenforceability does not seem to be a necessary
ingredient of a test that efficiently controls standard terms. Sub-
stantive control of standard form terms is a question of law. Control
is often seen as a part of the unconscionability doctrine,267 which in
turn is derived from the equitable principle of unconscionability, 268
and thus has a tradition of being decided by the judge, rather than
by the jury. U.C.C. § 2-302 makes the question of unconscionability
of contracts or single contract term(s) a question of law.2 69 It is not
only consequent but desirable to use the same issue of unconscion-
ability where common law contracts are concerned. 270 Thus, a uniform
structure of the law under the U.C.C. and common law is insured.
Additionally, questions of substantive control of unfair or uncon-
scionable standard form terms are appealable if unconscionability is
seen as an issue of law. The possibility of appeal could further
uniformity and certainty in the decisions on unconscionability.
If substantive control of standard form terms is a question of law,
a presumption of unenforceability of standard form terms is not
necessary. The courts, once having taken the step to a reasonable
and adequate control of standard form contracts, can set their limits
without following presumptions. As fact questions are not decisive
when adjudicating standard terms, presumptions are not needed to
decide a particular issue. The courts can therefore set their standards
for determining when a boilerplate term must be invalidated.27 1
The presumption of unenforceability is thus neither a prerequisite
for applying Rakoff's theory, nor is it necessary for its theoretical
foundation. One can speak of the non-drafting party's assent that
27 Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 3-11; Braucher, supra note 1, at 343;
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 141, at §§ 4.26-4.27; Holmes, supra note 1, at 792-97.
See Braucher, supra note 1, at 339; Davenport, supra note 1, at 123; Hillman,
supra note 1, at 35.41; see also the criticism of claiming the history of equity for the
UCC concept of unconscionability in Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 528-33.
169 U.C.C. § 2-302 and comment 3 (1977); see also Bracher, supra note 1, at 345.
But see the criticism in Price, The Conscience of Judge and Jury: Statutory Uncons-
cionability as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743 (1981).
27o See generally infra Section IV dealing more specifically with the problem.
"' KAUFMAN, CoRanN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 581 (once courts hold certain
terms invalid because of their unfairness, there is a presumption of fairness. Thus, in
later cases involving similar clauses, the drafter will have to show that in his case the
term is justified).
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makes the standard terms enforceable and nevertheless controls the
terms in the manner Rakoff proposes. Assent is a legal concept within
the scope of the objective theory of contract; 272 the internal intent
or consent of the parties is not at issue. The question is what con-
sequences the law connects with the parties' communicated manifes-
tations. The law can, for example, take the signing of a document
as a sufficient expression of assent. Concerning standard form terms,
however, it is desirable to require more than the signing the contract
document; if not, the drafting party has too much leeway to impose
harsh terms upon the other party. When deciding to what extent the
law will draw consequences from the mere act of signing, a balancing
of business interests in the reliability of contractual obligations and
societal interests in fair transactional dealings to uphold trust in the
institution of contract is required. Some significance should be given
to the signing of the contract form, since a party submitting to the
standard form has taken the risk that the drafter provided terms
favorable for himself. As long as standard terms are proper, both
parties have the advantage of having a custom-made law for the
specific agreement without being forced to negotiate. One can thus
justify enforcing standard terms at least when such terms are con-
trolled by the courts. Judicial control allows extant standard terms
by forcing the substance of those terms into reasonable limits as far
as shifting contractual risks to the non-drafting party is concerned.
The law sets the margins, but the enforcement of standard terms can
still be initially premised on assent.
The apt question is whether the advantage of having a document
containing second-range provisions tailored for the particular type of
transaction is sufficient to hold the non-drafting party signing a
standard form contract to his signature. The disadvantage of one-
sided terms and the eventual necessity of judicial control (which will
never reach all cases) may be seen as outweighing that advantage,
but presumably it is more likely for an average reader to understand
a contract than to understand contract law. If standard form terms
are carefully controlled and fairly drafted, the law can force the
drafter to adapt general rules to specific types of transactions. Stan-
dard form contracts are sufficiently accepted in commercial life to
recognize the non-drafting party's signature as general assent to the
inclusion of standard terms into the contract. Though the traps in
172 Regarding the objective theory of contract, see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 141,
at 113-16.
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the fine print are resented and one might wish to eliminate them
entirely, there is a general feeling that we cannot realistically eschew
their use, and indeed, a workable alternative has not been presented
as yet.
To summarize, the essential and progressive parts of Rakoff's
theory are: (a) an initial test for the application of specific rules for
standard form contracts, which disregards the market situation, the
non-drafting party's possible alternatives and all other factual ques-
tions and simply inquires if standard form terms are used, and (b)
the recognition of the role which implied rules of law play in judging
the substantive fairness of standard form terms. Rakoff does not
consider issues of defective assent, because assent in his theory is not
the proper basis for enforcing standard form terms.
When looking for a predictable way of adjudicating the validity
of standard form contract terms and considering the danger of un-
controlled one-sidedness arising from the formation of standard form
contracts, the concept of control through a theory of assent and
Rakoff's theory have their useful points. The two theories supplement
each other. As a logical consequence of his theoretical foundation,
Rakoff ignores questions of defective assent to standard form terms.
The assent-based theory, on the other hand, neglects the question of
direct substantive control. Both theories can help provide a workable
common-law theory. Before synthesizing the two theories into one,
however, a brief consideration of court decisions, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, and the U.C.C. shall be undertaken to probe
them for assistance in developing a new theory for form contracts.
C. The Courts, Restatement, and U.C.C. on Standard Form
Terms
American court decisions concerning standard form contracts dem-
onstrate little common structure. A great variety of factors are invoked
to justify invalidating clauses where necessary. Underlying principles
for evaluating these factors supporting invalidity are often difficult
to decipher, resulting in unpredictability. 273 Since the purpose of this
article is to develop a systematic theory for standard form terms, it
seems appropriate to use predictability as the guiding principle when
looking at court decisions. The five decisions to be discussed were
chosen because they have attracted attention and are remarkable in
27For an account of the deficiencies of the case law, see Dugan, supra note 1; see
also Oldfather, supra note 208, at 304.
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their efforts to find a sound approach to unfair standard form terms.
The extent to which these decisions adopt any of the ideas explicated
by scholars previously discussed will be evaluated.
Many decisions deal with standard form contracts under the heading
of unconscionability. 2 4 Others refer to the contra proferentem rule275
or the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 276 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts Section 206 contains the contra proferentem rule,
and Section 207 on unconscionability and Section 211(1) and (3)
involving the problem of impaired assent to standardized contracts
stress the reasonable belief of the adherent party. The structure in
the unconscionability analysis will be considered first. The Restate-
ment section on unconscionability will only be briefly mentioned, as
it is similar to U.C.C. § 2-302 and can be treated together later with
the U.C.C. provision. Furthermore, decisions using public policy to
invalidate standard form terms instead of,277 or in addition to,2 78
unconscionability will be considered.
The least useful decisions are those simply stating that a term is
or is not unconscionable without offering any reasons for the par-
ticular determination. 279 Decisions purporting to give "reasoning"
274 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); A &
M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982);
Weaver v. American Oil Co. 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971); C. & J. Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Hawes v. Kansas Farm
Bureau, 238 Kan. 404, 710 P.2d 1312 (1985); Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb.
522, 524-32, 198 N.W.2d 57, 60-64 (1972) (concerning limitation of liability clause similar
to the one in Henningsen); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240
A.2d 195 (1968) (holding disclaimer unconscionable); Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA
Land Dev. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976).
"7 Mosby v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 405 I11. 599, 606-08, 92 N.E.2d 103, 107
(1950); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 667-71 (N.D. 1977);
State Bank of Albany v. Hickey, 29 A.D.2d 993, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1968).
276 C & J. Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d at 169; Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250
N.W.2d at 671-73 (doctrine of reasonable expectations mingled with contra proferentem
reasoning); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz.
383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984) (doctrine of reasonable expectation and elements of uncons-
cionability and contra proferentem taken together).
2" Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 122-23, 232 A.2d 405, 417-18 (1967) (retail installment
contract for the purchase of 140 records with an assignment provision in fine print);
Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973); Ellsworth Dobbs,
Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315
N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1982) (herbicide manufacturer's disclaimer of warranty and limitation
of consequential damages clauses against public policy in South Dakota).
278 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (using
inconspicuousness and public policy).
27 American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964).
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without any assembly of factors to be evaluated in deciding the
question of unconscionability are perhaps the most dangerous pre-
cedents. A paradigmatic example of this type is Hawes v. Kansas
Farm Bureau.20 In Hawes, plaintiff alleged the unconscionability of
a clause in a life insurance policy requiring that death occur within
ninety days after the accidental injury before entitling the beneficiary
to double indemnity. The court commenced its analysis by stating
ten evaluative factors to determine unconscionability:
(1) The use of printed form or boilerplate contracts drawn skillfully
by the party in the strongest economic position, which establish
industry wide standards offered on a take it or leave it basis to the
party in a weaker economic position (Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,161 A.2d 69 (1960), Campbell Soup Co.
v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80)); (2) a significant cost-price disparity or
excessive price; (3) a denial of basic rights and remedies to a buyer
of consumer goods (Williams v.Walker-Thomas Furniture Company,
350 F.2d 445; 18 ALR3d 1305); (4) the inclusion of penalty clauses;
(5) the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract,
including its commercial setting, its purpose and actual effect (In
re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Company, 253 F.Supp. 864, (E.D.
Pa.)); (6) the hiding of clauses which are disadvantageous to one
party in a mass of fine print trivia or in places which are incon-
spicuous to the party signing the contract (Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., supra); (7) phrasing clauses in language that is in-
comprehensible to a layman or that divert his attention from the
problems raised by them or the rights given up through them; (8)
an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the
bargain; (9) exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated,
uneducated and the illiterate (Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Company, supra); and (10) inequality of bargaining or economic
power. (Citations omitted) 281
The court's conclusion following these factors is indeed laconic:
Plaintiff does not cite nor has our research disclosed a single case
from any jurisdiction Where a time limitation requirement in a double
indemnity rider has been invalidated on the basic of unconsciona-
bility. We conclude the concept of unconscionability is inapplicable
to the issue before us. 282
238 Kan. 404, 710 P.2d 1312 (1985).
281 Id. at 405, 710 P.2d at 1314, citing Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co, 219 Kan.
755, 758-59, 549 P.2d 903, 906 (1976).
Hawes, 235 Kan. at 406, 710 P.2d at 1315.
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The rationale seems to be that no other court ever held this clause
unconscionable. The factors, stated so extensively, are reduced to
mere decoration. Such a decision does not help to make results
predictable nor to structure the unconscionability analysis. 213
The factors of unconscionability which the court mentions include
as points (6) and (7) the questions previously considered as procedural
and substantive inconspicuousness. Hawes v. Kansas Farm Bureau is
thus one of the decisions which have in some manner touched on
these categories.24 Apparently, defective assent has been accepted by
other courts; however, the idea of defective assent is often used in
connection with a finding of unequal bargaining power, or an im-
pairment of free choice on the part of the non-drafting party, or by
considerations of both. s8 Additionally, whether or not the contract
has been read is evaluated. 2 6
The Hawes decision illustrates insufficient reasoning which provides
no assured guidance for the unconscionability analysis. On the other
hand, there are decisions which try to distinguish the aspects of no-
choice, defective assent and violation of public policy or substantive
unconscionability. 2 7 They may use these aspects together 288 or as
alternative reasons to invalidate standard form terms.2 9 Some deci-
sions concentrate on one of the aspects, 290 while other courts have
3 The conclusion is what the court deemed appropriate, or "the oatmeal theory or
what the court ate for breakfast." The danger of such proceeding was seen by Hillman,
supra note 1, at 19.
Other decisions include A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. 135 Cal. App.3d
473, 484, 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121, 126 (1982); Chemical Bank v. Rinden Professional
Ass'n, 498 A.2d 706, 714 (N.H. 1985) (no unconscionability found); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
2 Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1280, 1295-97 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Jones v.
Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (not sufficient for an adhesion contract that a
standard form is offered on a take- it-or-leave-it basis; showing of great disparity of
bargaining power, no opportunity to negotiate or to obtain the item elsewhere necessary);
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 460, 276 N.E.2d 144, 145 (1971).
Even a rather considerate decision like C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins.
Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) engages in such activity. See also Henningsen,
32 N.J. at 366-67, 161 A.2d at 74; Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264,
266, 268 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Weaver, 257 Ind. at 460-61, 276 N.E.2d at 146 (1972).
Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 358, 161 A.2d at 69; C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.
2d at 169 (dealing with the assent questions under the heading of reasonable expectations
and also unconscionability).
211 Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 358, 161 A.2d at 69.
C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d at 169.
2o Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 451 Pa. 218, 301 A.2d 799 (1973) (public policy
with an additional reasoning of contra proferentem).
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formulated their reasoning particularly for standard form contracts. 291
Five of these decisions will be reviewed after a quick look at the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 292
Unconscionability not only is used by the courts, but also is in-
corporated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 208.
The Restatement adopted the U.C.C. provision on unconscionability
which, like U.C.C. § 2-302, does not distinguish between the inval-
idation of standard form terms for reasons of unconscionability and
overall unconscionability that may concern any contract. Likewise,
the Restatement does not limit the contra proferentern rule to standard
form contracts (Section 206).
Section 211 of the Restatement, however, contains rules which are
especially shaped for standardized terms. 293 Section 211(1), dealing
with the assent to standard form terms, approximates the traditional
understanding of the duty to read, the only qualification being the
signing party must have had reason to believe that similar writings,
embodying terms of the agreement, are usual. Section 211(3) provides
the objective theory of contract. Standard terms are not part of the
agreement if the supplying party had reason to believe that he would
not have been able to obtain assent if the other party had known
the term.
Even when dealing with defective assent, however, the Restatement
is relatively vague. It does not take the step to differentiate the
procedural and substantive aspects of defective assent. The wording
of Section 211(3) itself gives no guidance for determining when the
drafter had reason to believe that he would not be able to obtain
knowing assent. Moreover, the Restatement does not sufficiently aid
in formulating categories for controlling standardized terms under
either defective assent or considerations of unfairness. 294
Five of the better court decisions have done more for developing
a theory of control of standard form contracts than has the Restate-
ment. The most impressive decision concerning a standard form
contract term is probably the 1960 landmark case of Henningsen v.
29 C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d at 169; Darner Motor Sales v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 387-94, 682 P.2d 388, 392 (1984).
2 For an account of the Restatement provisions concerningstandard form contracts,
see Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 735, 762-89 (1982) [hereinafter Murray, Restatement].
293 See Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1, at 60-64 (discussion of Restatement
Section 211).
9 For the same conclusion, see Murray, Restatement, supra note 293, at 779.
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Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 295 Ten days after buying a new car, Mrs.
Henningsen heard a loud noise under the hood of her car while
driving. The steering wheel spun in her hand, and the car crashed
into a wall, injuring Mrs. Henningsen. The evidence indicated a
mechanical defect or failure. The case went to the jury solely on the
basis of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
When purchasing the car Mr. Henningsen signed a standardized
purchase order form. On the front, the contract form contained two
paragraphs indicating that the front and back of the form comprised
the entire agreement. Furthermore, the text stated that the purchaser
had read the print on the back of the form, had agreed to it, and
had the capacity to contract. The limitation of liability clause at issue
in the case was printed on the back of the form, in somewhat larger
print than the rest of the text, about two-thirds down the page. The
clause granted replacement of defective parts in lieu of all other
expressed or implied warranties and bore the heading "limited war-
ranty."
The decision commences with general observations about the legal
nature of implied warranties and the degenerated nature of the par-
ticular warranty which gave an illusory, conditional right of replace-
ment of defective parts and barred any claim for personal injury.
The court then turns its attention to the "[e]ffect of the [d]isclaimer
and [1limitation of [1]iability [c]lause on the [ilmplied [w]arranty of
[m]erchantability." The court starts with the "duty to read," im-
mediately declaring that "in the framework of modern. . .business
practice. . .such rules cannot be applied on a strict, doctrinal basis.
The conflicting interest of the buyer and seller must be evaluated
realistically. ' ' 296 The decision addresses the mass standardized char-
acter of the car purchase form and the impairment of choice caused
by lack of power to bargain over the clause, especially since most
car manufacturers used the same clause. The court questions whether
the signing of the clause under those circumstances indicated assent
by the purchaser. 297 Justifying this doubt, the court points to the
form and arrangement of the contract and the method of expressing
the nature of the obligation, which "could have been different to
- 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Id. at 386, 161 A.2d at 84.
Id. at 387, 399-400, 161 A.2d at 85, 92 ("the buyer is said to have accepted the
exclusion of the maker's liability"); cf Murray Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 52.
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make the purchaser aware of the purported implications of the agree-
ment. ''298
The court additionally posits an argument based on public policy.
It again notes the overwhelming bargaining power of car manufac-
turers and declares that the implied warranty is "a child of the law. ' 299
The court concludes:
The lawmaker did not authorize the automobile marfufacturer to
use its grossly disproportionate bargaining power to relieve itself
from liability and to impose on the ordinary buyer, who in effect
has no real freedom of choice, the grave danger of injury to himself
and others that attends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality
as a defectively made automobile. In the framework of this case,
illuminated as it is by the facts and the many decisions noted, we
are of the opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of an implied
warranty of merchantability and of the obligation arising there from
is so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of
its invalidity. 3-
Henningsen is a relatively early decision which in the absence of
U.C.C. § 2-302 had to devise an unconscionability analysis of its
own. The analysis addresses each of the elements which today appear
in all unconscionability analyses: the procedural inconspicuousness
(fine print) and substantive inconspicuousness (possibility of a clearer
wording of the limitation clause), as well as substantive unconscion-
ability for reasons of violation of public policy. The decision distin-
guishes these elements, though it premises the procedural as well as
the substantive analysis very much on the lack of choice. It is certainly
a decision that has opened the way to a differentiated and compre-
hensive analysis of unconscionability, but it still relies on elements
of a traditional understanding of unconscionability (which concern
not only standard form contracts) such as lack of bargaining power,
choice, similar terms throughout an industry, and the basic necessity
of the item bought.
A second famous case, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture,0'
has never received the unanimous approval that the Henningsen de-
Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 399, 400, 161 A.2d at 92, 93 (concerning the issue of
noncomprehension of the term).
Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
3M Id.
--, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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cision enjoys. 0 2 Though criticism of the decision primarily concerns
the outcome of the case, the reasoning also falls short of the quality
of Henningsen. The case concerned an "add-on" clause in a printed
standard form furniture sales contract. Under this clause, the company
credited installment payments pro rata on all outstanding accounts
due at the time of payment. The effect of the clause, which the court
described as "rather obscure," was to keep open the customer's
balance on all items whenever purchased from the furniture store.
The clause enabled the store to repossess all items bought from the
store on credit upon failure to pay any installment.
The court analyzed the case under an unconscionability rationale
describing unconscionability as "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.' '303 The court uses what
legal scholars have called no-choice unconscionability. 304 When ex-
plaining the doctrine in more detail, however, the court refers to the
problem of terms being hidden or incomprehensible which may impair
assent. Since fact questions concerning the circumstances of con-
tracting are decisive for this approach, the court sent the case back
to the trial court for findings on this point.
The case helps little to structure an unconscionability analysis, to
distinguish categories, or to make a predictable outcome. Though
involving a standard form term, the case applies a general concept
of unconscionability in which the fact of standardization is only one
element. Even though it is a case that deals with "overall" uncons-
cionability, Williams v. Walker-Thomas is not particularily helpful. 05
The case stands for the notion that, where an indistinct finding of
overall unconscionability is used, the discussion degenerates into a
social-value debate about the result. Such reasoning does not serve
predictability nor help to develop a rationally-controlled analysis.
For the criticism, see Epstein, supra note 47, at 306; Leff, Unconscionability,
supra note 1, at 551-56; Leff, Unconscionability - the Code, the Courts and the
Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 367 (1968). For a comprehensive description
of the Walker-Thomas sales technique, see Greenberg, Easy Terms, Hard Times:
Complaint Handling in the Ghetto, in No AccEss TO LAW, 379-91 (R. Nader ed. 1980).
- 350 F.2d at 449.
30, Holmes, supra note 1, at 794-96.
105 Compare the criticism in Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 554-55, ques-
tioning what exactly is unconsdonable about the contract between Mrs. Williams and
Walker-Thomas Furniture, given the purpose of this article it is the rationale rather
than the result of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture which is of interest.
[Vol. 17:323
ADJUDICATING STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
Another case garnering considerable attention is C & J Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.3°6 Its guiding quality has been
compared to Henningsen,30 7 and it is remarkable in at least two
regards: it clearly states that special rules apply to standardized con-
tracts, and it expresses the court's awareness of the "revolution in
formation of contractual relationship."
30 8
Plaintiff, C & J Fertilizer, bought both a "Broad Form Storekeepers
Policy" and a "Mercantile Burglary and Robbery Policy" to insure
its premises. The policies contained a clause with a definition for
,'burglary" which, to trigger coverage, required "entry ... by actual
force or violence, of which force and violence there are visible marks
by tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon, or physical damage
to the exterior of the premises at the place of such entry." 3°9
When the premises were robbed one weekend, the burglar left no
exterior marks on the door through which he entered. An inside
door, however, was physically damaged and there were tire tracks in
the driveway. The insurer denied coverage because visible marks at
the exterior entry door did not exist.
In its decision on the claim of coverage, the court reviews three
theories: the doctrine of reasonable expectations, implied warranty,
and unconscionability. The court starts by describing the modern
process of contract formation and concludes that:
[t]he inevitable result of enforcing all provisions of the adhesive
contract...would be an abdication of judicial responsibility in face
of basic unfairness and recognition that persons' rights shall be
controlled by private lawmakers without the consent, express or
implied, of those affected. A question is also raised whether a court
may constitutionally allow that power to exist in private hands except
when appropriate safeguards are present, including a right to mean-
ingful judicial review.3'0
This passage is impressive in its recognition that the lawmaking
power in private hands is a factual problem needing a response in
the form of judicial review but is not an element of a theory of
106 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
107 KAUFmAN, CoRaIN SuPpLEMENT, supra note 1, at 556.
"I C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc., 227 N.W.2d at 173. One more important aspect is that
the court makes it clear that the insurance commissioner's statutorily required approval
does not change the need for judicial control. Id. at 175.
309 Id. at 171.
310 Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
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democratic lawmaking. Against the backdrop of this awareness that
the unbargained-for contract allows one party to legislate terms in
contract formation, the court reviews the three theories of control.
Regarding the first theory, the doctrine of reasonable expectations
(DRE), the rationale centers around two ideas: the burglary definition
in the two policies deviates from the usual understanding of the term
by requiring outside visible marks of entry, and that this definition
literally would deny coverage even though the clause's sole purpose,
to make sure that no "inside job" would be covered, could be fulfilled
through other evidence. As the plaintiff purchased burglary coverage
and claimed coverage for a burglary, the court viewed the term
denying coverage as one not reasonably to be expected.
The court applies the doctrine of reasonable expectations clearly
as a means of substantive control, not as a means of construction. '"
The definition of burglary expunges what, according to the under-
standing of an average person, one bought when purchasing burglary
insurance. The rationale behind the decision is one of lack of assent
rather than unfairness per se. The court expressly states that, ac-
cording to the record, the plaintiff had no knowledge of the clause.
This passage indicates that the plaintiff's signing with knowledge
could have made a difference under the reasonable expectations ra-
tionale.
The court next addresses the issue of implied warranty of fitness,
referring to Llewellyn's formulation that when read alone standard
terms must not alter or impair the fair meaning of what is bargained
for and must not be manifestly unreasonable or unfair. 12 The court
advocates an extension of the implied warranty of fitness for chattels
to the purchase of "protection," hoping to "encourage insurers to
make known to insurance buyers those provisions which would limit
the implied warranty inherent in the situation."3 '3
The implied warranty reasoning addresses the same contradiction
between consciously bought protection and a limitation of such pro-
tection via a standardized term as does the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. The difference is that the implied warranty expresses
even more clearly what has been violated; it is a legal requirement
concerning fairness and expectability of a boilerplate term. The war-
C" cf. supra text accompanying notes 170-184.
31 227 N.W.2d at 178; see K. LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW TRADMON, supra note 1,
at 371.
133 227 N.W.2d at 179.
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ranty is implied by law. In contrast to the implied warranty notion
the reasonable expectation, though defined by the law, looks through
the eyes of the adherent party to ascertain the substance of the term.
The implied warranty reasoning in C & J Fertilizer was experimental
and barely has support in other decisions. It is appealing in its parallel
to the sale of goods provisions, but even the U.C.C. provisions on
implied warranties and the possibility of limitations and disclaimers
cannot stand. Such provisions must be incorporated into a broader
theory of standard form terms and unconscionability. The contro-
versies about the applicability of U.C.C. § 2-302 to the disclaimer
of an implied warranty mentioned in U.C.C. § 2-3163'4 show that
the Code provisions, to be coordinated, must be understood against
the backdrop of an underlying theory. When further pursued, how-
ever, the implied-warranty reasonsing does not yield that helpful a
theory.
Finally, the court in C & J Fertilizer addresses unconscionability
and mentions the fine print of the clause and its unusual placing,
not among the exclusions, but in a definition of burglary. Without
using the specific term, the court thus addresses aspects of (physical)
inconspicuousness as a prerequisite to the invocation of unconscion-
ability, then broadly applies the unconscionability doctrine. This un-
conscionability analysis itself lacks precision:
Commentators suggest a court considering a claim of uncons-
cionability should examine the factors of assent, unfair surprise,
notice, disparity of bargaining power and substantive unfairness.
(Citations omitted). We have already touched on those considerations
in the factual discussion, above. . . . In the case sub judice, plain-
tiff's evidence demonstrated the definitional provision was uncon-
scionable." 5
Indeed, the court previously discussed the factual aspects of the
insured's lack of knowledge concerning the clause, his being con-
fronted with the standard insurance contract delivered only after
contracting, and the unexpected nature of the provision at stake.
These general references, however, do not help to elaborate an un-
conscionability analysis. In this regard one recalls the Kansas case
1,4 Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 516-528; Murray, Unconscionability,
supra note 1, at 45-49; Comment, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial
Code, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 843, 854-59 (1960); Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 794-03; Dugan,
Systematic Approach, supra note 1, at 100-01.
227 N.W.2d at 181.
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of Hawes v. Kansas Farm Bureau.3 16 The factors affecting the ap-
plication of unconscionability are mentioned, and the result is stated;
however, the deductive reasoning structure is missing.
Another omission is the relation between the doctrine of reasonable
expectations and unconscionability. Both doctrines stand unrelated
side-by-side, though the concepts have elements in common. C & J
Fertilizer is thus an example of a very comprehensive presentation
of the elements influencing a theory of standard form contracts, but
it does not arrive at a systematic structure. The decision is useful,
however, because it causes one to wonder how the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations might be fitted into a comprehensive theory of
standard form contracts.
The next decision deserving mention is not as well-known and is
somewhat different because its holding is not confined to standard
form contracts. In Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,317 a real estate
broker claimed the seller owed a broker's commission even though
the sale did not close due to the prospective buyer's failure to obtain
financing. The brokerage agreement stipulated that the commission
was due upon sale. The New Jersey court, considering what the law
ought to be, overruled prior decisions and concluded that "absent
default by the owner, the contract of sale must be performed by the
buyer before liability for commission is imposed upon the owner." 318
The court then asked to what extent an agreement between owner
and broker can change this rule. The Court, employing a public
policy analysis, noted the legislature's expression of public interest
in brokerage contracts when it subjected broker's activities to reg-
ulation, resulting in the creation of fidiciary obligations on the broker.
The court strove to protect the public from undue harm where
"persons with whom they deal who through experience, specialization,
licensure, economic strength opposition, or membership in associa-
tions created for their mutual benefit and education, have acquired
such expertise or monopolistic or practical control in the business
transaction involved as to give them an undue advantage." 3 19  The
court held unenforcable those contractual obligations which are at
odds with common understanding and which result from the undue
316 238 Kan. 404, 710 P.2d 1312 (1985); see supra notes 281-83 and accompanying
text.
117 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
I'l Id. at 540, 236 A.2d at 855.
19 Id. at 541, 236 A.2d at 856.
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advantage of the drafter. Basing its finding of unenforceability on
public policy, the court stated:
whenever the substantial inequality of bargaining power, position
or advantage to which we have adverted appears, a provision to
the contrary [of what has been stated as the law in New Jersey] in
an agreement prepared or presented or negotiated or procured by
the broker shall be deemed inconsistent with public policy and
unenforceable.3 20
Ellsworth Dobbs is remarkable in the way it proceeds from finding
and stating the law to questioning whether or not contract terms can
deviate from that law. The court clearly exercises substantive control,
but does not limit this control to standard form terms. It uses the
situation of unequal bargaining power as the trigger for invalidating
clauses which deviate from the rule of law. Under the court's rea-
soning, not only standard form terms but also negotiated terms could
be invalidated. The commission clause, however, is not declared
invalid in every case. The decision would have provided assured
guidance if it had drawn the line for invalidating commission clauses
between standard form terms and negotiated terms without reference
to the somewhat amorphous category of unequal bargaining power.
Alternatively, one could draw the line between merchant contracts
and consumer contracts.
The last decision is the California case of A & M Produce Co. v.
FMC Corp.321 Alex Abatti, owner of A & M Produce, a farming
company, decided to start producing tomatoes and needed a weight-
sizing machine for the packing. Abatti had no experience with such
equipment. He talked first to a competitor of FMC and then, finding
the quoted price too high, spoke with two FMC sales representatives.
In the negotiations, the parties discussed the capacity of the weight-
sizing equipment. The FMC representatives recommended a machine
without a hydrocooler, the item making the competitor's bid so
expensive.
:2 Id. at 542-43, 236 A.2d at 857-58.
321 135 Cal. App.3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982); for comments on this case, see
Note, Unconscionability Redefined: California Imposes New Duties on Commercial
Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTwnGS L.J. 161 (1983); 1982 California Courts
of Appeal Survey: Unconscionability, Accord and Satisfaction, Implied Terms, Mu-
tuality, 5 WmrR L. Rv. 149-61 (1983); Comment, Unconscionability and the En-
forcement of Standardized Contracts in Commercial Transactions, 16 PAC. L.J. 247
(1984).
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Abatti signed a standard form order and eventually received a copy
of the form contract in the mail. The form contained a paragraph 4,
"Warranty" with a disclaimer of warranties in bold print, and a
paragraph 5, "Disclaimer of Consequential Damages" in somewhat
smaller print, which stated that "seller in no event shall be liable
for consequential damages arising out of or in connection with the
agreement." Abatti made two down payments on the contract price
but never paid the balance of $21,361.20 due on delivery.
The weight-sizer malfunctioned, resulting in the loss of most of
A & M's tomato crop. A & M offered to return the weight-sizer for
a refund of the down payments and the freight charges. FMC,
however, demanded full payment of the balance due. A & M then
filed a damage action for breach of express and implied warranties
for a particular use and misrepresentation. The trial court (in the
third trial) found the disclaimers of warranties and of consequential
damages unconscionable and FMC appealed from the verdict.
The decision of California Court of Appeals turns upon the un-
conscionability of the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of con-
sequential damages clauses of the sales contract. The court, considering
whether a valid U.C.C. § 2-316 warranty disclaimer may be uncon-
scionable under U.C.C. § 2-302, favored the applicability of U.C.C.
§ 2-302 because "oppression and unfair surprise, the principal targets
of the unconscionability doctrine, may result from other types of
questionable commercial practices," in addition to inconspicuousness
dealt with in U.C.C. § 2-316..
The court next turns to unconscionability in general. It repeats the
formula that unconscionability includes the absence of meaningful
choice by one of the contracting parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party, and recognizes
therein the two elements of procedural and substantive unconscion-
ability. In addressing procedural unconscionability the court focuses
on the factors of "oppression" and "surprise;" oppression dealing
with the problem of inequality in bargaining power, and surprise
addressing the supposedly consented-to terms being hidden in a prolix
printed standard form.
In its analysis, the court refuses to include in the "circle of assent"
only bargained-for terms. When dealing with unbargained-for terms,
however, such terms must be both substantively unreasonable and
procedurally defective to make them invalid. Defining substantive
unconscionability, the court refers to Murray's formulation that a
term is substantively suspect if it reallocates the risks of the bargain
in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner. Additionally,
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the court reasoned that the more objectionable the terms are pro-
cedurally, the less unreasonable the risk allocation must be, to in-
validate a term.
The court does not address indentification of an unreasonable risk
allocation. Instead, the court justifies the use of procedural and
substantive unconscionability with a parallel to the 1981 case of
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. ,322 where the lack of choice for one
party together with the absence of a "minimum level of integrity"
regarding an arbitration clause proved sufficient for invalidation of
the offensive clause.
Applying the general considerations to the facts of the case, the
court affirms the trial court's finding of unconscionability. Addressing
the question of procedural unconscionability, the court emphasized
the disparity in the market power between parties. In this case the
court found that even though A & M was an experienced and relatively
big farming company, FMC was of a different class. In addition,
since the attention of the buyer was not directed to the disclaimer
of warranty and limitation of damages clauses, the court found that
incorporation of those terms within the long pre-printed contract may
have caused unfair surprise.
The court also found the contract to be substantively unconscion-
able because the disputed clauses negated any enforceable performance
standards of the contract. The court relied upon the inexperience of
A & M as a buyer of the particular type of machinery and FMC's
knowledge of this inexperience. Under these circumstances, the court
found substantive unconscionability if the seller prevents the buyer
from reasonably relying on performance representations through the
use of liability disclaimers. As to the limitation of damages, the court
adds that the risk involved (of the tomatoes rotting if not processed
properly and expediently) was obvious from the outset and reasonably
avoidable only by the seller, FMC.
The decision is thoughtful and comprehensive. It tries to use schol-
arly concepts (citing Leff and Murray) and prior case law to approach
the issue of unconscionability in a systematic analysis. By invoking
the no-choice situation to determine procedural unconscionability,
however, the court gets lost in a wilderness of factual considerations,
including the relative bargaining power of the parties and the question
of whether the terms were read. Because mere differences in bar-
3- 28 Cal.3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, (1981).
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gaining power are sufficient for procedural unconscionability, the
court must require both procedural and substantive uinconscionability
to invalidate a term. The test is vague, though, because a "sliding
scale" approach is taken, meaning that more of one type of un-
conscionability takes less of the other in order to find unconscion-,
ability in the whole.
Comparing A & M Produce Co. to Henningsen, one realizes that
in substance there has been no progress. The same considerations
and categories previously addressed in Henningsen are used in A & M
Produce. The only change is that by now the steps of reasoning have
labels such as procedural and substantive unconscionability. There is
still no basic distinction between an unconscionability analysis for
negotiated contracts on the one hand and standard form terms on
the other. The complicated factual questions of bargaining power
and choice are still of major importance. Twenty-two years after
Henningsen, A & M Produce shows that the judicial progress is lim-
ited to and mired in terminology.
This review of selected decisions and some patterns which can be
found repeatedly in other cases illustrates two things. First, courts
have used, in various forms and constellations, the same elements of
analysis for the control of standard form terms which appear in
scholarly articles. Second, the courts achieved no more structure or
predictability than did the scholars, particularly in attempting to
develop a clear distinction between a theory of standard form terms
and a general doctrine of unconscionable contracts.
D. U. C. C. § 2-302 Unconscionability
In Section 2-302, the U.C.C. gives courts the possibility of directly
invalidating (or modifying) entire contracts or single contract clauses
for reasons of unconscionability. The provision itself, which reappears
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208, does not define or
structure unconscionability, but simply lists available remedies.3 23 Al-
though the comments note the underlying principle of prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise, they give further guidance about the
general idea behind the provision or what kind of clauses courts
could find unconscionable.3 24
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment g (1981); cf Spanogle,
supra note 1, at 937.
124 See also Spanogle, supra note 1, at 942-43. Spanogle nevertheless tries to draw
an analytic structure of unconscionability from the difference of oppression and unfair
surprise. Id.
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There has been a lot written on the way U.C.C. § 2-302 is drafted. 325
Leff criticized the provision because of its lack of definiteness, im-
plying that it gives the courts the possibility of replacing insufficient
reasoning by no reasoning at all.326 Some courts have, indeed, yielded
to this temptation.3 27 Others, however, have tried to use ideas from
scholars or the key words in the comments to U.C.C. § 2-302-
"unfair and oppressive" terms and "no choice,"- to explain their
decisions.3 2  Leff has been severly criticize as being unwilling to
understand U.C.C. § 2-302,329 to recognize the intent of the "father"
of the provision, Karl Llewellyn, and to comprehend the difficulties
faced by a legislator when implanting into the Code a concept that
uncontestedly needs elaboration and structuring. 30 Murray explained
that presumably Llewellyn knew about the difficulties in developing
a doctrine of unconscionability and thought that in a common law
system the courts are the proper entity to flesh it out. Thus, U.C.C.
§ 2-302 can be explained as an intended catalyst to encourage and
accelerate the creation of a doctrine of unconscionability by forcing
the courts to assume the task. 3 ' Unhappily, the courts have not
gotten very far in their efforts to elaborate the possible elements of
3 Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 489-546; Braucher, supra note 1, at 773-
75; Note, Unconscionability - The Code, the Court and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND.
& Comm. L. REv. 367 (1968); Speidel, supra note 1; Leff, Unconscionability and the
Crowd, supra note 33; Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 34; Note, Uncon-
scionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IowA L. REv. 843, 847-50
(1960).
326 Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 550-57; see also Note, Unconscionable
Business Contracts: A Doctrine Gone A wry, 70 YALE L.J. 453, 453-54 (1961); Comment,
Policing Contracts under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 146
(1950).
321 See, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964).
3 A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.3d 473, 475, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 116 (1982) (using oppression and unfair surprise); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v.
King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 633-36 (Mo. App. 1979) (using Leff's distinction
of procedural and substantive unconscionability; both required for invalidity of a clause);
Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146-48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
(using Murray plus the distinction between unfair surprise and no choice).
129 Dawson, supra note 29, at 1041 n.l.
110 See Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 38. For the history of U.C.C.
§ 2-302, see Spanogle, supra note 1, at 938; see also Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 761;
Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IowA L. REv.
843, 847 (1960).
33 Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 761; Murray, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 37-
38 (skeptical about the effect); see Davenport, supra note 1, at 149-50.
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an unconscionability doctrine.33 2 In legal scholarship, on the other
hand, one notes some advances; it is possible to complete the fleshing
out of U.C.C. § 2-302.
Keeping the development of the German law of standard form
terms in mind, it sounds reasonable to leave it to the courts to create
a theory and systematic doctrine for standard form contracts if the
courts are given the tool of a generally formulated provision with
which to work. In Germany, courts developed the theory of standard
form terms out of a general clause in the BGB. 33 The general clause
is an effective tool because courts must deal with contract drafters'
never-ending ingenuity in finding new wordings. Courts thus need a
flexible instrument to adjudicate standard terms. It does not make
sense merely to suppress certain clauses which are known at the time
the statute is enacted. In addition to the German experience, another
reason exists to leave the development of a theory of standard form
contracts to American courts. It is a painful process to give up highly
esteemed ideals of freedom of contract and judicial nonintervention,
ideals which have shaped the society which produced them and which
are deeply rooted in society's perception of freedom. Thus, while a
changed reality demands some modification, this difficult task is
probably better left to the courts because they proceed more slowly
in the creation and adaption of law than do legislators.M
In any case, U.C.C. § 2-302 does not provide a solution to the
problem. It rather requires a solution which the courts have not
provided in applying U.C.C. § 2-302. We thus revert to the efforts
of legal scholarship to integrate the traditions of common law, the
modern case law, and the changed reality of contract formation to
divine an American theory of standard form contract law. What can
be taken from U.C.C. § 2-302 is that any theory for standard form
contracts has to explain its relation to the concept of unconsciona-
bility. U.C.C. § 2-302 permits invalidation or modification of single
332 Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 761; Slawson,.New Meaning, supra note 1, at 52;
J. WmrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL
CODE 112-33 (2d ed. 1980); see also Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd, supra
note 33, at 349; Dugan, supra note 1, at 1329; Dugan, Good Faith, supra note 1, at
2 n.4, with a vivid criticism of the tendency to consider factual circumstances of contract
formation when adjudicating standard terms.
333A general clause may be described as something like a standard in the sense
Ellinghaus, supra note 1, at 759-60, and Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36
HARv. L. REV. 641, 645-46 (1923) understand it, that is, as a "residual" category to
keep the system open for changes and flexible application of firm rules.
3-, See Linzer, supra note 55.
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contract terms without affecting the entire agreement. The illustrations
to U.C.C. § 2-302 show that the drafter's intended the section to
address standard form terms.335 One issue that will have to be faced
is whether the common law should also deal with standard terms
within the scope of unconscionability or if it should distinguish the
two concepts. With these remarks on U.C.C. § 2-302 in mind, the
theories developed by German and American scholars and the elements
supplied by case law shall be rearranged into a new theory of Standard
form contracts.
IV. A NEW AMERICAN THEORY OF STANDARD FORM CONTRACT
LAW
The first decision concerning an American theory of standard form
contracts involves a choice: one can perceive the doctrine as part of
the concept of unconscionability or as a distinct body of rules. The
fact that the U.C.C. considers standard form terms within the scope
of unconscionability is an argument for doing the same regarding
contracts governed by common law. Although the doctrines are sim-
ilar, the concept of unconscionability and the control of unfair stan-
dard form terms are asserted to be different. 3 6 Kaufman understands
unconscionability as applicable to negotiated as well as to standardized
contracts. On the other hand, he sees the concept of unconscionability
restricted to grossly unfair contracts on the whole, while the analysis
of standard form terms strikes down individual terms as unfair per
se.
33 7
Looking at the history of unconscionability, Kaufman may have
a point. Unconscionability has been an extraordinary remedy used
to invalidate outrageous contractual terms or agreements in cases
where harsh clauses came together with inequality of bargaining power
at the outset and resulted in overreaching by a superior contracting
party using an advantage of power or knowledge or both. 38 Standard
form contracts do not neccessarily fall into this category of extremely
All the illustrations concern standardized terms. See also Dugan, Systematic Ap-
proach, supra note 1, at 81.
336 KAUFMAN, CoRBIN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 568-70.
3:1 Id.
I3 See Bracher, supra note 1, at 339; Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411
(1889), quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep.
82, 100 (Ch. 1750) (a bargain is unconscionable if it is "such as no man in his senses
and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other.")
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unbalanced, outrageous contracts. As a routine control, standard-
form contract control must intervene at a lower level, though out-
rageous situations may appear occasionally. The question is whether
the traditional understanding of unconscionability should be broad-
ened or whether a new category of unfairness control should be
created. It is mainly a question of terminology. Kaufman is right
that control of outrageous contracts and the doctrine of control of
standard form terms have similarities but require different rules. 3 9
This article perceives the theory of standard form contracts as a
distinct part of the unconscionability doctrine because the law has
developed the theoretical elements for the control of standard terms
mainly by reference to unconscionability. It seems easier to proceed
in the same terminology rather than to solicit acceptance for a new
terminology. In addition, perceiving the control of standard form
contracts as part of the unconscionability doctrine makes it possible
to keep the connection to U.C.C. § 2-302, which already addresses
invalid contract clauses. This perception of the control, however,
makes it paramount to distinguish the control of standard form
contracts from the traditional concepts of invalidating extremely one-
sided contracts procured through the use of improper means.4o
The traditional concept of unconscionability can be described as
gross inequality in the bargaining position of the parties together with
harsh and grossly one-sided contract terms. The concept applies to
all contracts, not only to standard form contracts. Finding uncons-
cionability in the traditional sense affects the whole contract which
in toto is considered improper, even though U.C.C. § 2-302 authorizes
the judge to invalidate single parts of the contract for reasons of
unconscionability. In exceptional cases, it may be possible to re-
balance the agreement through the deletion or modification of some
terms. Basically, the first step toward developing a specific doctrine
of standard form contract law out of U.C.C. § 2-302 and the similar
Section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is to distinguish
between provisions which apply to all contracts and those which
especially concern standard form contracts. Invalidating or modifying
single terms of a contract primarily concerns standard form contracts,
339 KAUFMAN, CoRBiN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 568-70. One very clearly de-
manding special rules for standardized contracts is Dugan, supra note 1, at 1307 n.2,
1322, 1325, and 1331.
340 Leff sees a difference between "the pathology of bargaining and the pathology
of non-bargaining." He tries, however, to reduce the U.C.C. to the latter, as a rule
for mass transactions only. Leff, Unconscionability, supra note 1, at 537.
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while overall unconscionability normally calls for invalidating or mod-
ifying the entire contract.
The factual circumstances of contract formation play a decisive
role in reviewing the agreement under the concept of traditional overall
unconscionability. Consideration of the formative circumstances makes
the adjudication process complicated and time consuming, causing a
certain unavoidable unpredictability of the result. As a result of this
unpredictability the concept of overall unconscionability should not
be a readily-used device. Epstein reminds us that the roots of the
theory of unconscionability require an unbalanced agreement reaching
a level comparable to fraud or duress.3 4' The use of a standard form
does not justify setting in motion such a costly and time consuming
analysis. Unconscionability, according to traditional understanding,
is a concept that must overcome the presumption of adequacy in the
contractual exchange secured by the bargaining process. It must show
that the bargaining process did not work and resulted in an unac-
ceptably one-sided contract. Overall unconscionability is an extreme
tool for extreme cases; it should be used reluctantly because its very
character prevents it from being a predictable and economic tool. It
is basically an equitable remedy 42 and has the somewhat wobbly
contours which are a consequence of exercising equity.
The cooperation of drafters is needed to reach the overwhelming
number of standardized contracts which are formed every day. Thus,
unlike the extreme tool of overall unconscionability, the test for
unconscionability of standard form terms must be a routine test, easy
to administer and predictable in the outcome. Only an accessible
doctrine can provide an adequate answer to the widespread use of
standard form terms and the skills of the drafters. Such a routine
test gives drafters the carrot of assurance that form terms will be
enforced and the stick of deterrence that over drafted terms will be
brought into court and invalidated in a fast and efficient procedure.
Control of standard form terms in such a manner should encourage
fair drafting.
The simplest and most effective test to trigger a special analysis is
to determine whether standard form terms are involved. Rakoff and
Kaufman favor this test.3 43 The mere fact that standard form terms
341 Epstein, supra note 47.
342 Cf. Bracher, supra note 1, at 339; see also supra note 269.
'4 Rakoff, supra note 1, at 1177-79 and 1248-49; KAUFMAN, CoBIuN SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 1, at 565; Dugan, supra note 1, at 1316-19 (equally requiring only a
standardized contract without further factual findings concerning formation process);
Dugan, Systematic Approach, supra note 1, at 85.
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are used leads to the application of special rules, which is also the
German test.3" To define standard form terms for the purpose of
activating the special test, one may use Rakoff's seven points of
identification or one could as well use something similar to the German
provision: prepared terms which are intended to be used in several
contractual agreements. 345 Whether the party drafted the form or uses
one drafted for him, and whether the standard terms are used industry-
wide or used only by the supplying party, is not important. Under
this analysis, who makes the contract provisions and who applies
them does not change their character. Assuming the initial test has
triggered the application of special rules, it is necessary to separate
terms which have been subject to negotiation even though they appear
as part of the standard form. If this step is not taken the test would
be overinclusive. It is unquestionably possible to distinguish between
bargained-for and non-bargained for contract terms and to accord
each different treatment.3 " As to the negotiated terms, traditional
contract law rules apply. The same is true for terms which basically
characterize the agreement, independent of their appearance. By en-
tering into an agreement, the adherent party minimally made an
active choice of a certain overall type of transaction to engage in.
To the remaining terms, specific rules for standard form contracts
apply.
The traditional contract inquiry of whether the non-drafting party
read some or all of the contract terms or otherwise had actual
knowledge of them should be eschewed. Such a procedure would
create a lot of fact questions to trigger the specific rules. Furthermore,
standard form contracts differ from the traditional process of contract
formation not only because the terms are normally not read but also
because they are usually offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The
simple fact that somebody reads a contract term does not make the
agreement match with the traditional understanding of contract for-
mation. Only when the take-it-or-leave-it basis of acceptance is not
present does the contract fit the category of bargained-for agreements.
In order to maintain orderly contractual relations in some sectors
of society, courts should next consider exempting certain types of
See supra notes 72 and 75 and accompanying text.
34, See supra note 253 for Rakoff's definition. For the German version see supra
note 75; see also Dugan, supra note 262, with a similar definition.
346 KAuFMAN, CORBN SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 575-76; see also Dugan, Systematic
Approach, supra note 1, at 85.
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standardized contracts from application of the specific rules. Collec-
tive bargaining agreements in the sector of labor law, for example,
should probably follow different rules because there is a specific
bagaining process involved. Additionally, the incorporation of bus-
inesses should deserve separate treatment, since the incorporation
procedure is usually not a matter of drafting by one side prepared
for mass adherent consumers.
Once a standard form contract is found and is not exempted, the
next step is to ask if the standardized terms become a part of the
agreement. American law considered this question especially in con-
nection with parcel and parking tickets which contained contractual
clauses like limitations of liability. 47 Under the Restatement rule, it
is sufficient that, by signing or otherwise, assent to standard form
terms is manifested and that similar writings can be expected in
agreements of the same type.3 48 Actual knowledge of the content of
the standard terms is not necessary. For merchants, the manifestation
of assent without knowledge of the content of the terms may be
sufficient, as businessmen can be expected to know what terms may
be in such an agreement. For consumer transactions, however, there
should be a notice requirement of the content of the terms given in
a manner so that the non-drafting party has the possibility of obtaining
actual knowledge.3 49 Since the notice requirement makes transactional
terms more transparent, it assures the consumer that he can read the
terms if he so desires. Making terms known is the first step in making
them subject to discussion, criticism, and control. Notice should be
given in the manner that is practicable for both sides. In most
instances, it is possible to hand over an exemplar of the included
terms when the contract is concluded. Where this is not possible,
however, a notice with the text of the terms must be given at some
point.
An example of one industry which in most instances does not
disclose contract terms at the point of contract completion is the
insurance industry. It does not, however, seem necessary to exempt
the insurance business from the requirement of handing over the
terms at the time of contracting. In most cases it is possible to hand
47 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 141, at 296-98 (for the incorporation of standard
terms into the contract); see also Dugan, supra note 1, at 1319-23.
348 RESTATEFENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 211.1 (1981).
49 This notice requirement rejects any consideration of readability and comprehension.
See supra note 134.
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out the text of policy provisions at the time of application for the
insurance contract. Even where life insurance policies are sold from
vending machines, the provisions can be posted at the machine. It
should not, however, be a prerequisite for incorporating the printed
policy terms into an insurance contract that the provisions had been
handed over prior to the contract completion. This is true since the
insurance business is based on standardization of risks to make the
appropriate premium calculable and to make possible a fair risk-
distribution between insureds. There is thus the need to apply uniform
conditions in order to treat different insureds equally. 50 It would
lead to unequal treatment if failure to give notice of the policy terms
made them inapplicable.
Upon notice of the standard terms (the terms are handed over or
the non-drafting party may otherwise have reasonable opportunity
to read them), and acceptance by the non-drafting party occurs (the
non-drafting party accepted by signing or by otherwise manifesting
assent to them), the formed contract includes the standard form
terms.
The next step involves the issue of control of the terms incorporated
into the agreement. Regarding control, American legal doctrine has
pursued two lines: (1) holding the assent to unfair or unexpected
terms defective, and (2) exercising direct substantive control of unfair
terms, under various headings like substantive unfairness, uncons-
cionability per se, or violation of public policy. 351 Before using either
line of reasoning, the potentially objectionable terms have to be
isolated and evaluated. Terms are not objectionable simply because
they are part of a standard form. They become objectionable only
where they are unfavorable to the non-drafting party in a form and
to an extent which the law cannot accept. Courts therefore should
isolate the unfavorable terms so they may be properly analyzed. In
order to do so, the standard terms must be compared with something
serving as a gauge; it is no defense that the non-drafting party incurs
obligations, since obligations are one characteristic of a contract. One
could call the backdrop against which any standard form term is
measured the reasonable allocation of risk. The problem with labeling
in this manner is that reasonableness invokes a notion that any
deviation in risk is unreasonable and therefore objectionable. This,
310 Compare the German law that does basically the same, see supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
3' See supra Part III(B)(2) and text at notes 288-293.
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however, is not necessarily the case as there must be a certain leeway
to allocate the legal burdens. The reasonable allocation of risks is
usually nothing more than what the law would imply if the parties
had not agreed on the specific point. The standard to which form
terms are compared should be what the law would normally gap-fill
as terms, absent an agreement of the parties. Thus, the court in
adjudicating the objectionable nature of a standard form term as-
certains if the term deviates from what the law would imply as a
usual, appropriate risk allocation; or to use Rakoff's term, the court
asks if the standard form term deviates from the background rule
of law.352 Such a procedure may sometimes cause the court first to
create or state the implied law, as Ellsworth Dobbs v. Johnson
illustrates. Once this risk allocation step is done in a sufficient number
of cases, the drafter will have a predictable indication of where he
must restrain himself to have his standard form terms validated.
The law thereby supplies a general rule of general acceptability of
standard terms for the average case. Even if there is a deviation, the
standard form clause is not yet voided. There may be acceptable
reasons to put greater burdens on the non-drafting party than the
law would normally imply. Moreover, to invalidate terms it is nec-
essary to find the deviation unfair, unexpected or otherwise objec-
tionable. At this juncture, the two lines of reasoning (defective assent
and direct substantive control) must be considered. The category of
defective consent has been adequately sub-categorized into physical
and substantive inconspicuousness. American law in this regard has
developed clear and applicable categories.
Physical inconspicuousness concerns the method of presentation,
such as: extremely fine print; print in colors; letter types which are
not readable; undetectable organization of the terms in the document;
terms hidden in places where they do not belong and cannot be
expected; terms hidden under wrong headings; or a few clauses in
an overwhelming amount of insignificant printed text which buries
important provisions. These examples are merely illustrative and not
complete.
Substantive inconspicuousness concerns the way a term is formu-
lated. Even if the term can physically be found, it may be drafted
in legal terms or obscure language, may use exotic or foreign terms,
or use extremely complicated grammatical construction. An objec-
352 See supra notes 259 and 260.
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tionable term procured in a procedurally or substantively inconspic-
uous manner should be held invalid.
The next step concerns direct control of unfairness, emphasizing
the improper substance of a clause rather than the defective assent
to it. Arguably, the concept of defective assent may be outcome-
determinative so that the additional category of substantive unfairness
is unnecessary. Standard terms would not necessarily be restricted to
the issue of inconspicuousness. The assent to terms which are in their
substance unfair could be deemed invalid because the terms are
objectively unexpected. Llewellyn's blanket assent notion concerns
terms which could reasonably be expected. Regarding unexpected
terms, the drafter could not reasonably expect general blanket assent
to standard terms as including them.
Omitting direct control of unfairness is supported in Section 211.(3)
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Referring to the reasonable
expectations (or the reasonable belief) of the non-drafting party and
invalidating his assent, however, creates difficulties when a term was
made known to that party without having been subject to negotiation.
Such reasoning also creates difficulties when a term was stated clearly
and somewhat distinctly from others so that knowledge would have
been easily obtainable. In those situations, it is hard to speak any
longer of the adherent party's belief or expectation that such a term
would not be part of the transaction, no matter how unfair the term
is. This way of reasoning may dangerously lead the courts into the
escape device of overstretched construction or into an overall un-
conscionability reasoning that creates fact questions and lowers the
necessary level of unfairness for this exceptional remedy. In the
alternative, an equally undesirable consequence would be to not val-
idate unfair terms if they are simply made known. Omitting an
unfairness-control step would mean that the law does not adequately
respond to the problem of contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.
For these reasons, it seems preferable as a final step to exercise
an open and direct unfairness control regarding the substance of
standard terms. That does not mean, however, that the unfair content
of a term has nothing to do with the assent of the non-drafting party.
To invalidate unfair terms means that the non-drafting party is not
held to the general, expressed assent because the law will not lend
its power to enforce such unfair terms. Using an unfairness control
in the final step is not a question of exclusiveness but one of emphasis.
The issue is where the thrust of the defectiveness is located. When
the substance of terms is not agreed upon, emphasis should be placed
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on the unfairness of the terms and not on the improper presentation
to procure the appearance of assent to it. To center the reasoning
around the defectiveness of the assent when the concern is the sub-
stantive unfairness of terms sounds too much as if the form itself
and not the particular unfairness is the anathema. If one accepts
standard form contracts as inevitable and potentially useful even if
properly drafted, basic substantive fairness is ignored. As the final
step, an open substantive control is thus preferable. It has the further
advantage of inducing courts to state clearly their opinions on par-
ticular clauses, thereby giving standard-form drafters clear guidelines
of what will and will not work.
If one still favors a concept of substantively defective assent instead
of substantive control consider the German experience. The trouble
German law has with the relation between direct substantive control
in AGBG § 9 and invalid assent because of the unusual character
of a standard term (AGBG § 3) should be a warning. As both
provisions are part of the AGBG, the German law now must find
a way to make them both useful with each having a separate sig-
nificance. Perhaps efforts to analyze the relation between the two
provisions will lead to new insights about the basic structure of a
law of standard form contracts. Right now, however, it seems a
rather useless complication to have to deal with both lines of rea-
soning. As long as American law is not forced to confront the same
burden, it does better to concentrate on direct substantive control
and to give up using an additional line of reasoning involving sub-
stantive defectiveness of assent.
For direct substantive control it does not suffice to say simply that
terms which are unfair are not enforced against the non-drafting
party. Factors used in applying the fairness standard must be de-
veloped. One factor mentioned in American law is eviscerating the
main purpose of the transaction through standard form terms. This
important type of unfairness has been recognized by German law as
well. It applies where standard form terms give the party supplying
the terms the right to deprive the other party of the subject matter
of the contract, of the qualities or possible uses of the subject matter,
or of certain incidental circumstances or possibilities which are ma-
terial for the type of transaction. A standard term depriving the
adhering party of the subject matter of the contract can be seen in
a repossession clause as used in Williams v. Walker-Thomas or in
exemptions or exclusions in an insurance contract which eliminate
the most likely way of realization of the insured risk. The quality
of the subject matter may be found in warranty disclaimers or lim-
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itations like those in Henningsen. An example of incidental char-
acteristics could be a far-reaching due-upon-failure-to-pay-clause in
an installment sale contract.
The category of unfair terms which eviscerate the core of the
transaction is an important one. It cannot, however, stand alone.
This category determines the unfairness of a term in relation to the
transaction as a whole. A term may, however, in and of itself be so
unfair that is is unconscionable per se. This category of isolated or
individual unfairness is more vague and harder to systematizise in a
predictable way. Addressing this problem will require carefully rea-
soned court decisions in order to properly shape and guide the law
in this area. Generally, a term is invalid for reasons of unfairness
when it deviates to the disadvantage of the non-drafting party from
what the law would otherwise imply, without a valid reason for
deviation in the nature or the particular circumstances of the trans-
action. How much of a burden for the non-drafting party the term
contains, how far it deviates from the otherwise applicable law, and
how strong are the reasons for the deviation are important factors
to determine unfairness. Another factor may be whether the term
covertly intrudes upon an area normally regulated by the law in the
public interest. "Evidentiary conditions" purporting to be a part of
the description of the risk in an insurance policy but which in fact
impose conditions on how the insured risk must be proven313 are an
example.
Clauses may be invalidated for reasons of public policy in the spirit
of unconscionability per se. A provision may be deemed absolutely
invalid, whether particularly agreed upon or contained in a standard
form. Apart from that, when standard form terms in particular are
invalidated the public policy aspect is implied in the unfairness control.
Inherently, unfairness control has an aspect of public policy. It is 'a
matter of public concern that standard terms are, for example, used
in a proper way so that the business device "contract" can be trusted
and relied on. Thus, a court could use public policy as one of the
standards for determining fairness.
Eventually, a list of invalid clauses will develop case-by-case and
types of invalid clauses will be discernable. Some clauses, it can
already be said, are invalid because of their isolated unfairness or
violation of public policy: warrants of attorney in a repair contract
"I See generally Holmes, supra note 1.
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(and in consumer sales contracts as well), for example, are always
unfair. The warrant of attorney is such a sharp weapon that it should
not appear in standard terms. Choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clauses
in standard terms are dubious, too, at least when used in a consumer
contract. They alter the entire background situation for the agreement
and can result in substantial difficulties to enforce contractual rights
at all. Standard form integration clauses or acknowledgments of notice
of certain circumstances are other examples of unfair standard terms.
Such terms take away important rights to secure the proper per-
formance of the contract, rights meant to be exercised consciously
and not limited to a formality. Other examples are unreasonably high
liquidated damages or limitations on a debtor's right to redeem
collateral .1 4
The singular unfairness of standard terms is a concept that will
always have to tolerate a certain amount of unpredictability because
every clause invokes somewhat different considerations and standard
form terms concern a broad scope of different issues. Because of
that inbuilt unpredictability, it is important to limit the unpredicta-
bility by separating this kind of substantive control from other con-
cepts of substantive unfairness and from the concept of defective
assent. A proper distinction makes sure that one must deal only with
the inherent vagueness and not with an additional one that derives
from the mixing of different categories.
If the control of unfairness with its categories of per se unfair
clauses and terms that eviscerate the main purpose of the transaction
is exercised, there is no more need to misuse the contra proferentem
rule for covert substantive control. As a true rule of construction,
however, it is not objectionable and can survive. Its significance,
though, will most probably be limited to truly ambiguous language.
Furthermore, contra proferentem must be applied as a last resort
where a meaning of a standard term cannot be determined. If the
New York rule of contra proferentem is used,355 it would actively
influence the substance of standard form contracts in favor of the
non-drafting party. Such use, however, would interfere with the overt,
direct substantive control of the terms.
If the contra proferentem rule is used as a supplement to direct
substantive control, one must ask whether the rule should take into
consideration specific oral agreements and circumstances of contract
114 See Braucher, supra note 1, at 343.
"I See supra note 169.
1987]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
formation or be used in a strictly objective manner considering only
the standardized wording of the contract. What is suggested here is
a conceptual distinction between those parts of a contractual agree-
ment which are specifically agreed upon and its standardized parts.
When the construction of standardized language is concerned, how-
ever, the specific circumstances should be taken into account. The
agreement is still one comprehensive contract. Different rules for
different parts should be applied only when it is necessary. Concerning
construction of standard terms such a piecemeal approach could lead
to difficulties rather than help the analysis.
Even if the contra proferentem rule were restricted to the stan-
dardized wording of terms, specific oral agreements could not be
ignored. It would be necessary to develop a doctrine of how the
ambiguous standard terms as construed against the drafter and the
conflicting oral agreements relate. One can avoid this complication
by evaluating specific agreements and circumstances in the first place.
Doing so, however, could lead to conflicting construction of terms
when used in different contracts. If construction against the drafter
is limited to cases of true ambiguity, the possible conflicting con-
struction should not be too much of a problem because the number
of cases invoking the contra proferentem rule would shrink remark-
ably. It is important to realize, however, that consideration of specific
circumstances of the contracting process does not mean that an
ambiguity is created if an oral agreement and a standard form term
conflict. In this case, the oral agreement expresses the parties' agree-
ment and prevails. There is no room for the parol evidence rule
where standard form terms are concerned.
In contrast to the contra proferentem rule, the doctrine of rea-
sonable expectations (the'DRE) has no right and no purpose to exist
once a comprehensive doctrine of substantive control of standard
form terms has developed. 5 6 Where the DRE does nothing more than
resolve ambiguities in favor of the non-drafting party,357 the contra
31 That does not mean that Slawson, New Meaning, supra note 1, at 23, 29, could
not describe the new meaning of contract appropriately as what the parties reasonably
expected. This may be the description of the overall theory; for the application and
shaping, however, more detailed standards and rules are necessary.
317 In applying the DRE, most courts require an ambiguity in contract language and
then test it to determine whether a construction favoring the insured is reasonable.
Regarding insurance contracts, an insured's reasonable expectations thus turn on whether
the policy language is so ambiguous that the average insured could reasonably expect
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proferentem rule can take care of these cases. Where the DRE changes
the content of clauses, defective assent and the doctrine of substantive
control (notably in invalidating terms eviscerating the main purpose
of the contract) should govern the field. There is, therefore, no further
justification for a doctrine of reasonable expectations.
A few accessorial questions remain. One is whether different rules
should apply for business and consumer contracts. As far as the
contra proferentem rule and questions of inconspicuousness are con-
cerned, there is no reason for treating merchants differently from
consumers. Both concepts concern primarily formal aspects of de-
fectiveness. The non-drafting party is left in darkness as far as the
possibility of understanding, determining, and evaluating the content
of the standard form terms is concerned. Since darkness is darkness,
it makes no difference whether the party is a merchant or not. The
only provision is that more, different, or fewer options of how the
wording can be understood may be considered for merchants because
commercial customs or usages presumably influence the understanding
of a contract term. The positon of the adhering party as a merchant
may thus influence how the contra proferentern rule is applied.
As to substantive control, it may make a difference in a merchant-
to-merchant transaction. The background rules may already differ-
entiate between commercial and consumer transactions because com-
mercial transactions have special needs. Business needs as well as
special needs may justify deviations from the implied rules of law.
Therefore, substantive control should take judicial notice if it is a
commercial or a consumer transaction. Commercial transactions, how-
ever, are not generally excluded from substantive control or always
subjected to different standards of control. Judicial recognition of a
difference in the evaluation of standard terms in a commercial trans-
action must be decided in relation to the particular term whose validity
must be adjudicated.
Another consideration in evaluating a term's substantive fairness
is to take a more concerted, sophisticated application of the reason-
able-allocation-of-risk test (suggested earlier in determining a term's
first-instance objectionability). The inquiry now can be as narrow or
broad-based as the court deems necessary and proper. The court
coverage other than what is given by the insurance policy. See generally supra note
176. For the minority of jurisdictions that do not require ambiguity as a prerequisite
to using the DRE, see supra note 183 and cases citied therein.
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could draw upon one or more of the theories or models from the
spectrum described in the introduction to this article. A court, for
example, might adopt some economic inquiry into efficiency of the
term;358 or draw upon notions from noncontract law such a tort or
equity;359 or undertake an empirical investigation;3 60 or consider the
relational (if applicable) needs of the parties as Ian Macneil would;16 1
or apply general societal notions of fairness like altruism;3 62 and so
on. Here, much would depend on a court's jurisprudence in under-
taking the step of direct substantive control of contract terms in the
first instance.
The determination of unfairness as well as defective assent may
involve fact issues. In principle, though, the control of standard form
terms should be considered a question of law to be decided by the
judge, just like the question of unconscionability in U.C.C. § 2-302.
Control of standard terms is a question of law necessary for practical
reasons as well. A uniform and predictable law to serve as guidance
for standard-form drafters can be achieved only when the questions
of control are appealable.
Finally, if the assent to a standard term is found defective or a
term found unfair, the remedy should regularly be invalidation of
the term, but only the term with application of an implied (substituted)
rule of law. If necessary, this implied rule must be developed in the
same decision. The consequence of invalidating a standard term should
not be that the entire contract is invalided. Standard form terms
concern mostly secondary questions of contract performance. In some
instances, however, the characteristic parts of a transaction may
formally appear as standardized, as in insurance policies. Regarding
what kind of policy is chosen and what subject matter is insured
there is nevertheless an individualized decision so that in regard to
those characteristic factors one cannot speak of standard terms. Con-
sidering the secondary standard provisions, it can normally be assumed
that the parties wanted to go through with the transaction even if
isolated terms are invalid and have to be replaced. It should be the
extreme exception that the contract is deemed invalid in toto. Total
invalidation may occasionally be necessary where the assent to all
358 See supra notes 4 and 5.
39 See supra note 13.
31 See supra note 14.
361 See supra note 15.
362 See supra note 16.
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standard terms is invalid, e.g., for reasons of lack of notice with no
possibility to determine sufficiently what the remainder of the agree-
ment should be.
V. SuMMARY OF THEORY AND CONCLUSION
Any summary of a complex theory can be a bit misleading and
thus must be used with caution and with purposive interpretation
and application. The purposes, reasons, and underlying assumptions
of this new theory for adjudicating standard form contract terms
have been detailed in this article. With those matters in mind, a
summary of this new theory consists of the following ten progressive
steps.
1. Courts must recognize that control of standard terms is a part
of the unconscionability doctrine and that the doctrine must be par-
ticularized in rules and considerations applicable only to standard
form contracts. Overall unconscionability of the entire contract is
irrelevant as the proper inquiry focuses on invalidating or modifying
particular, isolated contract terms under a special, routine and ef-
ficient test.
2. To trigger the special test, a court must first ascertain if standard
form terms are involved. This threshold inquiry might adopt the
formal German approach (prepared terms to be used in several con-
tract transactions) or Rakoff's seven points of identification.
3. The court should next consider whether, given the nature of the
contract or transaction, that contract or transaction should be ex-
empted from the special test. For example, labor collective bargaining
agreements and incorporation of businesses should be exempted.
4. If the special test is activated and the contract not exempted,
the negotiated terms (even if standard) and terms characterizing the
transaction are deemed prima facie valid but subject to traditional
contract law. The remaining standard terms are then subject to the
following special rules.
5. The court next ascertains if the standard terms are part of the
contract form. For merchants, all the terms are presumed part of
the contract. For non-merchants, the same presumption is entertained
but only if notice of the standard terms was provided to the non-
merchant. Whether the terms were actually read or comprehended
or whether the consumer had actual knowledge is irrelevant. If the
consumer is given adequate means, by notice or otherwise, to read
the standard terms and accepts them by signing or other manifestation
of assent, the contract is presumed to include the standard terms.
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This presumption (for merchants and consumers) may be rebutted
under the following rules.
6. The standard terms are next isolated and evaluated by using a
reasonable-allocation-of-risk approach to determine if they are ob-
jectionable in any respect. A term is acceptable as a reasonable risk
allocation as long as it is a term the law would imply if the term
were not present, or (to use Rakoff) if the term does not deviate
from the background rule of law. If, however, the standard term
deviates from what the law would normally imply as an appropriate
risk allocation, the term is presumably objectionable. The implied
law (background rule) serves as the gauge of the general acceptability
of standard terms.
7. For a deviating term that is presumably objectionable to remain
part of the contract, it must pass the tests of imputed (blanket) assent
and substantive fairness, that is, tests of defective assent and direct
substantive control.
8. To determine if the non-drafting party's assent is held imputed
or alternatively defective, the court inquires into the procedural and
substantive conspicuousness of the standard term. An objectionable
term procured in a procedurally or substantively inconspicuous man-
ner is held invalid as a matter of law.
9. If assent is held imputed and not defective, then the term is
directly probed for substantive fairness. Although omitting this step
of direct substantive control has some support, the problems and
dangers (as discussed) caused by its omission strongly underwrite its
inclusion. Factors or considerations to be used in applying substantive
control are to be developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
Several factors have nonetheless been identified. One factor is the
core purpose test: Does the standard term eviscerate the main or core
purpose of the transaction? Another factor is to isolate the term
apart from the overall contract and to test the singular term for
fairness under the notion of unconscionability per se. In that inquiry,
a subsidiary factor is the public interest. If the term violates public
policy then it is unconscionable per se and invalid.
Another consideration is a more sophisticated application of the
reasonable-allocation-of-risk approach of step 6. In that step the term
was found objectionable because it was not a term the law would
normally imply. Now the inquiry proceeds further, drawing upon
theories or models in the spectrum suggested in the introduction such
as: an economic efficiency inquiry; relational versus discrete consid-
erations; empirical (social science) evaluation; compliance with the
fairness standard of the altruistic; and the like. The choice to accept
[Vol. 17:323
ADJUDICATING STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
or reject any of these theories or models of fairness is for the courts.
In general there is no reason merchants and consumers should be
treated differently. But in a merchant-to-merchant transaction there
may be a business or customary justification for using a different
standard of fairness.
A final factor is to be applied as the last resort, limited use of
contra proferentern when the term is truly ambiguous. The doctrine
of reasonable expectations (the DRE) should be overruled (where
applicable) or at least not used.
10. If a standard term is held invalid due to defective assent or
substantive unfairness, the remainder of the contract terms should
be enforced except in the rare case where the assent to all terms is
defective or there is overall unconscionability.
Current American law of standard form contracts demonstrates a
tortuous and tortured legal jujitsu of sundry attempts to find a
doctrine and a structure. These disparate attempts identified in this
article are somewhat useful and usable. What is attempted here is
to put these sometimes palliative efforts in a unified and workable
theory. Perhaps American law may prospectively proceed in a com-
pletely different direction. Nonetheless, some rethinking about the
effectiveness of how courts adjudicate standard form contracts with
the concomitant effect on the drafting process seems inevitable. To
awaken courts from the intellectual catatonia of rubberstamping clas-
sical contract rules of another century to the modern reality of
standardized contracts is imperative. Understanding how American
legal scholarship over the years has progressed closer to ideas rem-
iniscent of German law indicates an inherent need for an effective,
efficient, just, and predictable control of standard form terms.
The time is ripe for us to candidly cut the legal cord tied to the
doctrinaire nineteenth-century contract law which was carved in stone
without knowledge of the standard form contract of today. If we
do, we can start afresh with a renewed spirit to fashion a fair,
predictable, and economical theory for adjudicating the terms of the
mass, standardized contract.
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